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1.1	 Overview
Migration is clearly a major issue across Africa. Indeed, migration – both within 
countries and across borders – can be seen as an integral part of labour mar-
kets and livelihoods across much of the continent for at least the last century. 
Over time, and in different places, migration has taken a number of different 
forms. It has cut across class and skill boundaries, and exists in widely differ-
ent geographical and demographic contexts. Migration represents an important 
livelihood strategy for poor households seeking to diversify their sources of 
income, but is also characteristic of the better off, and indeed of many African 
elites. 
In practice, however, the link between migration and poverty is often viewed 
more negatively. It is assumed across much of the continent that it is poverty 
that forces poor people to migrate, rather than migration being a potential 
route out of poverty. The poor are also generally seen as those worst affected by 
conflict-induced migration, itself a prominent feature in Africa. The movement 
of skilled and/or wealthy Africans is also generally viewed negatively (e.g. there 
is long-standing concern on the African continent with the impact of the ‘brain 
drain’ of African professionals). Only slowly, and in relatively few quarters, is 
understanding emerging of the potentially positive role that migration itself can 
play in reducing poverty, or of the possibilities for ‘mobilisation’ of the African 
diaspora in the fight against poverty. Meanwhile, public policy remains a long 
way from building effectively on such understanding.
The aim of this study is to synthesise existing research on migration in 
Africa, and its relationship to development policy. The report focuses on the 
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relationship between migration, poverty and pro-poor development policy. Pro-
poor policy is taken here to mean policies that are context-specific, listen and 
react to poor people’s voices, and/or seek to assist poor people to become less 
vulnerable and build up their income and assets. Government health and edu-
cation policies might not be considered intrinsically pro-poor, but become so 
where they are targeted at widening access to health and education services, 
and especially basic health and education services (e.g. primary care, vacci-
nation campaigns, primary schooling), or at responding to the specific needs 
of the poor. Pro-poor policies might also seek to identify and support poor 
people’s livelihoods, through the promotion of social protection mechanisms 
(ranging from pensions, health insurance, maternity benefit and unemploy-
ment benefits to food aid and other social assistance) or enhancement and 
enforcement of poor people’s rights. In turn, our focus is not only on the poli-
cies of developing country governments, but also on those of non-government 
and intergovernmental organisations, and of donor nations. In terms of migra-
tion, the study covers both international and internal migration. 
In the sections that follow, issues are dealt with first in relation to sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole, and then in detail for three regions – West Africa, 
East Africa and Southern Africa. The sections on Africa as a whole, and on 
West and East Africa were completed by researchers at the Sussex Centre for 
Migration Research at the University of Sussex, whilst the section on Southern 
Africa was written by researchers at the Southern African Migration Project.
1.	General	Findings
• Migration can be seen as an integral part of labour markets and liveli-
hoods across much of the African continent for at least the last century. 
Over time, and in different places, it has taken a number of different 
forms. It has included internal, regional and international movements. It 
has cut across class and skill boundaries, and exists in widely different 
demographic contexts. Migration represents an important livelihood strat-
egy for poor households seeking to diversify their sources of income, but 
is also characteristic of the better off, and indeed of many African elites.
• There are estimated to be between 20 and 50 million migrants in Africa, 
although statistical data on migration flows are incomplete and often 
outdated, and there are significant undocumented flows. The most impor-
tant countries of immigration are Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa, whilst 
Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Liberia, Sierra 
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Leone, Mali, Gambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa are all significant 
countries of emigration.
• Internal migration involves men, women and children, and includes 
rural-rural, urban-rural and urban-urban flows as well as rural-urban 
movements. Links between rural and urban areas developed by migration 
are significant in promoting remittances, encouraging community level 
initiatives for the construction of public facilities and infrastructure, and 
linking rural producers to urban markets. 
• Although evidence is patchy, patterns of internal migration appear to have 
been affected by economic crisis and structural adjustment, with some 
arguing that a long trend of urbanisation across the continent has been 
stopped or even reversed, sometimes with negative effects on rural liveli-
hoods. 
• Migration to Europe and the United States is predominantly of educated 
individuals, giving rise to considerable concern over the issue of ‘brain 
drain’. However, once again data is incomplete, and some claims may 
be exaggerated. International migrants also appear to remit significant 
amounts of money to Africa, through both formal and informal channels.
• Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed significant flows of forced migrants, 
including internally displaced people and victims of trafficking. However, 
peace processes in a number of African countries suggest attention needs 
to be turned urgently towards facilitating sustainable return.
 • Occupational diversification in rural areas is often inextricably linked to 
mobility, whilst migration has been a key factor in shaping settlement 
patterns and livelihoods. One recent study by IIED found that a stagger-
ing 50-80 per cent of rural households had at least one migrant member, 
across all wealth categories, and with increasing involvement of women 
as independent migrants. However, the study also found that remittances 
had declined over a 15-year period, largely as a result of employment 
insecurity in destination areas, even though at the same time rural house-
holds had become more dependent on these remittances.
• Eleven countries are signatories to the Migrant Workers’ Convention – 
more than in any other world region. The ILO has designed and launched 
an ‘African Labour Migration Policy Initiative’ which seeks to enhance the 
knowledge base on labour migration and build capacity of labour minis-
tries and others to deal with labour migration.
• In relation to the brain drain, there is particular concern about the impacts 
on health of migration of doctors and nurses. The impact of migration 
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on health outcomes for poor people is felt not only through migration of 
health personnel to northern countries, but also through regional migra-
tion flows (e.g. to South Africa, Namibia and elsewhere), rural-urban 
migration within countries, and through ‘migration’ from the public to the 
private sector. However, policy in this sector needs to recognise the need 
of health professionals to gain skills and career enhancement through 
short-term mobility.
• Despite emerging interest in migration in sub-Saharan Africa, there 
remain significant knowledge gaps:
• International remittances appear to be much smaller in Africa than 
in any other world region, representing just 10 per cent of external 
finance in 2001, compared to 63 per cent in South Asia, and 56 
per cent in the Middle East and North Africa. However, this is partly 
because almost two thirds of sub-Saharan African countries simply 
do not report any data on remittances, suggesting that investment in 
monitoring systems would be of some value. 
• Data on the mobility of professionals in Africa remains poor, and might 
be best collected through cooperation with institutions in destination 
rather than sending countries. The complex relationships between 
international migration, training and labour market change also remain 
relatively underexplored.
• There is scope for the development of more effective regional policies 
on forced migration, which pay attention to the problems of long-term 
protracted refugee crises, the related economic, security and protection 
issues and the lack of solutions for many populations. The link to liveli-
hoods is important here too, with a relative dearth of knowledge about 
effective livelihood strategies that are open to displaced populations.
• In thinking about policy on migration in sub-Saharan Africa, it is impor-
tant to consider both migration policies per se, e.g. immigration control, 
facilitation of temporary and regional mobility, policies on refugees and 
trafficking, and also sectoral policies where migration is a relevant issue. 
The development of health and education strategies can be made more 
effective by taking into account the likely consequences of internal and 
international migration on resource allocation decisions, whilst policies 
to support poor people’s livelihoods need to recognise the significance of 
migration as a livelihood strategy.
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1.	Data	Issues
There are conflicting accounts of the volume of migration in contemporary 
Africa, reflecting the paucity of data sources and their often poor quality. 
According to the African Union, of the 190 million international migrants in the 
world, one third are estimated to be Africans.1 In contrast, the ILO estimates 
that 20 million African men and women are migrant workers2, IOM figures 
suggest that out of 175 million migrants worldwide, just 16.2 million are in 
Africa.3 Zlotnik highlights only Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa as key countries 
of immigration on the continent.4 Elsewhere, the size of foreign populations 
is either very small, or, in the absence of statistical systems to monitor flows, 
numbers are largely unknown. These figures do not include the large amount of 
undocumented cross-border migration within Africa, nor the extent of migration 
within countries.5 
Table 1: Migrants as a proportion of the population
Region % migrants
Caribbean 2.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.8
Latin America 1.7
Asia 1.4
Source: UN
One area in which Africa has long been prominent is in the production of 
refugees, where it accounts for a third or more of global totals. However, the 
numbers have been in steady decline since a peak of 6.8 million in 1995. The 
number has since fallen to 4.6 million at the start of 2003, largely as a result 
of significant repatriation to Rwanda from 1996. The main refugee-producing 
countries in Africa are now Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, Eritrea, Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, although significant repatriations have occurred to all of 
these, with the exception of Sudan.6 There is also growing awareness of the 
extent of internal displacement in Africa, with an estimated 13 million IDPs 
dwarfing the number of refugees, and representing over half of the global total 
of IDPs.7 These include an estimated 3 million in Sudan and 1.2 million in 
Uganda. Although there were some repatriations in 2003, new IDPs were cre-
ated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Sudan, Liberia, and 
in the Central African Republic.
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There is substantial and growing migration from key African countries to 
Europe and North America.8 Data presented in Appendix 1 shows that from 
Africa as a whole, over 110,000 people left each year to go to Europe or the 
US between 1995-2001, with the number rising from 93,000 in 1995 to 
nearly 140,000 in 2001. Countries with higher than average annual rates 
of migration proportional to their population size were Somalia and Eritrea in 
East Africa; Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Gambia 
and Guinea-Bissau in West Africa; and South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, the 
Seychelles and Comoros in Southern Africa. 
Table 2: African-born residents in the US, 2000
Country of birth Number
Nigeria 134,940
Ethiopia 69,531
Ghana 65,572
South Africa 63,558
Sierra Leone 20,831
Source: US Census, 2000, cited at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Usfocus/print.
cfm?ID=147
In terms of absolute numbers, the key countries of long-distance emigration 
were Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Somalia, Ethiopia and Senegal. Of these, 
migration from South Africa, Somalia and Senegal is orientated primarily to 
Europe, Ethiopian emigration is orientated primarily to the US, and Nigerian 
and Ghanaian emigration is split evenly between the two. 
There is rather less available data on flows of migrants within African 
countries, though evidence from micro-level studies suggests that this form 
of mobility is very substantial across most African countries. Relevant data 
may be available from censuses, although recent censuses in some countries 
such as Nigeria, Tanzania and Malawi do not include information on internal 
migration. Thirteen African countries have not held a census within the last 
ten years; many others have held them so recently that preliminary results are 
not yet available (Appendix 2). 
Special surveys that include figures on internal migration are available in 
some countries. Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) in Ghana, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire provide fairly reliable measures of 
household livelihoods as well as basic migration data.9 
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It is not possible on the basis of currently available data to generalise much 
about the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of internal and 
inter-regional migration within Africa, apart from noting that it involves men, 
women and children.10 There is some evidence from countries such as Nigeria, 
Mali and Tanzania that the number of young female migrants has increased.11 
Predominant flows appear to be from rural to urban areas, although rural-
rural migration is also significant in many countries, with areas of significant 
cash-crop production often recruiting large numbers of farm labourers from 
neighbouring regions. Only eight African countries have more than half of their 
population in towns.12 
There is increasing evidence of links between migration and HIV/AIDS, 
although this tends to focus more on high HIV prevalence amongst migrants, 
rather than investigation of how the contraction of HIV/AIDS affects migration 
patterns and the value of migration as a livelihood strategy. Meanwhile, pat-
terns of internal migration appear to have been affected by economic crisis 
and structural adjustment, with some arguing that a long trend of urbanisation 
across the continent has been stopped or even reversed.13 However, much of 
the evidence for both urbanisation and counter-urbanisation remains anecdo-
tal.
In contrast, slightly more confidence can be given to observations that 
African migration to Europe and North America is dominated by flows of 
more educated and, by implication, less poor individuals (see Table 3). This 
evidence is provided by the US Census and the SOPEMI reporting system of 
migration statistics for OECD countries. Based on 1990 census figures, it has 
been calculated that 95,000 out of 128,000 African migrants in the US at 
that time had a tertiary education, whilst migration of those with primary edu-
cation or below was ‘virtually zero’.14 
Nonetheless, in most African countries, it appears that only a relatively small 
proportion of tertiary-educated individuals (and few others) had migrated to 
the US. The figure was over 5 per cent for Mozambique, Mauritius, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, over 10 per cent for Kenya, Uganda and Ghana, around 25 per 
cent for Sierra Leone and a massive 60 per cent for Gambia.15 When migra-
tion to other OECD countries is added, it was estimated that over a quarter of 
Ghanaians with tertiary education had left Ghana, whilst the figure for South 
Africa was around 8 per cent. 
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Table 3: Educational attainment of African-born population in US, 2000
Country of birth Proportion with 4 years 
schooling or less
Proportion with over 4 
years tertiary education
Nigeria 7% 47%
Tanzania 4% 46%
Cameroon 6% 45%
Uganda 3% 45%
South Africa 8% 44%
Zimbabwe 6% 39%
Kenya 10% 36%
Sudan 15% 28%
Africa, ns/nec 8% 28%
Ghana 7% 26%
Senegal 9% 25%
Liberia 8% 25%
Ethiopia 8% 23%
Sierra Leone 9% 23%
Eritrea 10% 18%
Somalia 24% 9%
Africa total1 8% 33%
Source: calculated from 5% sample of US census
Notes: 1. Figure for all residents born in Africa
 
1.	 Migration	Policy
Across sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the position of governments towards 
migration generally remains either neutral or hostile. In a review by UNDESA, 
seven countries – Kenya, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Botswana, Namibia, Djibouti, 
and Gambia – were reported as indicating in 2000 that levels of immigration 
were too high, whilst a further eleven reported that they had in place policies 
to reduce immigration.16 Meanwhile, four – Gabon, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and 
Guinea-Bissau – reported that emigration was too high, and that their policy 
was to reduce emigration. In its most recent review of the status of poverty 
in Africa, the African Development Bank refers to rural-urban migration as a 
source of urban poverty. A recent position paper of the ILO on Working out 
of Poverty fails to mention migration as a relevant component of poverty or 
poverty reduction. In the UNDESA survey, only one country – Cape Verde 
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– considered that its level of emigration was too low, and even then, there was 
no explicit government policy to promote it. 
One area in which concern is expressed about migration is the question of 
‘brain drain’ of African professionals. This is said to hit the sectors of health, 
education and technological development particularly severely.17 As African 
professionals leave the continent, an estimated US$4 billion is spent each 
year, mostly through overseas aid programmes, on hiring some 100,000 
skilled expatriates to replace them.18 
Box 1: Migration in the PRSPs
A	review	of	PRSPs	across	Africa	shows	considerable	ambivalence	about	
migration.	It	is	often	simply	not	recognised	as	an	issue,	or	not	addressed.	
So,	for	example,	in	a	total	of	seven	sub-Saharan	African	PRSPs,	migration	
is	not	mentioned	at	all,	whilst	 in	a	further	ten	other	countries,	 it	 is	men-
tioned,	but	the	anti-poverty	strategies	outlined	in	the	document	fail	to	
then	refer	to	it	as	an	issue.	In	Burundi,	the	DRC	and	Sierra	Leone,	forced	
migration	is	considered,	but	other	forms	of	migration	are	not.
Overwhelmingly,	where	economic	migration	is	mentioned,	it	is	seen	as	
negative.	For	example,	migration	is	seen	as	contributing	to	population	
growth	(Gambia),	placing	pressure	on	urban	areas	(Gambia,	Guinea,	
Mauritania),	breaking	down	traditional	family	structures	(Kenya,	Malawi),	
promoting	 the	 spread	 of	 crime	 (Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 Malawi,	 Sierra	 Leone)	
and	diseases	such	as	HIV/AIDS	(Burkina	Faso,	Niger,	Sierra	Leone),	stimu-
lating	 land	degradation	(Ethiopia)	and	 reinforcing	 rural	poverty	 (Côte	
d’Ivoire,	Gambia,	Malawi,	Niger,	Sierra	Leone).	Only	Cape	Verde	and	
Senegal	mention	emigration	as	a	positive	factor,	with	the	Cape	Verde	
PRSP	noting	 that	 restrictive	measures	 in	host	countries	have	cut	 remit-
tances,	whilst	the	Niger	and	Rwanda	PRSPs	note	that	internal	migration	
can	boost	household	incomes	of	the	poor.
Where	policy	responses	to	migration	are	mentioned,	these	are	primarily	
geared	to	reducing	or	preventing	migration,	mainly	through	promoting	
rural	development.	However,	some	exceptions	exist.	For	example,	both	
Cape	Verde	and	Senegal	propose	a	strategy	to	promote	remittances	
and	engage	emigrants	in	national	development,	whilst	Mauritania	sug-
gests	creating	viable	 jobs	 in	urban	areas	rather	than	trying	to	prevent	
rural-urban	migration.
Source: Review of PRSPs, March 2004. See Appendix 3.
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A number of policy responses have been put forward to address the ‘brain 
drain’. At one level, intergovernmental initiatives, including through the African 
Union, have sought to improve the quality of tertiary education in Africa, and 
the circulation of students and professionals within Africa, to remove the 
necessity for Africans to go abroad for university training.19 The African Virtual 
University, established by the World Bank in 1997, also operates in 17 African 
countries and has so far educated more than 24,000 students. 
Where training does take place abroad, there are various mechanisms that 
might be put in place to encourage individuals to return. One positive exam-
ple is provided by analysis of return amongst participants in AIDS Training 
and Research Programs funded by the Fogarty International Center, National 
Institutes of Health in the US, where nearly 80 per cent of African trainees 
returned, whether on masters, doctoral or post-doctoral training. The strategies 
used in this case included the building of health infrastructure in the trainee’s 
home country, provision of re-entry research support and the use of short-stay 
visas and repayment agreements to discourage non-return.20 
Another response at continent-wide level has been the development of links 
with Africans abroad, either to encourage them to return, or to utilise their 
skills, knowledge or financial capital in the promotion of African develop-
ment. Online databases, which provide an opportunity for Africans abroad to 
advertise their skills, or for African companies or government bodies to adver-
tise vacancies, have been advocated or established by organisations such as 
‘Africa’s Brain Gain’ (ABG)21, Africa Recruit22 and the Economic Commission for 
Africa.23 There are also initiatives focused on specific sectors such as health24 
and law25, as well as databases of diaspora members maintained by particular 
countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, Benin, and Burkina Faso. 
The International Organisation for Migration has also established a 
‘Migration for Development in Africa’ (MIDA) programme, which aims to build 
partnerships between host countries and countries of origin of migrants, and 
encourage the return of African professionals on temporary assignments.26 
In addition, some countries, such as Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda and Ethiopia, 
have organised meetings and conferences for members of the diaspora, whilst 
the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa 
(CSSDCA) of the African Union organised the first ‘AU-Western Hemisphere 
Diaspora Forum’ in Washington DC in December 2002.27
At a continent-wide level, the African Union has established a ‘strategic 
framework for a policy on migration’, and a specific programme on migration 
within its Social Affairs Directorate. The programme’s goals include address-
ing the causes of internal and international migration and the ‘challenges 
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posed by migration’, but it also seeks cooperation between countries to ‘make 
effective use of the opportunity presented by the phenomenon’, and seeks to 
assist AU member states to work towards the free movement of people.28 At 
the moment, this programme appears to exist on paper only; in contrast, the 
strategic framework was pushed forward at an experts meeting in Addis Ababa 
in March 2004. 
Concern with the effects of migration has also filtered through into poli-
cymaking in specific sectors. The New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD) has not yet developed an overall policy or initiative on migration, but 
its strategy for the health sector does include proposed measures to mitigate 
the loss of health sector personnel, including the promotion of guidelines on 
ethical recruitment practices, and measures to improve conditions of service 
and work environments.29 Attention also certainly needs to be paid to the fac-
tors creating shortages of doctors and nurses in recruiting countries, although 
this is clearly much more difficult for NEPAD or the AU to influence.
It is worth noting here that the impact of migration on health outcomes for 
poor people is felt not only through migration of health personnel to northern 
countries, but also through regional migration flows (e.g. to South Africa, 
Namibia and elsewhere), rural-urban migration within countries, and through 
‘migration’ from the public to the private sector.30 In this context, measures to 
promote improved telecommunications or the supply of drugs to rural clinics 
may have an impact in reducing movement of health personnel out of clinics 
serving the poorest, but expansion of training in the health sector in general 
– both in Africa and in the ‘north’ – also clearly needs to be part of the solu-
tion.
The migration of health personnel in Africa has also received the attention of 
the World Health Organisation, which conducted a study of over 2,000 health 
professionals across Ghana, Uganda, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Senegal in 2002.31 This study found that availability of training, standard of 
living and working conditions were all significant factors encouraging health 
personnel to emigrate, and that their loss is having a significant impact in 
terms of increasing workload. This decreases motivation and quality of service 
provided by those who remain, who are often less skilled and unqualified to 
carry out specialised tasks. 
There is also concern in some quarters that rich nations should pay some 
sort of compensation for medical personnel recruited out of Africa, given the 
structure of African health sector training in which the bulk of this training 
is publicly funded and provided. However, the Joint Learning Initiative on 
Human Resources for Health (HRH), funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, 
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has stressed that whilst health systems are suffering attrition from international 
migration and internal displacement, they also face significant challenges 
from deteriorating conditions of employment, reduced effectiveness of delivery 
systems, an increase in disease burdens and a lack of financing for the sector 
from African governments. 
A recent study of the movement of doctors and nurses from Ghana, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa to the UK critiques emerging WHO policy in this 
area.32 It stresses that data are poor and might be better collected in destina-
tion countries. It also suggests that migration of medical personnel from Africa 
to the UK at least may be declining, whilst movement of nurses has recently 
increased dramatically.
In contrast to this attention to the brain drain, there appears to be rather 
less interest amongst African governments in migration as a livelihood strategy, 
or in the welfare of migrants, despite the fact that these relate more clearly 
to the poor and to pro-poor policy. Rather, traditional countries of immigration 
such as South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon have become more intolerant of 
migrant workers. Regional blocks such as ECOWAS and SADC have generally 
failed to prioritise freedom of movement. Where attention has been paid to 
HIV/AIDS, this has tended to stigmatise migrants as potentially spreading the 
epidemic.33 There has also been little attention to date to policies on currency 
exchange or the improvement and extension of banking systems in a way that 
would facilitate the flow of remittances.
In the field of forced migration in particular, there has been a tightening of 
policies towards refugees in a number of countries, reflecting growing global 
antipathy towards forced migrants.34 States have cited the economic burdens 
involved, declining support from international donors, and the potential secu-
rity threats (e.g. camps being used as rebel bases, local insecurity and cross-
border attacks). In addition to some cases of expulsion of refugees, a major 
consequence appears to have been the increased use of camps with severe 
restrictions on movement, even though these have often failed to guarantee 
security and limit refugees’ ability to contribute to their own livelihoods and 
the local economy. 
Nonetheless, 11 African countries are signatories to the Migrant Workers 
Convention – more than in most other world regions.35 The ILO has designed 
and launched an ‘African Labour Migration Policy Initiative’ which seeks to 
enhance the knowledge base on labour migration and build capacity of labour 
ministries and others to deal with labour migration.36 IOM has conducted some 
preliminary work to identify and promote networking between initiatives to 
combat HIV/AIDS amongst migrant and mobile populations.37 Some sectoral 
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organisations have also promoted mobility: e.g. the Association of African 
Universities has called on African governments to bring in legislation to pro-
mote the mobility of academic staff and students. 
Many African governments and international organisations pay most 
attention to the movement of skilled professionals to the US and Europe, and 
measures that might be taken to limit this flow, or encourage their return 
or engagement with development initiatives in their home countries. This is 
reflected in the regional and country sections that follow. However, although 
such linkages may be relevant to pro-poor policy, it is important to bear in 
mind that they may not; e.g. the private capital transfers of such migrants 
may not filter down to sectors of the economy where the poor are found, whilst 
the return of professionals may have little impact on services targeted at the 
poor.
In contrast, it is important not to ignore large-scale migration by the poor in 
search of livelihood, even if this has, to date, received less attention from gov-
ernments and policymakers. A review of Africa-wide issues based on field stud-
ies in Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania notes that occupational diversification in rural 
areas is often inextricably linked to mobility, whilst ‘migration has been a key 
factor in shaping Africa’s settlement patterns and households’ livelihoods’.39 
This study found that a staggering 50-80 per cent of rural households had at 
least one migrant member, across all wealth categories, and with increasing 
involvement of women as independent migrants (see Box 2). 
Box 2: Migration and Poverty: trends in the 1990s
In	work	by	IIED,	strong	linkages	maintained	between	(rural)	source	and	
(urban)	destination	areas	for	migrants	in	Africa	were	found	to:
•	promote	significant	flows	of	remittances,
•	encourage	community	 level	 initiatives	 for	 the	construction	of	public	
facilities	and	infrastructure,
•	help	link	rural	producers	to	urban	markets.		
However,	 the	 study	 also	 found	 that	 remittances	 had	 declined	 over	
a	 1-year	period,	 largely	as	a	 result	 of	 employment	 insecurity	 in	des-
tination	 areas,	 even	 though	 at	 the	 same	 time	 rural	 households	 had	
become	more	dependent	on	these	remittances.		In	turn,	public	policy	
had	 failed	 to	 recognise	 the	 spatial	 and	 occupational	 complexity	 of	
rural	and	urban	livelihoods.
Source: Tacoli (2002); see endnote 11.
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The potential for remittances to contribute to national development priori-
ties, including the reduction of poverty, is clearly a priority for policymakers 
across the continent. However, it is worth noting – in contrast to comments 
globally that remittances constitute a ‘stable source of external development 
finance’ – that remittances in Africa appear highly volatile, at least in terms of 
official IMF figures.40 The standard deviation from annual average remittance 
figures between 1980-99 was over 50 per cent in the cases of Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Niger and Togo, and over 100 per cent in Botswana, Lesotho and 
Nigeria. In Burkina Faso, official remittances dropped from $187 million in 
1988 to just $67 million in 1999, a decrease of two thirds, which coincided 
with a sharp drop in GDP growth rates.41 
If official figures are to be believed, international remittances are much 
smaller in Africa than in any other world region, representing just 10 per cent 
of external finance in 2001, compared to 63 per cent in South Asia, and 56 
per cent in the Middle East and North Africa.42 In part, this is because almost 
two thirds of sub-Saharan African countries simply do not report any data on 
remittances, suggesting that investment in monitoring systems would be of 
some value.43
There is also scope for the development of more coordinated regional poli-
cies on forced migration, given the prominence of forced migration across the 
continent. Although most African countries are signatories to the 1969 OAU 
Convention44, and many in practice recognise refugees en masse, or devolve 
responsibility to UNHCR for the processing of refugee claims, there have been 
calls for a change of approach from some quarters (e.g. the mixed assistance 
and protection mandate of UNHCR has been called into question).45 Attention 
also needs to be paid to the problems of long-term protracted refugee crises, 
the related economic, security and protection issues and the lack of solutions 
up to now. The link to livelihoods is important here too, since a livelihoods 
approach to forced migrants may be just as valid as to poor people in general.
The sections below explore these issues in more depth in relation to three 
major regions of sub-Saharan Africa, and specifically in relation to Nigeria, 
Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia in West Africa; Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Rwanda in East Africa; and South Africa. Each section considers the impact of 
migration on the poor, and policy responses that have sought to curtail, man-
age or mobilise the opportunities presented by migration. Key policy themes 
across each of these regions and countries include a clear concern with the 
loss of skilled professionals and with the trafficking of women and children, but 
examples are also reported where migration has had potentially positive out-
comes for the poor, and how these positive outcomes might be maximised. 
.1	Overview
• West Africa has a long history of population mobility, both regionally and 
internationally. Linked with factors as diverse as long-distance trade; 
the search for pasture; urbanisation and the growth of administrative 
centres; the demands of mining, industrial production and plantation 
agriculture; armed conflict; land degradation; drought and rural poverty, 
migration has played a major part in shaping settlement patterns. It is 
estimated that one third of West Africans live outside their village of birth. 
Contemporary West African migrants are found in significant numbers 
around the world.
• Most West African countries were net losers of population from 1995-
2000. In particular, countries such as Ghana and Nigeria have undergone 
a ‘reverse migration transition’, moving from being net immigration to net 
emigration countries. 
• Monetary transfers made by migrants in the region are substantial, and 
have come to constitute a major source of income for many households 
in the context of economic decline, retrenchment of public services and 
adverse environmental conditions. Migrants also represent an important 
source of energy, ideas and improved agricultural management tech-
niques in many rural areas.
• Both internal and international flows in West Africa appear to have 
diversified in recent years, with more regions and countries producing 
migrants, and these migrants moving to a range of new destinations. 
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Movement to Europe and North America is higher than in other parts of 
the continent, and is dominated by young men and women.
• There is emerging concern, but also controversy, over the level of traffick-
ing in the region, including of children. There is also continuing concern 
about forced migration both regionally and internally, although conflict 
resolution efforts in Sierra Leone and Liberia have already produced some 
substantial return movements.
• A sizeable amount of West African migration is orientated to the UK, 
with significant groups from Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone, as well as 
other countries in the region. These groups are also often organised into 
hometown, ethnic, alumni and other organisations, making this a fertile 
area for engagement with diaspora groups. Such engagement could seek 
to learn from the experience of these groups, and facilitate their invest-
ment in pro-poor policy initiatives and the promotion of conflict resolution 
and good governance across the region.
• There is technically freedom of movement within the ECOWAS zone, but 
migrant workers’ rights are not always respected. The Dakar Declaration, 
a regional process initiated by IOM in 2000 and signed by most West 
African countries, serves as a plan of action to promote the protection of 
migrants and to strengthen their role in development. Attention could also 
be paid to promoting an ECOWAS initiative to introduce regional pass-
ports, although regional action to address conflict and mass displacement 
may be a more urgent priority.
• Unlike much of sub-Saharan Africa, PRSPs in some West African coun-
tries do acknowledge the importance of migration for poor people’s liveli-
hoods – notably those in Cape Verde, Mali and Niger. 
• West African governments have recently sought to prioritise either the 
return of their diasporas, and/or the promotion of financial investments in 
the country by those living abroad. However, there may also be scope to 
facilitate the trading and business networks that some diaspora commu-
nities have developed abroad in a way that is of benefit to West African 
economies. One study of West Africans in New York shows how they have 
successfully marketed authentic ‘African’ products to the large African 
American community of the city. This suggests that there may be some 
scope for increased trade flows that could benefit the region.
• Trafficking in West Africa is seen by many agencies as ‘pervasive and 
growing’, leading to both child labour and sexual exploitation of women. 
However, problems with definitions of trafficking, and especially ‘traffick-
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ers’ are highlighted by a recent study of the causes, context and con-
sequences of youth migration from central Mali. The types of hardship 
experienced by migrant children may be similar whether or not they cross 
international borders. The use of an intermediary may also be obligatory 
for any child wishing to migrate, yet it is often impossible to determine 
whether these intermediaries have an intention to exploit. Often NGO and 
government initiatives to return trafficked children to their villages have 
been met with unhappiness from children, incredulity from parents, and 
teasing and humiliation from the children’s peer group.
• A number of knowledge gaps remain in relation to migration within and 
from West Africa:
• Some countries, such as Ghana, have relatively good population and 
migration statistics, but the same is not true for countries such as 
Sierra Leone and Liberia that are emerging from periods of armed 
conflict, and in which social research capacity has been severely weak-
ened.
• In Nigeria, there is also a major dearth of data on migration, reflecting 
the poor quality of social and demographic statistics more generally. 
However, with a new census planned for this year, there is a prospect 
of improved data becoming available, and resources could be allocated 
to ensure it is properly analysed.
• A particularly poorly understood area is that of the migration of chil-
dren, whose movement is often denied or characterised as forced, 
but which in reality may be somewhat more complex. Attention could 
usefully be focused on seeking to understand these flows, as well as 
prioritising the reduction of harm and exploitation rather than the pre-
vention of all child migration.
• Regional policy initiatives are starting to appear in West Africa that hold 
out the prospect of more effective policies on migration. The Sahel and 
West Africa Club of the OECD has recently published a study on West 
Africa in the context of globalisation, which includes attention to migra-
tion. It also organised a conference in 2003 on the Mano River Union 
region and Côte d’Ivoire, which explored the relationship between migra-
tion, displacement and conflict. 
• Discussions on regional integration are also advancing, and this presents 
an opportunity to raise the issue of regional mobility, both of skilled pro-
fessionals and unskilled workers. However, fears about migration, includ-
ing within countries, are real and need to be addressed. For example, 
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policies to promote improved tenure rights for poor people over land, 
forests and mineral resources remain divisive, at least in part since they 
can exacerbate tensions between migrants and ‘indigenous’ populations 
of particular areas.
.	Region-Wide	Issues
West Africa has a long history of population mobility, both internally and exter-
nally. Côte d’Ivoire is one of the top ten countries of destination for migrants 
worldwide according to figures collated by the IOM, with some 3 million 
immigrants making up a quarter of its population. Migrants have also histori-
cally moved to Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and the Gambia. Major countries of 
emigration are Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. According to De Haan46, around 
one third of West Africans live outside their district or village of birth, whilst 
42 per cent of the total number of international migrants residing in Africa are 
located in West Africa.47 Historically, labourers have moved to work in planta-
tion agriculture, the mining industry, centres of oil and industrial production, 
and administrative centres. Trade, war and harsh physical environments have 
also led to highly mobile livelihoods across the region.48 
Over a thirty-year period from 1960-90, it has been estimated that inter-
national migration alone involved 7.2 million people, excluding Nigeria, rep-
resenting around 11 per cent of the median population of the region in that 
period.49 More recent UNDESA figures suggest that most West African coun-
tries were net losers of population from 1995-2000, with the exception of Côte 
d’Ivoire, Gambia, Liberia and Togo (Table 4). 
In the latter two countries, net immigration from 1995-2000 reflects return 
of nationals during this period, whilst the high migrant stocks shown in Table 4 
for Burkina Faso, Liberia and Togo probably represent nationals of those coun-
tries who were born abroad and subsequently moved ‘back’ to their country of 
nationality, rather than immigration of nationals of other countries.
Despite long-established patterns of migration in the region, it is worth not-
ing that there has been considerable volatility in West African migration pat-
terns over recent years:
• First, expulsions of migrants from Ghana in 1969, Nigeria in 1983 and 
1985, and violence against foreigners living in Côte d’Ivoire in the after-
math of the 2000 elections has led to significant return movements of 
West African migrants from neighbouring states, with some fundamental 
impacts on migration and settlement patterns. 
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Table 4: Selected development and migration indicators for West African 
countries
Country Population 
(millions) 
2000
GDP per 
capita 
(US$ PPP) 
20001
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
20002
Migrant 
stock 
(%) 
20003
Average annual 
net migration 
rate (per 1000) 
1995-2000
Benin 6.3 990 0.420 1.6 -3.2
Burkina Faso 11.5 976 0.325 9.7 -5.5
Cape Verde 0.4 4,863 0.715 2.4 -2.5
Côte d’Ivoire 16.0 1,630 0.428 14.6 0.8
Gambia 1.3 1,649 0.405 14.2 9.1
Ghana 19.3 1,964 0.548 3.2 -1.2
Guinea 8.2 1,982 0.414 9.1 -6.2
Guinea-Bissau 1.2 755 0.349 1.6 -2.9
Liberia 2.9 .. .. 5.5 36.5
Mali 11.4 797 0.386 0.4 -4.7
Mauritania 2.7 1,677 0.438 2.3 3.4
Niger 10.8 746 0.277 1.1 -0.1
Nigeria 113.9 896 0.462 0.7 -0.2
Senegal 9.4 1,510 0.431 3.0 -1.1
Sierra Leone 4.4 490 0.275 1.1 -7.8
Togo 4.5 1,442 0.493 4.0 6.1
Source: Figures compiled by Jørgen Carling from UNDP and UN Population Division. 
Notes: 1. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is an adjustment of the Gross Domestic Product to account for 
price differences across countries and allow comparison of real incomes.  
2. The Human Development Index is calculated on the basis of statistics on life expectancy at birth, adult 
literacy rate, gross educational enrolment ratio and GDP per capita (PPP, $US).  
3. Refers to the percentage of the population born outside the country, except figures for Guinea, Mali, 
Mauritania, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, which refer to percentage of the population with foreign citizenship.
• Second, conflicts notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone have made West 
Africa host to one of the continent’s larger refugee populations, although 
significant returns have now occurred both to these countries, and to 
some other countries affected by civil strife, including Togo, Mali and 
Guinea-Bissau. 
• Third, whilst urbanisation accelerated in the period 1960-80, it is 
thought to have slowed considerably since then, if Nigeria is excluded 
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from the analysis.50 Moreover, although urbanisation has occurred, rural 
population densities across the region have nonetheless continued to 
rise.
Movement to Europe and North America also appears to have been higher 
in West Africa than in other parts of the continent. Figures from the 2000 
US census show that West Africans made up more than half of those born 
in sub-Saharan Africa, with most entering the country since 1990. Data 
from EUROSTAT and other sources for the period 1985-93 suggests that 
415,000 West Africans already lived in Europe at that time, around a third 
(128,000) in France, followed by the UK (82,000), Germany (74,000) and 
Italy (63,000).51 
Migration routes to Europe have traditionally followed old colonial linkages, 
with the bulk of West Africans in France coming from Francophone countries, 
and those in the UK coming from Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone. 
However, diversification of flows was already evident in 1990 both to other 
European destinations (see Box 3), and from a wider range of West African 
countries of origin (e.g. Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea). EUROSTAT data sug-
gests around 60 per cent of West Africans in Europe are aged 20-39. They 
also show migration to Europe to have been on a distinct upward trajectory in 
the last decade, although the absence of flow data for some countries makes 
time series comparisons problematic. 
Box 3: Diversification in international flows from 
West Africa
In	the	last	year	for	which	official	data	on	new	arrivals	was	available	in	
all	 EU	countries,	 Italy	had	become	 the	most	 important	destination	 for	
West	 Africans	who	moved	 legally,	 with	 just	 under	 10,000	 entrants.	Of	
these,	roughly	one	third	came	from	Senegal,	and	a	further	0	per	cent	
each	from	Nigeria	and	Ghana.	The	next	 largest	European	destination	
was	Portugal,	with	just	over	,000	entrants,	the	vast	majority	from	Cape	
Verde	and	Guinea-Bissau,	 followed	by	 the	UK	and	France.	Germany,	
which	had	admitted	more	than	10,000	West	Africans	in	1,	with	two	
thirds	 coming	 from	 Nigeria	 and	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo	
alone,	fell	to	just	1,0	entrants	in	1,	though	rose	to	over	,000	in	001,	
whilst	France	also	saw	a	dramatic	decline	from	over	1,000	entrants	in	
1	to	just	under	,000	in	1.	In	contrast,	the	numbers	going	legally	to	
the	UK,	Spain	and	Portugal	rose	considerably	at	the	end	of	the	10s.
Source: Data from Eurostat
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Table 5: Senegalese migrants worldwide
Destination Registered Non-registered Total
Côte d’Ivoire 50,000 100,000 150,000
France 45,000 60,000 105,000
Gambia 100,000
Italy 60,000
Mauritania 12,000 45,000 57,000
Egypt 2,000 30,000 32,000
North America 3,200 15,000 18,200
Iberian peninsula Over 15,000
Gabon 15,000
Germany 1,500 5,000 Over 6,500
Total 113,700 255,000 Over 558,700
Source: Diatta and Mbow, 1999, see endnote 53.
Yet figures for legal migration clearly only tell a part of the story. Legal 
entry to the US from Africa has remained fairly level over the last decade, 
but substantial communities of West Africans have built up, including people 
entering and overstaying on tourist or student visas who are not counted by 
official immigration statistics. It has been estimated that there are as many 
as 35,000 to 40,000 Senegalese in the New York area alone, many of whom 
are believed to have entered or remained in the US illegally.52 Data on the 
Senegalese diaspora have been compiled by Diatta and Mbow, showing over 
half a million Senegalese living outside Senegal, at least half of whom are not 
officially registered in their country of destination (Table 5).53
A number of key themes emerge in relation to migration in West Africa. 
These include:
• Substantial levels of mobility, internally, regionally and internationally, 
with long historical roots, and impacting significantly on the poor. This 
includes substantial rural-rural as well as rural-urban flows.
• A diversification of migration flows in recent years (see Box 3), with coun-
tries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and more recently Côte d’Ivoire undergoing 
a ‘reverse migration transition’, moving from being countries of immigra-
tion to countries of emigration.
• Emerging concern, but also controversy, over the level and nature of ‘traf-
ficking’ within the region (see Boxes 4 and 6).
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• A history of expulsions of migrant workers in some countries, and a con-
tinuing high degree of political sensitivity over migration (see Box 5).
• Attempts by governments in a number of countries to reach out to 
diaspora groups living in Europe and North America (see Box 7).
• Continuing concern about forced migration both regionally and internally, 
although conflict resolution efforts in e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mali 
have already produced substantial return movements.
In the following sections, these themes are merged both in relation to their 
impact on the poor, and in terms of long-distance international migration that 
tends to be the preserve of more educated, less-poor individuals. Trends in 
Francophone West Africa and the region as a whole are briefly reviewed, before 
sections that deal with Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone and Liberia in more 
detail.
Box 4: Alternative views on trafficking
Problems	with	 definitions	 of	 trafficking,	 and	 especially	 ‘traffickers’	 are	
highlighted	by	a	recent	study	of	the	causes,	context	and	consequences	
of	 youth	migration	 from	central	Mali.	 This	 study	 suggests	 that	 types	of	
hardship	experienced	by	migrant	children	were	similar	whether	or	not	
they	had	crossed	international	borders,	or	could	be	considered	to	have	
been	 trafficked,	whilst	many	 revealed	positive	migration	experiences.	
It	 also	 shows	how	 in	a	 sample	of	 over	 100	Malian	children	working	 in	
Abidjan	and	the	cocoa,	coffee,	cotton,	yam	and	cashew	plantations	
of	Côte	d’Ivoire,	all	of	whom	had	been	identified	as	victims	of	traffick-
ing,	only	four	turned	out	to	have	actually	been	handled	by	a	trafficker.
The	study	highlights	how	the	focus	on	‘traffickers’	 is	problematic	in	the	
West	African	context,	where	use	of	an	intermediary	is	almost	obligatory	
for	any	child	wishing	to	migrate,	yet	 it	 is	often	impossible	to	determine	
whether	these	intermediaries	have	an	intention	to	exploit.		It	also	notes	
that	NGO	and	government	initiatives	to	return	trafficked	children	to	their	
villages	have	been	met	with	unhappiness	from	children,	incredulity	from	
parents,	and	teasing	and	humiliation	from	the	children’s	peer	group.
Source: Castle and Diarra (2003); see endnote 70.
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.	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Across West Africa, migration represents a significant livelihood strategy for 
poor people. As noted above, this is a factor that is recognised in Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in Cape Verde, Senegal and Niger, but it is 
certainly not restricted to these countries (e.g. until the recent civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire, around a quarter of Burkina Faso’s GDP came from remittances from 
that country).54 Evidence from a recent study of remittance behaviour by over 
800 immigrant household heads in Abidjan suggests that monetary transfers 
to family members both outside the country, and those living in other parts of 
Côte d’Ivoire, remained substantial even during the civil war, and mainly take 
the form of cash transfers to support basic household expenditure.55 
In Senegal, a country widely acknowledged to have benefited from migra-
tion, it is estimated that nearly $1 million is transferred to the Bank de 
l’Habitat du Senegal from Libreville every month56, whilst somewhere between 
30 and 80 per cent of household budgets in Senegal are said to be comprised 
of remittances.57 These are transfers that affect all social classes. Roy Stacy, 
Program Director of the Famine Early Working System (FEWS) Network, noted 
in evidence to a recent congressional caucus that deregulation, liberalisation 
of trade and freer movement of labour in West Africa as part of the Sahel 
Development Plan had led to a ‘spatial redistribution of people with approxi-
mately 8.0 million Sahelians dispersing into other parts of West Africa. Many 
of these migrants are now an important source of capital, ideas and improved 
agriculture management techniques which flow back into the Sahel as a result 
of the livelihoods diversification that has occurred with the labour mobility’.58 
In contrast, restriction of mobility has been seen as a cause of land degradation 
as it leads to conversion of grazing to cropland. 
Internal migration, between and within urban and rural areas, continues to 
account for most migratory movements in West Africa. But in some countries, 
such as Burkina Faso, international migration outweighs internal migration.59 
Many individuals as well as entire families move out of hostile areas charac-
terised by drought and low agricultural productivity in search of richer lands to 
farm or a remunerated job in town. Many of these movements are temporary or 
seasonal. They help the rural poor in supplementing farm earnings during the 
off-season, while keeping rights over their land.60 Destinations have become 
more diversified and migrant itineraries more complex partly due to changes in 
wage-labour employment opportunities. 
Rural to urban migration has contributed to the growth of cities, but a series 
of national surveys conducted simultaneously in eight West African countries 
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in the 1990s shows that urban growth rates have declined in the region com-
pared to the 1970s.61 These surveys also reveal the prominent role played by 
female migration in contemporary urbanisation processes. 
In turn, rural-rural flows, often (but not always) over shorter distances and 
for a few months rather than years, may often be the most important to the 
poor and in times of economic hardship. A study in the Sahel during the 
drought years of the mid-1980s found that as the drought took hold, long-dis-
tance migration actually declined, possibly because people could not afford the 
up-front investment involved in migration, but that temporary circulation over 
shorter distances increased considerably.62 Such ‘distress’ migration may be a 
key factor in keeping poor households from starvation. More generally there is 
a relative paucity of studies focusing on rural to rural seasonal flows, although 
some recent studies are noted in the section on Ghana below.
Whilst migration has a number of positive benefits, problematic aspects of 
migration are noted in the literature that may specifically impact the poorest. 
The FAO has argued that mobility of members of farming households is partly 
responsible for seasonal labour shortages and an ageing of on-farm popula-
tions, with a negative effect on agricultural productivity.63 In addition, traffick-
ing in West Africa (see Box 4) is seen by many agencies as ‘pervasive and 
growing’, falling into two main types: 
• trafficking of children mainly for domestic and agricultural work both 
across and within national borders; and 
• trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation, mainly to out-
side the region.64 
Although figures are often provided on the extent of these two phenomena, 
they are often unreliable. 
.	Migration	Policies	in	West	Africa
Within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) there is 
technically freedom of movement, and significant numbers of West African 
nationals are living in neighbouring countries. Yet such movement is not 
always officially recognised, or indeed tolerated. The history of expulsions of 
foreign workers is reflected in increasingly restrictive attitudes in key countries 
of immigration such as Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, as well as widespread har-
assment and denial of rights. One response has been proposals at a regional 
level to introduce ECOWAS passports, which would provide an opportunity 
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for holders to gain residence, employment and other rights in other ECOWAS 
countries, but such passports probably remain some way off.65 
There are several areas in which policies and initiatives have been devel-
oped. First, regional action to address conflict and mass displacement has 
included ECOMOG interventions in conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and 
regional efforts to bring a resolution to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, 
a number of more recent initiatives to end conflict and promote development 
across the area of the Mano River Region and in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire 
were discussed at a recent conference of the Sahel and West Africa Club of 
the OECD, recognising the extent to which national borders in the region cut 
across ethnic divisions and traditional migration routes.66
Second, there has been considerable regional attention to the issue of traf-
ficking. ECOWAS members adopted a Political Declaration and Action Plan 
against trafficking in human beings in the West African region in December 
2001, which called, amongst other things, for the creation of special anti-traf-
ficking police units and a regional task force to deal with the issue.67 
A review of national policies by UNICEF in 2002 has highlighted varied 
responses and perceptions, ranging from Mali, which was the first country in the 
region to adopt a ‘National Emergency Plan to Fight against Child Trafficking’, 
to Benin, which has so far taken no action, and Burkina Faso, where a plan 
is still under discussion and policy interest is low.68 Bilateral agreements on 
combating trafficking have been reached between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali and 
Burkina Faso, and between Benin and Nigeria and Togo.69 However, such poli-
cies, based on the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children can be questioned (see Box 4).70 
Third, across West Africa, there have been efforts by governments to reach 
out to diaspora communities in Europe and North America, largely with an eye 
to encouraging their return to, or investment in their country of origin. These 
are described in more detail in sections on individual countries below, but there 
are also some important initiatives from Francophone countries, including 
some that involve the private sector and/or civil society. 
The 2003 World Migration Report relates how three Paris-based banks have 
offered special transfer schemes to Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Senegal with much 
lower fees than money courier services. At the same time, the phenomenon 
of co-development or ‘coopération decentralisée’ in which development initia-
tives are funded by migrants through home town associations or local NGOs 
is widespread across the region. Such ‘translocal’ initiatives fund work on 
irrigation, drinking water, roads, health centres, schools, literacy programmes, 
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and measures to combat environmental degradation, and sometimes include 
mechanisms to lever public funds, such as town twinning arrangements 
between municipalities in Europe and towns or villages in Africa.71 
Policy initiatives have been developed in several areas, but various gaps 
remain at a regional level. First, although individual governments have sought 
to encourage return of their diasporas, there may also be scope to facilitate 
the trading and business networks that some diaspora communities have 
developed abroad (e.g. a study of West Africans in New York shows how they 
have successfully marketed authentic ‘African’ products to the large African 
American community of the city, in a way that suggests some scope for 
increased trade flows that could benefit the region).72
Second, there is in practice relatively little in the way of regional policy 
initiatives on migration and development. Some steps toward a more effective 
management of migration have been taken with the establishment of a regional 
consultative process. One of the outcomes of this process, which was initiated 
in 2000 by the IOM and the International Migration Policy Programme (IMP), 
is the Dakar Declaration signed by most West African countries and serving as 
a plan of action to promote the protection of migrants and to strengthen their 
role in development.73 
Whereas this kind of process has the advantage of fostering an open dialogue 
among governments on migration issues, it has been criticised for being too 
informal and non-binding. There are also some bilateral agreements between 
West African countries, which could be expanded (e.g. Senegal signed a pro-
tocol agreement with Gabon in 1987, which secured social security benefits 
for the children of Senegalese workers, whether or not they were living with 
these workers in Gabon).74 Such bilateral agreements across important migra-
tion ‘dyads’ (e.g. Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire, Togo-Ghana) could be valuable 
in promoting migrant workers’ rights and enhancing the potential benefits of 
intra-regional migration.
Third, whilst at a national level, it has been common for concern to be 
focused on limiting the ‘brain drain’ of nationals and (more recently) linking 
with migrant diasporas, there is considerable scope for enhanced cooperation 
across West Africa to create a more integrated labour market for professionals 
within the region, in order to provide clearer paths for career development and 
training at a regional level. 
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.	Nigeria
..1	Introduction
Nigeria has been a major international migration destination in the past, 
although this flow was affected by civil strife in the 1970s, and was dramati-
cally reversed with the expulsion of about a million Ghanaian and other foreign 
workers in 1983.75 Since that time, migration in Nigeria has been character-
ised by emigration, as well as substantial amounts of internal migration. As 
elsewhere in the region, this has involved considerable rural-urban migration, 
including both permanent and temporary moves for work, education and to 
escape drought conditions in the northern Sahel areas in the early 1970s and 
again in the early 1980s.76 A World Bank report in 1996 suggested that the 
pace of urbanisation is such that 60 per cent of the population will be urban 
by 2010.77 A recent report by an NGO, ‘Cities Alliance’, suggested that the 
population of Abuja triples every year, in the fastest process of urbanization in 
West Africa.78 In contrast, unlike many other countries of the region, there has 
been relatively little circular migration between rural areas, as Nigeria has a 
relatively underdeveloped plantation economy. 
Box 5: Migration as a ‘driver of change’
An	overview	of	migration	as	a	‘driver	of	change’	in	Nigeria	has	recently	
been	 completed	 for	 DFID	 Nigeria.	 	 The	 study’s	 draft	 report	 generally	
paints	a	negative	view	of	the	impact	of	migration	on	the	poor.	
Highlighting	 rural-urban	and	 forced	migration	as	 the	 key	 components	
of	current	 flows,	 the	 report	notes	overcrowding	 in	cities,	with	negative	
effects	on	public	health,	unemployment,	and	the	threat	of	violence,	as	
well	as	 rising	prices	of	staple	foods	as	 labour	shortages	appear	 in	 rural	
areas.		
Going	on	to	analyse	the	‘drivers	of	pro-poor	change’,	the	report	identi-
fies	demographic	growth	and	greater	pressure	on	 land,	 the	 increased	
‘manufacture’	 of	 ethnicity	 relating	 to	 land	 claims,	 deteriorating	 infra-
structure,	and	discrimination	against	pastoralists	as	all	stimulating	addi-
tional	migration	that	is	negative	in	its	consequences.		
The	paper	also	recognises	the	lack	of	both	statistics	and	recent	literature	
on	 internal	migration	 in	Nigeria,	which	 it	describes	as	‘tailing	off’	 in	the	
10s.
Source: Blench (2004); see endnote 92.
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Aside from rural-urban migration, internal migration in recent years has been 
increasingly characterised by forced displacement by conflicts over crude oil 
mining and refining, communal conflicts, and conflicts associated with the 
democratisation process. One recent study has suggested the number of forced 
migrants in Nigeria is currently as high as 1.2 million, although none are ‘of 
concern’ to UNHCR.79 
Nigerians are almost certainly the largest single national group amongst 
Africans living in Europe and North America, although as a proportion of 
Nigeria’s vast population this type of movement is rather less significant than 
in many of Nigeria’s neighbours.
..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
There are relatively few studies that consider directly the impact of migration 
on the poor in Nigeria. According to one study, rural-urban migration has led 
to rural depopulation and loss of agricultural production, as well as strains on 
urban areas.80 Another notes how economic crisis and structural adjustment 
has dramatically reduced urban incomes, leading to declining remittances 
and weakening social ties, but without the urban-rural return migration that 
has occurred in some other regions of Africa.81 The World Bank’s Poverty 
Assessment for the country suggests that rural poverty is declining, and urban 
poverty increasing, largely due to rural-urban migration. The report suggests 
that there is a need ‘to design growth policies which focus on (the urban poor), 
as well as measures to slow down the pace of migration’.82
However, other studies are more upbeat. A study by the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in the south-east of the 
country found that investment of remittances in assets such as housing, land 
or livestock has been linked to intention to return, and has helped to fuel a 
construction boom that has stimulated local economic growth.83 The migration 
of Fulani pastoralists to southwestern Nigeria is also said by one study to have 
produced positive economic results, e.g. stimulating the trade in cattle.84
One negative feature of migration in Nigeria appears to have been its impact 
on the status and/or well-being of women. A study of migration in Bendel state 
in the 1980s found that migrant women had not gained economically from 
movement to Benin City, but had suffered a loss of status within the household 
in comparison with non-migrant women.85 There is also growing concern over 
a more direct attack on women’s status and well-being in the form of traffick-
ing of women and young girls to Europe, the Middle East and other parts of 
Africa. 
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Nigerian women are believed to be sent into commercial sex work in various 
European countries as well as Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa, whilst children 
are sent into domestic labour within Nigeria and in neighbouring countries. 
One recent press article stated that ‘10,000 Nigerian prostitutes were said to 
be in over 300 brothels in Germany, Spain and other parts of Europe and South 
America’.86 Children from Togo, Benin, Ghana and Cameroon are also believed 
to be brought to Nigeria for forced labour.87
..	International	Migration	and	the	Brain	Drain	
Nearly 15,000 Nigerians migrated legally to Europe and North America every 
year from 1995-2001 (Appendix 1), whilst there are estimated to be some 
200,000 to 300,000 first- and second-generation Nigerians living in the US88, 
including perhaps as many as 21,000 Nigerian doctors.89 A recent study based 
on 2000 census figures showed that of 109,000 Nigerian-born immigrants 
in the US aged 25 or over, some 90,000 were tertiary educated.90 In Europe, 
it is estimated that there are some 45,000 Nigerians in the UK, 17,000 in 
Italy, and 15,000 in Germany, and although these migrants may be less well 
educated than those in the US, it remains likely that their level of education 
overall is high.91 There is also significant movement to the Middle East, associ-
ated with the movement of pilgrims to Mecca.92
The exodus of Nigerian academics and students is said both to reflect and 
to have reinforced a decline in standards of university education in Nigeria.93 
High grade requirements and a limited number of places in Nigerian universi-
ties are also seen as encouraging attendance at college overseas, especially in 
the US.94 As a result, there are now said to be more Nigerian academics in the 
US than in Nigeria, with many not assuming jobs in relevant fields but work-
ing instead as taxi drivers, factory workers, or in other unskilled or low-skilled 
occupations. However, it is not possible to estimate what proportion of edu-
cated Nigerians leave each year, as reliable figures on the number of university 
graduates are not available. Blench argues that the movement of Nigerians to 
the developed world is ‘highly diverse’, and ‘certainly not the outflow of skilled 
labour it is sometimes portrayed as’.95
The international migration of highly skilled and other Nigerians to devel-
oped countries is not entirely negative. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago has estimated that Nigerians in the US alone send $1.3 billion 
each year, or more than six times the annual flow of US aid to Nigeria. A small 
sample survey of just over 100 Nigerians in Chicago found average remittances 
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of $6,000 per year, with 60 per cent of this going to basic household needs, 
and remittances higher where households in Nigeria are poorer, other factors 
being held constant.96 Financial flows can also go in the opposite direction 
e.g. there appear to be substantial outflows of Nigerian oil wealth to Nigerians 
abroad.97
..	Migration	Policies
The Nigerian government has put considerable effort into contacting Nigerian 
professionals abroad. President Obasanjo has met with Nigerian professionals 
living abroad to encourage their return, and has set up an ‘Office of the Special 
Assistant to Mr. President on Diaspora Activities’.98 The Senate has abolished 
a measure which meant that Nigerians abroad who had become citizens of 
other countries lost their Nigerian citizenship.99 The Federal government has 
established a ‘Diaspora Trust Fund’, and has also discussed the establishment 
of a database of Nigerian professionals abroad.100 This government activity 
complements an already-existing abundance of civil society initiatives, includ-
ing numerous Nigerian hometowns and alumni associations, which represent 
professional interests as well as channelling remittances.101
The Nigerian government has put effort into enhanced law enforcement 
and better protection including a systematic repatriation network for trafficked 
children, although the United States Department of State argues that Nigeria 
still does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking.102 Several ministries sponsor information campaigns on children’s 
rights and child labour; the Nigerian Immigration Service has created a Human 
Trafficking Unit; a comprehensive anti-trafficking law was passed in March 
2003, whilst anti-trafficking police units were created in 11 states considered 
to be affected by trafficking. A Federal anti-trafficking unit is said to have been 
particularly active in Edo state, the primary source state for women trafficked 
to Italy.103
Despite these initiatives, there appears to be something of a lack of Nigerian 
government attention to migration. Measures to address rural-urban migration 
have been tried in the past, although apparently with little success in stem-
ming such population movements. A policy on the dispersal of industries has 
not substantially changed the location of these industries, whilst minimum 
wage policy and low prices paid to farmers if anything reinforce the tendency 
for people to leave rural areas.104 Internal displacement of Nigerians has been 
largely ignored by state and federal authorities.
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Measures to curb rural-urban and other internal migrations remain popular 
in some quarters within Nigeria. A recent statement by the Presidential Advisor 
on Agriculture noted that ‘Nigeria has the highest migration level in the world 
… with nearly 5 per cent per annum. It means that cities like Abuja, Lagos and 
Port Harcourt will become impossible to manage in the next 15 to 20 years’, 
leading in turn to increased crime and other social problems.105 Meanwhile, an 
opinion piece in the Abuja-based Daily Trust in 2002 called for sedentarisation 
of nomads, both to end clashes between nomads and pastoralists, and to allow 
better delivery of education and health services.
According to Blench, ‘a failure to analyse or structure migration is having 
significant negative social and economic consequences’ in Nigeria.106 What 
is needed is improved data collection, a rational policy framework, as well 
as attention to discriminatory policies that have fuelled violence and conflict-
induced migration. Certainly the absence of statistics or other robust data on 
either internal or international migration limits the ability of governments at 
federal, state or local level to take into account the impact of migration on 
pro-poor policy.
As noted above, there has also been little public policy orientated to meeting 
the needs of displaced Nigerians, with the bulk of assistance being provided 
by philanthropic individuals, families and social networks. In the Niger delta, 
oil companies have provided some relief assistance; but elsewhere, displaced 
people are often excluded from economic resources and opportunities as ‘non-
indigenes’ in their place of asylum.107
.	Ghana
..1	Overview
Like Nigeria, Ghana has a complex migration history, witnessing something 
of a migration ‘turnaround’ from being a country of immigration during the 
colonial era to being one of emigration in the 1970s and 1980s, as economic 
and political conditions worsened. EUROSTAT estimates that approximately 10 
per cent of Ghana’s population of 19 million currently lives abroad, principally 
in Nigeria, the US, Canada, Germany, Italy and the UK. Only recently, with 
the establishment of an apparently robust multi-party democratic system, and 
a more dynamic economy, has significant return to Ghana started to become 
feasible, and immigration from neighbouring countries has restarted. 
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Ghana has also begun to host small numbers of refugees from neighbour-
ing countries, with around 20,000 new arrivals from Liberia during 2002.108 
However, perhaps of most importance to the poor is the very large scale of 
internal migration within Ghana, estimated at well over 50 per cent of the 
population according to data compiled from the Ghana Living Standards 
Survey (GLSS).109
..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Internal migration in Ghana is primarily from north to south, with in-migrants 
representing over 40 per cent of the population in the Greater Accra, Volta and 
Western regions. The role of migrant labour in the development of the cocoa 
and coffee industries in the 1960s and 1970s has been well-documented, 
with Eastern, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions receiving internal migration 
mainly from Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions.110 There has also 
been substantial movement to mining areas, and rural-urban migration, espe-
cially to the major cities of Accra and Kumasi. The latter flow appears to have 
slowed, or possibly even reversed in the last decade.111
A classic study of migration from the Upper East region showed that migra-
tion at any particular time takes around half of all working age males, and 15 
per cent of working age females to southern Ghana for periods of at least a 
year.112 Similarly, the World Bank Voices of the Poor report on Ghana argues 
that urban and rural young people feel they have no choice but to leave home 
in search of work, since their remittances are likely to make the difference 
between food security or a lack of food security for their families.113 In the 
Box 6: Trafficking and child fostering
Despite	domestic	and	international	concern	about	trafficking	in	Ghana,	
the	movement	of	children	cannot	be	viewed	without	reference	to	the	
practice	of	child	fostering,	which	is	widespread	(as	in	many	other	coun-
tries	in	the	region).		
Authors	differ	in	their	views	of	child	fostering.	One	study	of	women	from	
the	South	Volta	region	engaged	in	 low-paid	work	 in	Accra	found	chil-
dren	being	sent	to	relatives	in	rural	areas	ostensibly	for	education,	but	in	
practice	ending	up	in	highly	abusive	and	exploitative	situations.	Another	
study	 found	 that	 child	 fostering	 was	 practiced	 by	 wealthy	 and	 poor	
alike,	often	leading	to	positive	outcomes	for	both	family	and	child.
Source: Population and Development Review 11 (1985).
Upper East region in particular, infertile soils and lack of local services are seen 
as contributing to out-migration. Meanwhile a recent PhD study by Mensah-
Bonsu suggests that over half of rural outmigration in northeast Ghana is for 
work reasons, and that this is dominated by movement to other rural areas.114 
This study also suggests that migration is a phenomenon mainly involving 
young people, where permanent migration is often preceded by short-term 
seasonal migration. 
However, it is also worth noting that for Ghana as a whole, as reported in 
the GLSS, 60 per cent of migrants reported marriage or other family reasons 
as the cause of their migration, with only 25 per cent reporting work reasons. 
This was partly because the GLSS includes as migrants not just household 
heads, but members of the family aged over 15 who moved with them, and 
also return migrants who might be less likely to move for employment reasons. 
Nonetheless, if these two categories are excluded, still only 40 per cent of 
migrant household heads were found to have moved for employment, with the 
majority citing other reasons.
The impacts of migration on the poor, and on poor regions, are the subject 
of some dispute. Some work suggests that it may be the poorest groups in 
northern villages who benefit most from remittances, rather than the middle 
and ‘secure’ groups.115 A fairly optimistic picture is also painted by a recent 
analysis of GLSS data, which found a ‘migration premium’ in that migrants had 
statistically higher living standards than non-migrants, although this premium 
had declined by a half between surveys in 1991/92 and 1998/99.116 It is dif-
ficult, however, in such analysis, to separate out cause and effect – in other 
words, it may simply be the less poor who are more able to migrate, rather 
than that migration makes people less poor. 
In contrast, Cleveland’s study of the Upper East region found that migration 
increased dependency ratios (the number of young and elderly dependent on 
each working age adult) in sending areas, and that remittances and improve-
ments in land and labour productivity were insufficient to compensate for 
this increased dependency.117 Mensah-Bonsu found migrants send home only 
US$5-15 a year in remittances, making litttle impact on rural livelihoods.118 
Meanwhile, even if internal remittances do appear to redistribute some wealth 
from rich to poor regions, this effect may not be sustainable in the face of the 
decline of the cocoa industry. 
There has been some forced migration within Ghana: e.g. from 1994-95, 
around 100,000 people are estimated to have been uprooted in northern 
Ghana as a result of ethnic conflict over land, of whom 10,000 moved to 
neighbouring Togo. Although most returned as the conflict subsided, some 
remain displaced.
CHAPTER	TWO
||
Over the last decade, academic and media attention on internal migration 
of the poor in Ghana has tended to move away from north-south migration 
in general to more specific issues, such as the link between migration and 
HIV/AIDS, and an apparently growing number of women and especially child 
migrants who may be victims of trafficking and/or other exploitative practices. 
The proliferation of HIV/AIDS is said to be linked to the movement of women 
from rural to urban areas where they do not earn enough to live, and where 
they are therefore exposed to prostitution, rape, and/or promiscuity.119 Having 
contacted HIV, they are then said to return to their villages where they infect 
men with whom they come into contact. However, it is also worth noting that a 
study of Ghanaian women working Abidjan found that those selling sex – some 
75 per cent of the sample – were earning between six and seven times the 
national minimum wage in Ghana, irrespective of their level of education and 
skills.120 Such work was regarded by many women as a successful short-term 
livelihood strategy.
There is also concern about trafficking, such as children sold by their parents 
to fishermen on Lake Volta, or adolescent girls working as porters (‘kayayee’) 
at lorry stations and markets in Accra and Kumasi. Examples have also been 
cited of children being handed over to women by parents on the understanding 
that they will be sent to school, given training, or taken care of within a house-
hold, but instead the children are put into paid work and no money is given 
to the child or the parent (see Box 6). Most trafficked children are believed to 
be from the Northern region, the eastern part of Greater Accra, and from the 
peripheral and urban slum areas around Accra. Sekondo-Takoradi, the capital 
of Western region, is also said to be a major recruiting centre and thorough-
fare for internationally trafficked children.121 The Ghana Immigration Service 
estimates that 3,582 women were trafficked between 1998-2000, and IOM 
returned 535 trafficked women to neighbouring countries in 1999-2000. 
However, detailed data on child trafficking is not available.
..	International	Migration	and	the	Brain	Drain
Substantial numbers of Ghanaians have left the country since the 1970s to 
work and/or study in both Europe and North America. As with many West 
African countries, it is difficult to find accurate statistics, as undocumented 
migration is thought to make up a fair proportion of total migration. It has been 
estimated that in 1996, there were 31,000 Ghanaians in the UK122, whilst 
in 2001, over 100,000 Ghanaians were thought to be in each of the US and 
Canada.123 Ghanaians also appear to be particularly spread around the world, 
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with deportations of Ghanaians occurring from some 58 different countries in 
1998.124
Attitudes towards this international migration have been somewhat divided, 
with concern expressed by many observers about the brain drain, but also 
a growing level of interest in the potential for remittances and returnees to 
contribute to national development (see Box 7). Ghana is estimated to have 
lost around 14,000 teachers between 1975 and 1981 – many of them to 
Nigeria.125 The proportion of health workers leaving Ghana has reached quite 
dramatic proportions in recent years (Table 6), stimulating considerable media 
attention and calls for measures to stem the flow. 
However, at the same time, the media have also focused on the transfer of 
money to Ghana by its nationals abroad126, with inward remittances estimated 
in one report at $1.5 billion for January-September 2003 alone.127 This esti-
mate dwarfs a previous Bank of Ghana estimate for 2001 of around $400 
million in migrant remittances, which even then was the equivalent of 20 per 
cent of Ghana’s export earnings; both are an order of magnitude higher than 
the official IMF figure for workers’ remittances which stood at $32 million in 
2000.128 Another recent study suggested that professionals outside Ghana 
each remit between $1,000 and $5,000 annually, with a mean of $2,200.129 
There appears to have been a mushrooming of both formal and informal money 
transfer outlets to process such transfers. 
Box 7: International migration and development  
in Ghana
A	recent	special	issue	of	the	journal	Population, Place and Space devoted	
to	migration	and	return	in	West	Africa	includes	three	articles	that	focus	on	
the	impact	of	migration,	return	and	remittances	on	Ghana,	two	of	which	
were	based	on	a	recent	DFID-funded	survey	of	return	to	the	country.	One	
shows	how,	amongst	less-skilled	returnees	to	both	Ghana	and	neighbour-
ing	Côte	d’Ivoire,	families	have	a	significant	impact	on	migration	patterns,	
with	 those	whose	migration	 formed	part	of	a	 family	 strategy	being	 two	
and	a	half	times	more	likely	to	return	with	savings	over	$10,000.
Elite	returnees	to	the	two	countries	were	found	to	have	brought	with	them	
concrete	innovative	practices	and	productive	investments.
A	 third	 contribution,	 focused	on	Ghana	alone,	 shows	 how	 remittances	
from	Netherlands-based	emigrants	have	also	had	a	significant	impact	on	
families	and	community	development	back	home,	although	this	impact	
varies	and	can	be	highly	insecure.
Source: Population, Space and Place, 10(2), (2004)
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Table 6: Proportion of health workers leaving Ghana as percentage of those 
trained that year
Profession 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1995-
2002
GPs/Medical 
officers
Trained 93 104 84 85 113 84 67 72 702
Emigrated 56 68 59 58 68 50 60 68 487
% leaving 60.2 5.4 70.2 68.2 60.2 59.5 89.6 94.4 69.4
Dentists
Trained 10 13 9 9 12 9 7 8 77
Emigrated 2 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 21
% leaving 20 23.1 33.3 33.3 33.3 22.2 28.6 25 27.3
Pharmacists
Trained 67 65 80 120 120 120 120 120 812
Emigrated 29 27 35 53 49 24 58 77 352
% leaving 43.3 41.5 43.8 44.2 40.8 20 48.3 64.2 43.3
Medical laboratory 
technologists/ 
technicians
Trained 31 37 38 45 46 46 45 51 339
Emigrated 8 9 4 6 9 16 14 0 66
% leaving 25.8 24.3 10.5 13.3 19.6 34.8 31.1 0 19.5
Environmental 
health specialists
Trained 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Emigrated 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
% leaving na na 0 na na na na na 100
Environmental 
health technolo-
gists/technicians
Trained 100 112 108 109 139 145 135 144 992
Emigrated 2 6 6 3 3 0 2 3 25
% leaving 2 5.4 5.6 2.8 2.2 0 1.5 2.1 2.5
Nurses/midwives
Trained 975 911 868 814 1073 1037 1124 1074 7876
Emigrated 195 182 174 161 215 207 205 214 1553
% leaving 20 20 20 19.8 20 20 18.2 19.9 19.7
Total
Trained 1276 1242 1188 1182 1503 1441 1498 1469 10799
Emigrated 292 295 281 284 349 299 341 364 2505
% leaving 22.9 23.8 23.7 24 23.2 20.7 22.8 24.8 23.2
Source: ISSER (2003) State of the Ghana Economy
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..	Migration	Policies	
Migration policies in Ghana are currently focused on limiting the departure 
of skilled migrants, and encouraging those abroad to return. Dual citizenship 
has been extended to Ghanaians living abroad as an encouragement for them 
to return freely. The National Patriotic Party has made a conscious effort to 
strengthen relations with diaspora communities and associations. A Non-
Resident Ghanaians Secretariat (NRGS) was established in May 2003 to link 
with Ghanaians abroad and encourage return, whilst a Homecoming Summit 
was organised by the government in 2001.130
On brain drain in the health sector, President Kufour has pledged the govern-
ment’s determination to offer resources and support to the Council of Ghana 
College of Physicians and Surgeons in their effort to stop the brain drain.131 
Measures have been taken to address the issue through improved working 
conditions in the health sector, including the provision of cars to health sector 
workers, although there have been complaints that these have gone exclusively 
to doctors rather than nurses, leading to resentment and an apparent increased 
desire to emigrate amongst nurses.132 
There is also recognition in Ghana that the exodus of health personnel 
reflects a lack of opportunities for professional development inside Ghana. In 
response, the Ghana Information Network for Knowledge Sharing (GINKS), an 
NGO, is seeking to provide continuous medical education through newsletters, 
CD-Roms and the internet. The Ministry of Health is discussing with the World 
Bank and Howard University ways of implementing the use of ‘tele-medicine’ 
in Ghana.
Ghana is a signatory to both the refugee and migrant worker conventions, 
but has not ratified the 2000 protocols on trafficking and smuggling. In 1998, 
the Ghanaian Parliament approved a comprehensive Children’s Act, which 
prohibits work by children under 15, whilst it adopted the ILO Convention 
on the Worst Forms of Child Labour in 2000. IOM launched a programme 
in 2001 for the return and reintegration of children trafficked to Central and 
Volta regions, which includes measures to offer business advice and loans for 
small enterprises to parents who sold their children to fishing communities on 
Lake Volta. 
There is also considerable NGO activity on child trafficking to and within 
Ghana. World Vision International works to reduce rural-urban migration and 
prevent young people from ‘drifting’ to the cities, whilst Catholic Action for 
Street Children works to improve the lives of street children and promote their 
rights through child sponsorship. Other agencies have launched initiatives to 
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return children to their home villages in northern Ghana, although the children 
themselves have not always welcomed these measures.
Ghana does appear to have begun to grapple with some of the impacts of 
migration on development and poverty reduction, with policy development 
focusing at present on stemming the brain drain (especially in the health sec-
tor), reaching out to Ghanaians abroad, and addressing the problem of child 
trafficking. As Ghana’s economy improves, it is likely that the country will need 
to deal increasingly with issues of immigration and the return of its nationals, 
rather than addressing the loss of Ghanaians overseas.
However, as with Nigeria, perhaps the key policy gap is not so much interna-
tional migration as addressing patterns of internal migration and their impact 
on poverty. In Ghana, these patterns are especially complex, as rural-rural 
migration and movements from towns back to rural areas continue to feature 
strongly in contemporary movements, even if regions of destination may be 
changing. The government’s anti-poverty plans, as set out in the PRSP, do not 
as yet take this migration into account.
A particularly poorly understood area is that of the migration of children, 
whose movement is often characterised as forced, but in which the reality may 
again be somewhat more complex. 
.	Sierra	Leone	and	Liberia
..1	Introduction
Like Nigeria and Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia have also historically been 
countries of immigration, but now have substantial numbers of nationals living 
abroad as a result of economic and political collapse. Yet, to a much greater 
degree than in most neighbouring countries, the key migration issues relate to 
forced migration. Over the last decade, Sierra Leone and Liberia have experi-
enced a huge amount of displacement of their populations. The 11-year civil 
war in Sierra Leone is estimated to have caused the displacement of between 
one and three million people. Although internal displacement is now officially 
at an end, many certainly remain in host areas. In Liberia, conflict from 1989-
96 displaced as much as two thirds of the population and numbers of IDPs at 
the present time are estimated to be around 140,000.133 
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Displaced people in the two countries come in at least three distinct catego-
ries. First, up to a quarter of a million officially registered IDPs in Sierra Leone 
have been returned to their places of origin since the end of the war under 
the auspices of the government’s Resettlement Strategy. Although benefiting 
from a settlement package, which included a two-month food ration, house-
hold utensils, plastic sheeting, and in some cases transportation, conditions in 
home areas often remain difficult, and the process has been criticised in some 
quarters for not being entirely voluntary. A similar process, and similar criti-
cisms about the degree of voluntariness of resettlement, apply in Liberia. 
Second, clearly there is a large discrepancy between the number of IDPs 
that have returned in Sierra Leone, and estimates of the total number of IDPs 
at the height of the conflict. In part, this is accounted for by ‘spontaneous’ 
return, without assistance, but there are also many who were displaced, but 
were never officially registered with the authorities, or were de-registered, and 
have not since been resettled. This group can be seen as representing a quasi-
permanent rural-urban migration flow of some magnitude. 
Third, there has also been international movement of refugees. There were 
over half a million Sierra Leoneans in neighbouring countries, especially 
Guinea, at the height of the war in the mid-1990s, and an estimated 135,000 
in 2003, with on-going returns from the two main destinations, Guinea and 
Liberia. There remain over 270,000 Liberians living as refugees mainly in 
Guinea – to which new flows occurred in 2002 – and Côte d’Ivoire, from which 
there has been some recent repatriation as a result of the spread of conflict to 
that country.
Although migration primarily means forced displacement in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, it is important not to ignore other types of mobility. In Sierra Leone, 
there have long been movements from rural areas to towns. Yet post-conflict 
Sierra Leone is characterised by a resurgence of localised identities, built 
around village registration as the cornerstone of citizenship and access to basic 
rights, property and protection.134 As a result, continued mobility within the 
country may serve to exclude migrants from such rights: e.g. people remaining 
as ‘squatters’ in Freetown are likely to be excluded in this way.
..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
According to the UN’s Human Development Index 2003, Sierra Leone con-
tinues to be the poorest country in the world. The last household survey con-
ducted in Sierra Leone was in 1989/90, prior to the civil war. At this stage, 
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poverty was already ‘endemic and pervasive’. Life expectancy at birth is now 
estimated to stand at 34.5 years and adult literacy at 36 per cent.135 GDP 
per capita in US dollars fell by 35 per cent between 1990 and 2000. Primary 
school net enrolment fell from 55 per cent in 1990 to 42 per cent in 1999, in 
part because of the displacement of teachers. A total of 57 per cent of Sierra 
Leone’s population fall below the $1 a day poverty line, although this is lower 
than a number of neighbouring countries, including Nigeria. Lower levels of 
income poverty notwithstanding, these indicators highlight the extent of pov-
erty that prevails in Sierra Leone, and point to the role played by conflict and 
displacement in increasing the incidence, depth and severity of this poverty. 
However, internal migration in both Sierra Leone and Liberia certainly pre-
dates the most recent conflicts. In Sierra Leone, circular rural-rural migrations 
have long been directed to the main swamp rice-growing areas of Cambia 
district in the North and Bonthe district in the South, as well as the main 
cash-cropping districts of the East and the diamond mining areas of the South 
and East, whilst there was also substantial movement out of rural areas to 
urban centres of employment.136 There have also historically been substantial 
movements to the Firestone rubber plantation in Liberia. Although the latter is 
largely abandoned at present, a recent study of the diamond mining areas in 
Sierra Leone suggests the migration of perhaps 10,000 seasonal workers may 
still support 70,000 or more poor people in sending districts.137 
A study of the role of internal remittances sent by a sample of 1,500 rural 
out-migrants in Sierra Leone in 1981-82 found that remittances on average 
comprised only 12 per cent of the incomes of rural households. Yet this rose 
to over 40 per cent of the income of the poorest households, with their overall 
effect being to reduce income inequality in poor areas.138 In turn, although 
remittances were mainly used in rural areas for consumption, about 16 per 
cent were used for building or house improvement, whilst 6 per cent were used 
to set up and/or improve export crop plantations in rural areas.139 
More recent studies on internal migration for work, or on IDPs who have 
chosen not to return to their home area, are not available for either country. 
One useful source of information in Sierra Leone may be a new National 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey, although continued insecurity 
means there is no equivalent for Liberia.
MIGRATION	AND	DEVELOPMENT	IN	AFRICA:	AN	OVERVIEW
|0|
..	International	Migration	and	the	Brain	Drain
It is unclear exactly how many Sierra Leoneans and Liberians live abroad, 
but as noted above, over 20,000 people born in Sierra Leone were counted 
in the 2000 US census. There are also believed to be considerable numbers 
of Liberians in the US, many still holding a form of ‘temporary protection’. 
International migration between Liberia and Sierra Leone and western coun-
tries also has a long history, dating in the Liberian case to that country’s colo-
nisation by freed slaves from the Americas. The movement of men from Liberia 
and Sierra Leone as stevedores and seafarers not only to other West African 
ports, but also to Britain and Europe, also dates to the nineteenth century.140 
Although less studied than Ghanaian and Nigerian associations, there is 
some evidence that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians abroad have played a role 
in peace-building and development in their home countries. At the height of 
the civil war in Liberia, the Liberian Islamic Union for Relief and Development 
(LIURD), a major NGO that provided assistance to displaced and war-affected 
populations in the West of Liberia, was established through the efforts of expa-
triate Liberians living in Philadelphia in the US. More recently, the Coalition 
of Concerned Liberians (CCL) was established in Washington, DC to represent 
various Liberian humanitarian groups and lobby for increased US involvement 
in Liberia.
There are numerous Sierra Leonean organisations in the UK and North 
America. One example is the ‘Sierra Leonean Women’s Forum’ in the UK, 
which although primarily orientated to providing advice, information, assist-
ance and social events for Sierra Leonean women in the UK, also raises funds 
for food and clothing to be sent to Sierra Leone, and promotes awareness of 
gender and development issues in Sierra Leone.
..	Migration	Policies
The Sierra Leone Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) consists 
of three central pillars: improved governance, revival of economic growth and 
extension of social services. However, whilst it mentions the challenges faced 
in the resettlement of displaced people, and highlights policies to supply return-
ees to farming areas with agricultural seeds, tools and services to improve food 
security, and encourages artisanal miners returning to mining areas to form 
cooperatives, consideration of migration is otherwise largely absent.141 
A lack of attention to migration is also characteristic of policy elsewhere. 
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One example is a Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (CRRP), 
funded by the World Bank and ADB, and launched in 2000, which seeks to 
address the short-term needs of ex-combatants, IDPs, returnees, and the com-
munities to which they are returning. The project locates these needs in the 
context of remaining in rural areas, and not re-opening previous channels of 
migration. This is despite heavy investment in road-building that might stimu-
late renewed mobility.
One exception involves the National Long Term Perspectives Study (NLTPS) 
Vision 2025 Programme being developed by the Sierra Leone government 
with UNDP assistance. This study has created a website to solicit the views 
of Sierra Leoneans in the diaspora.142 The Sierra Leone government has also 
organised a series of ‘Homecoming Summits’, the latest of which was held in 
Freetown in December 2003.143
In relation to trafficking, the Sierra Leonean government is not seen by the 
US State Department as fully complying with the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking, although it considers that the government is mak-
ing significant effort to do so. There are no specific laws against trafficking 
but there are laws against ‘procuring a female by threats or coercion for the 
purpose of prostitution’.144 The Mano River Union countries (Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea) have also formed the Mano River Human Rights Network 
to address specific human rights issues in each of the countries.145 
In Liberia, there is as yet no PRSP, and the country and government are cur-
rently arguably too unstable for clear policies on migration to have developed, 
although there are signs already that the new government is interested in pro-
moting the return of exiles from the US.
As both Liberia and Sierra Leone move towards a more sustainable peace, 
the key issue relating to migration is clearly the return of refugees and dis-
placed persons, rather than migration for economic reasons. Within Sierra 
Leone in particular, there have been efforts to build local institutional structures 
to manage local development, whilst in both countries there has been direct 
material assistance to returnees.
However, internationally, it is worth noting that the UK is moving ahead with 
a refugee resettlement programme to move up to 500 Liberian, Ivorian or pos-
sibly Sierra Leonean refugees currently registered in Accra to new homes in the 
UK. Although targeted at ‘old case load’ refugees, this could be seen as giving 
mixed signals at a time when the emphasis is on return.
It is also important to bear in mind that in the context of disrupted livelihood 
opportunities and continued insecurity in rural Liberia and Sierra Leone, the 
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option of diversification of livelihoods through migration is likely to remain an 
attractive one for many individuals and families. Policies to promote sustain-
able rural development and peace-building need to avoid ‘trapping’ families in 
rural areas, based on a misconception that their full-time presence there is a 
precondition for peace and development. Rather, increased attention could be 
paid to the benefits of strong interactions between rural and urban areas.
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 .1	Overview
• East Africa has a long history of labour migration between and within 
countries to plantations (cotton and coffee in Uganda), mines (DRC 
and Uganda) and with the seasons (pastoralist communities in Uganda, 
Tanzania and Kenya). In the post-colonial era, these movements have 
been supplemented by substantial forced displacement, and increasing 
rural-urban migration within countries for employment or to earn a liveli-
hood. However, both urbanization rates and levels of international migra-
tion remain generally lower than in other parts of Africa.
• Labour circulation forms a particularly important part of migration within 
East Africa, although the region has also witnessed substantial move-
ments of refugees and internally displaced people, which have affected 
virtually every country in the region. In particular, Tanzania, Kenya and 
Uganda all remain host to substantial refugee populations.
• In contrast, international migration is relatively weak in the region, with 
the exception of the Horn of Africa, which has seen substantial movement 
to the US (from Ethiopia and Somalia), Europe (from Somalia) and the 
Middle East (from Somalia and Sudan).
• A range of innovative informal remittance systems have developed across 
the region to facilitate especially intra-country flows through bus and 
courier companies, and in the case of Somalia, substantial flows from 
overseas. However, there is some evidence that trust in internal remit-
tance systems at least is eroding, whilst Somali money transfer agencies 
have raised some regulatory concerns.
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• Empirical studies of the impact of migration on poverty and poor people 
are relatively rich in East Africa, and can contribute to understanding of 
how pro-poor policy can take migration into account. Yet despite this 
empirical knowledge base, and attempts to foster regional integration, 
attitudes towards both migration and refugee flows appear sceptical at 
least, and probably have hardened in recent years.
• The extent to which rural households engage in short- and long-term 
migration to maintain and diversify household income and reduce risk 
in the face of agro-climatic constraints is relatively well documented in 
East Africa. Studies have shown that rural families increase their liveli-
hood security by splitting the locations of the family. Research in Western 
Kenya suggests that the decision to migrate, and remittance behaviour, 
are linked to a form of intergenerational ‘migration contract’ between 
a migrant and his or her parents, in which the (usually male) migrant 
moves and sends remittances in expectation of a subsequent inheritance. 
In southern Tanzania, research by IIED suggests that male migration to 
save and invest in rural areas is also common, although return is less so. 
In contrast, in northern Tanzania, opportunities for migration appear to 
be especially important for marginalised women.
• An interesting feature of East African migration is the circulation of 
children in order to obtain education. Although helping to build national 
rather than ethnic identity, migration for education means that secondary 
school pupils can circulate each term over very large distances. It may 
also encourage onward migration once schooling is completed. Yet educa-
tion also appears to be a major focus of the community, and remittances 
are often invested in school fees. Those who have educated relatives in 
urban areas also appear to receive larger remittances and are therefore 
able to send a higher proportion of their children to school, perpetuating 
inequality from one generation to the next.
• There are a number of key knowledge gaps concerning migration and 
displacement within and from East Africa:
• Although useful research exists, there remains a need for deeper under-
standing of the relationships between migration and development in 
the region, including estimates of the scale of internal migration and 
its impact on rural livelihoods. In most countries in East Africa, recent 
survey data on internal migration that is nationally representative is 
simply unavailable.
• The lack of reliable estimates of the numbers of East Africans living 
abroad, their economic contribution to East African countries, and the 
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effect of their exodus on availability of skilled professionals in sectors 
such as health and education, may explain why international migration 
flows appear low across the region. Particular attention may need to be 
paid to migration to South Africa and the Gulf.
• Understanding of the significance and socio-economic impact of immi-
gration into East African countries, including that of temporary workers 
and refugees, is also a priority. Such understanding could contribute to 
a more informed policy debate in the face of proposals to limit migra-
tion (as recently in Kenya) or to adopt a more restrictive stance towards 
refugees (as recently in Tanzania).
• The extent of the turnaround in policy on emigration from Uganda is 
quite substantial, and reflects the new goal of the Ugandan Government 
to develop the potential economic contribution of the diaspora, rather 
than encouraging them not to leave. This could form a model for other 
countries in the region, although for some countries, conflict resolution 
and the rebuilding of failed states is clearly a more urgent priority.
• In Uganda, the liberalisation of financial markets, especially trade in 
foreign exchange, and the granting of permission for foreign denomi-
nated bank accounts, are said to have increased remittances. The Bank 
of Uganda Forex and Trade Department is now generally supportive 
and positively inclined towards granting permission to Money Transfer 
Organisations (MTOs). There is also some interest in using Micro-Finance 
Institutions (MFIs) as providers of money transfer services, and evidence 
across the region suggests that these may be more effective in channel-
ling resources to the poorest than international banks and corporations 
that lack local knowledge.
.	Region-Wide	Issues
Like West Africa, East Africa has a long history of labour migration between and 
within countries to plantations (cotton and coffee in Uganda), mines (DRC and 
Uganda) and with the seasons (pastoralist communities in Uganda, Tanzania 
and Kenya). In the colonial era, labour migration was orientated mainly from 
Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire to Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, as well as more 
recently from Sudan and the Horn of Africa to the Middle East.146 There is also 
a history of rural-urban migration within countries for employment or to earn 
a livelihood, although urbanization rates remain generally lower than in much 
of West or Southern Africa. 
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A major focus of literature on migration flows and processes in East Africa 
is circulation. This process of temporary or semi-permanent migration from a 
rural area to another rural or an urban area for employment is characterised 
by the links maintained with the area of origin. These circulation patterns have 
strong historical roots in East Africa: e.g. in Buganda, before colonisation, it 
was traditional to send young men to live and work with other relatives for 
some years in order to gain a better understanding of Bugandan culture.147 
There has also been substantial movement of pastoralists.148
Colonial labour laws enforced patterns of circulatory migration. They divided 
the areas of production and reproduction, moving African families into labour 
reserves, from which men were recruited to work in cities or on plantations. 
The rest of a family had to remain in the reserves, subsisting on crops grown in 
the area without the help of the most active members of the family. In this con-
text, cash remittances from family members working in the colonial economy 
assumed considerable importance.149
Since the 1980s, labour circulation has decreased and refugee flows have 
started to dominate movement.150 According to the IOM Migration Policy 
Framework for sub-Saharan Africa:
This subregion has been, and is, experiencing movements of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) … Much of the  
Box 8: Migration and education
One	 interesting	 feature	 of	 East	African	migration	 is	 the	 circulation	 of	
children	in	order	to	obtain	education.	Such	flows	have	historical	prec-
edents	in	the	pre-colonial	and	colonial	education	systems,	and	form	an	
important	part	of	mobility	within	Kenya,	Tanzania	and	Uganda.	These	
patterns	were	maintained	at	least	until	the	10s,	despite	greater	avail-
ability	of	schools	within	daily	commuting	distance.	
For	example,	the	national	admission	systems	to	secondary	schools	in	all	
three	countries	mean	 that	pupils	can	be	allocated	places	 in	 schools	
anywhere	in	the	country,	some	of	which	are	boarding	schools	and	oth-
ers	of	which	are	not.	 This	 system,	created	 to	encourage	 the	building	
of	a	national	rather	than	ethnic	identity,	means	that	secondary	school	
pupils	can	circulate	each	term	over	very	large	distances.
Migration	for	education	may	also	encourage	onward	migration	once	
schooling	is	completed.	The	greater	availability	of	formal	sector	jobs	in	
towns,	and	higher	wages	available	there,	are	also	relevant	factors.		
Sources: Gould (1985); see endnote 147.
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voluntary migration that characterised the Eastern African 
Community (EAC) countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
ceased by 1978 and has never resurfaced in the resuscitated 
Economic Community of Central African States (CEAC) (since 
1996). Countries in the sub-region do not have explicit policies on 
migration and no sub-regional cooperation mechanism to respond 
to their common migration challenges.
On rural-urban migration, it has been argued that following economic decline 
and the impacts of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, the real 
incomes of a large proportion of the urban population declined dramatically.151 
As a result, urban growth has slowed considerably in countries such as 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, giving way to return migration to rural areas in 
some cases. Nonetheless, out-migration continues, notably movement to the 
Gulf.152 
Table 7: Selected development and migration indicators for East African 
countries
Country Population 
(millions) 
2000
GDP per 
capita 
(US$ PPP) 
2000
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
2000
Migrant 
stock (%) 
2000
Average 
annual 
net migra-
tion rate 
(per 1000) 
1995-2000
Angola 13.1 2187 0.403 0.4 -1.4
Burundi 6.3 591 0.313 1.2 -12.9
Djibouti 0.6 2377 0.445 4.5 6.8
DR Congo 50.9 765 0.431 1.5 -7.1
Eritrea 3.7 837 0.421 0.4 0.6
Ethiopia 62.9 668 0.327 1.0 -0.1
Kenya 30.7 1022 0.513 1.1 -0.1
Rwanda 7.6 943 0.403 1.2 62.8
Somalia 8.8 795* 0.284* 0.2 -0.6
Sudan 31.1 1797 0.499 2.5 -2.6
Tanzania 35.1 522 0.440 2.5 -1.4
Uganda 23.3 1208 0.444 2.3 -0.6
Source: Figures compiled from UNDP and UN Population Division. For notes on terms, see Table 2.  
* Somali figures are for 2001
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A number of key themes emerge in relation to migration in the East African 
region, including:
• The importance of circulation, building on historic patterns of labour 
migration from rural areas to towns and cities and to areas of mining and 
plantation agriculture;
• The development of a range of informal remittance systems that have 
transferred money both within countries, and more recently from interna-
tional migrants (see Box 9), although trust in these systems is eroding in 
some cases (see Box 12);
• A degree of regional integration that has fostered mobility between East 
African countries (see Boxes 10 and 15);
• For Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the existence of a number of empiri-
cal studies of the use of migrant remittances by the poor (see Box 11), 
which could contribute to understanding of how pro-poor policy could 
take migration into account;
• Despite this empirical base of knowledge, continuing worries about the 
negative consequences of migration on the part of a number of key policy-
makers in the region, although the Ugandan government appears to have 
developed a more positive attitude towards linking with the diaspora (see 
Box 13); and
• The rising significance of forced migration (including internal displace-
ment – see Box 14), although more recently this has given way to sub-
stantial return of refugees and IDPs in some countries.
In this section, in addition to a broad overview, we focus on particular stud-
ies in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Work on Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and 
Uganda is then considered in more detail in subsequent country sections.
.	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Migration is of considerable importance to the poor in East Africa. Historically, 
the migration of millions of rural households in eastern and southern Africa 
has provided investment capital for rural commodity production, stimulated 
the flow of new ideas and social practices into rural areas, and enhanced rural 
livelihoods.153 Decreasing agricultural incomes across East Africa since the 
1970s have led to a diversification of livelihood sources, and migration is a 
likely outcome in areas with easy access to labour markets.154 The impact of 
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urban economic decline has also been felt by the poor, although many public 
sector workers previously considered to be amongst the ‘labour aristocracy’ 
have perhaps been hardest hit. 
In Ethiopia, interesting information on the relationship between migration 
and poverty is available from work on livelihoods. This has shown that the poor 
migrate more than the better off, in order to supplement income from the land, 
and repay or avoid incurring debts.155 Although permanent or semi-permanent 
migration was seen by most families as an option of last resort, temporary 
seasonal migrations were often actively encouraged as a right of passage for 
young men. However, it is those with some assets, rather than none, who were 
found most able to migrate. 
Migration may affect the poor, but the impact of migration on poverty is more 
difficult to determine.156 Thus, although migration plays a central role in the 
livelihoods of rural households and communities, rich and poor, it was found 
that migration may increase inequality. The research also did not produce 
comparable quantitative estimates of the impact of migration on livelihoods. 
In fact, one of the lessons learned was that it was difficult to generalise about 
this. In policy terms, particularly, it was seen to be important to be aware of 
specific contexts in order that policies could be as supportive as possible. 
A study of female Ethiopian migrants to the Middle East also showed that 
many women are trafficked to destinations outside Ethiopia and are left in 
vulnerable positions, partly due to the strict laws surrounding the migration 
of women.157 When in the Middle East, most of the women work as maids or 
nannies, in jobs with little security or protection. The report partially blames 
the patriarchal Ethiopian society and the lack of education and career oppor-
tunities for women within Ethiopia as a cause of these exploitative forms of 
migration. 
Box 9: Informal remittance systems
Recent	estimates	suggest	that	Somali	money	transfer	companies	deal	
with	approximately	$0	million	in	transfers	to	the	country	each	year,	yet	
these	systems	are	largely	‘informal’	in	comparison	with	western	banks.
Somali	remittance	companies	utilise	the	‘Hawalla’	system,	which	relies	
on	trust	and	ethnic	bonds	to	transfer	money	around	the	world.		
Initially	 unregulated,	 concerns	 over	 the	 need	 for	 financial	 regulation	
have	been	raised	in	response	to	accusations	of	money	laundering	and	
links	to	Al	Qaida	following	the	September	11th	attacks.		As	a	result,	the	
Somali	Financial	Services	Association	(SFSA)	was	launched	in	00.
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In Somalia, it is international migration that has received most attention, not 
least because of the collapse of the state and with it virtually all social science 
research within the country. Somalis have moved in large numbers to Europe 
and North America, and in the US at least, census data shows that Somalis are 
less educated than any other African nationality, and indeed the only African 
country of origin where educational levels are below the US national average. 
However, interestingly, Somali international migrants have remitted quite large 
sums to the country even in the absence of a formal banking system (see Box 
9).
In other East African countries there are further examples of innovative for-
mal and informal mechanisms to transfer remittances, including the use of bus 
and courier companies.158 Another innovative semi-formal system, although 
not actually a money transfer system, which has sprung up in Uganda and 
Tanzania, is the transfer of pre-paid airtime on mobile phones to relatives (via 
passing on the pin code). This saves the relatives money in buying airtime and 
allows them to use it for other expenses. 
.	International	Migration	and	the	Brain	Drain
International migration from Somalia may have brought substantial remit-
tances, but in most other countries of the region it is seen as a major problem 
because of the ‘brain drain’. In Ethiopia, it has been estimated that between 
a quarter and three quarters of students and professionals travelling abroad 
to study have not returned to Ethiopia, with a particular loss to the academic 
and medical professions.159 Indeed, Ethiopia has the largest number of nation-
als of any East African nation in the US, and the second largest in Africa after 
Nigeria. By 1995, it was estimated that some 500,000 skilled Sudanese were 
working abroad.160 
There has also been some circulation of professionals within East Africa, not 
all of it voluntary (e.g. Kenya and Tanzania benefited from the immigration of 
professionals from Uganda during the Amin era). 
.	Migration	Policies
An International Migration Policy Conference for East Africa, the Horn of Africa 
and the Great Lakes Region, was held in Nairobi, Kenya in May 2002, and 
brought together 170 high, senior and middle level government officials from 
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Burundi, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Yemen. The Conference, believed to 
be the first of its kind in the region, identified a series of migration and forced 
displacement issues of interest and concern, including:
• Forced displacement (refugee protection and asylum; regional processing 
of secondary migratory movements; IDP access and assistance; mobil-
ity and human security; protracted displacement situations; migration, 
forced displacement and conflict resolution; crisis prevention and conflict 
resolution; and media sensitisation to issues of displacement and as a 
tool for awareness raising); 
• The management of labour migration (maximising remittances; pre-
departure training; bilateral agreements to avoid double taxation; moni-
toring circular migration; brain drain; registration and supervision of for-
eign employment agencies; ensuring migrant workers’ rights at home and 
abroad; integration and re-integration; strengthening co-operation with 
African diasporas; matching labour needs and demand; and facilitating 
exchange of knowledge, skills and resources); 
• The establishment of a Strategic Framework for an Integrated Policy 
on Migration on the African Continent (including partnerships between 
African countries and the EU; and inter-State dialogue and co-operation 
concerning return, readmission and re-integration).
With respect to labour migration, a number of policy initiatives can be high-
lighted across the region. There are regional initiatives to promote free move-
ment in the East African Community (see Box 10) and COMESA countries also 
plan to establish gradually the free movement of citizens as part of the creation 
of a free trade area, although there have been few signs of progress so far.161 
ILO has a sectoral programme on the elimination of the worst forms of child 
labour in the commercial agriculture sector in East Africa, working with the 
governments of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia and funded by 
the US Department of Labor. There has recently been a mid-term evaluation 
of this programme. 
In addition, IOM’s MIDA project has also made greater strides in East Africa 
than elsewhere in the continent, with one initiative aiming to build the capacity 
of the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to provide protection to 
their citizens working abroad and to expand legal labour migration opportuni-
ties for the benefit and development of their countries of origin. 
However, measures to promote freer movement have not received universal 
acclaim, and in some cases, policies have worked in the opposite direction. 
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In Ethiopia, the ADB has awarded $86 million in loans and grants in order to 
control what it sees as a massive explosion in rural to urban migration. This 
will be used for investments in rural areas, such as infrastructure development 
and credit facilities for rural farmers in an attempt to increase rural enterprise 
and prevent people having to move to the cities.162 
In the case of the EAC, the issue of labour migration has met resistance from 
some member states because of the different levels of advancement in training 
of human resources in the three countries.163 Thus whilst Kenya enrols about 
45,000 students in its institutions of higher learning, Uganda admits only 
20,000 and Tanzania just 7,000, leading to fears in the latter two countries 
that Kenyans will flood their job markets and render citizens of their countries 
jobless. 
At a recent conference, Uganda’s Minister of State responsible for Gender, 
Labour and Social Development, Henry Joseph Obbo, commented that the 
harmonisation of labour laws, labour migration and free movement of persons 
needed to take into account the aspect of the level of training in each country, 
although Kenya’s Minister for Labour and Human Resources Development, Ali 
Chirau Mwakwere, expressed reservations in turn about Pakistanis who had 
‘flooded’ the Kenyan job market while many Kenyans were jobless. 
In relation to forced migration, there have also been efforts to develop a 
regional set of policies. In April 2002, a consortium of NGOs hosted a regional 
meeting in Mombasa that sought to promote a ‘progressive legislative and 
policy framework’ across the region.164 At a subsequent meeting in Dar-es-
Salaam in September 2003, Tanzania proposed the introduction of a policy 
of ‘safe havens’ in conflict-ridden countries as a way of averting large-scale 
Box 10: Regional passports
The	EAC	has	also	recently	introduced	new	‘East	African	passports’	and	
temporary	 passes	 to	 speed	 up	 movement	 between	 countries	 in	 the	
region,	as	well	as	abolishing	charges	on	 the	 temporary	 importation	of	
private	vehicles	across	regional	borders,	and	establishing	special	immi-
gration	counters	 for	 East	African	 travelers	 at	 the	 region’s	airports.	 The	
passports	cost	US$10	and	have	six	months’	multiple	entry	validity.	New	
policies	are	also	being	considered	on	 the	application	of	national	 sta-
tus	treatment	to	East	African	nationals	in	any	of	the	Partner	States	with	
respect	to	access	to	services	in	the	fields	of	health,	education	and	train-
ing,	tourism	and	communications,	among	others.
Source: EAC Information and Publications Office
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refugee movements, as well as regional burden sharing arrangements, whilst 
Zambia proposed the introduction of measures to allow refugees to become 
economic players in the host country, therefore reducing the burden on the 
host.165 Although this conference, which brought together representatives 
from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, UNHCR and the AU, failed to reach agreement on 
these proposals, governments did recommit to the principle of refugee protec-
tion in the region.
Large-scale displacement from Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi 
and the DRC has made this region a key area for discussion of policies on 
refugees and IDPs. Historically, Tanzania had one of the most progressive 
pieces of refugee legislation in the world, although state practice has become 
much more restrictive since the presence of over a million Rwandans in the 
country from 1994-96. It is reassuring that the notion of a ‘progressive’ policy 
on forced migration is now on the agenda, along with regional passports and 
free movement of workers, even if these still raise problems for some in gov-
ernment.
However, although dealing with forced displacement continues to be an 
important issue in the region, it is not unreasonable to expect that the return of 
refugees and IDPs might gain increasing importance in the coming years. After 
large-scale returns to Rwanda in late 1996, there have been some returns at 
least to countries such as Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Somaliland. 
Here, it is clearly important for countries (and refugee agencies) to learn from 
experience in different countries about what kind of assistance is needed by 
returnees, and the most appropriate policies to promote an economic, political 
and social environment in which return can have positive outcomes.
As elsewhere on the continent, it is probably internal migration that is most 
significant for the poor in most countries, and where policy gaps are therefore 
most conspicuous. This issue is considered in more depth below, in relation to 
four specific East African countries, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.
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.	Kenya
..1	Introduction
According to a recent review of international migration from Kenya in 2001 
there were 47,000 Kenyan nationals in the US, 20,600 in Canada and 
15,000 in the UK.166 In the 1980s and 1990s, this appears increasingly to 
reflect permanent, rather than circular migration, due to the political and eco-
nomic instability in Kenya. Many workers also travelled to the Gulf States, and 
also, interestingly, Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo in search of low-skilled 
employment during the 1990s. There was also recruitment of Kenyan teachers 
to countries as diverse as the Comoros Islands, Seychelles, Rwanda, Burundi 
and the Congo. 
In contrast, there are few accurate statistics about internal migration. Census 
material on migration is not available since the last published census in 1989, 
and there has been little analysis of this. It seems likely that areas around 
Nairobi and Mombasa and the coast, as well as areas of commercial farming, 
are net areas of immigration, whilst there continues to be net out-migration 
from much of Western and Northern Kenya.
Kenya also hosts refugees from the surrounding countries, and acts as a 
transit point for resettlement to third countries such as the US. In 2002, Kenya 
hosted just over 230,000 refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring 
countries, notably Somalia and Sudan.167 There are also significant numbers 
of IDPs in Kenya. The reasons for displacement are complex, but are linked 
to land redistribution, inter-ethnic clashes and the introduction of multi-party 
democracy in 1992. There are hopes that the NARC government under Mwai 
Kibaki elected in December 2002 will begin to solve some of the problems that 
caused these people to flee, and enable them to return home (see below).168 
..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
The extent to which rural households engage in short- and long-term migra-
tion to maintain and diversify household income and reduce risk in the face 
of agro-climatic constraints is well documented in Kenya. Studies have shown 
that rural families increase their livelihood security by splitting the locations 
of the family, most often by one member of the family migrating to an urban 
area.169 This may be necessary in marginal areas as there is insufficient 
CHAPTER	THREE
||
economic capital in rural areas to diversify sources of income without migra-
tion.170 Research carried out under the Natural Resources Policy Research 
Programme (NRPRP) shows in a small sample in Makueni district not only that 
over half of the households surveyed had access to migrant income, but that 
this was also larger and more secure than income from local wage labour, and 
had contributed to investment in farming.171 
In addition to rural-urban migration, seasonal and temporary migration for 
agricultural employment is common in rural areas, and is used to increase 
family income. Pastoralists in northern Kenya still operate a nomadic or semi-
nomadic lifestyle, with implications for access to services. In areas where fami-
lies own marginal land the men will move seasonally to gain wage employment 
in order to provide cash to support their families which leads to short-term 
circulation patterns.172 
However, most academic and policy attention has focused on rural-urban 
migration systems, which also commonly includes circulation. Agesa looks 
at the economic determinants of joint migration of the whole family against 
sequential migration of the (male) head of household, followed by the other 
members. He concludes that due to women’s lower earning abilities in urban 
areas, families are likely to engage in sequential migration to decrease the 
costs and risks taken and to increase the benefits and income raised.173 Higher 
levels of male education also contribute to greater levels of migration amongst 
men than amongst women.174 
Path-breaking work in Western Kenya by John Hoddinott suggests that the 
decision to migrate, and remittance behaviour, are linked to a form of inter-
Box 11: The use of internal remittances in Kenya
The	 phenomenon	 of	 male	 labour	 migration	 from	 Western	 Kenya	 to	
urban	 areas	 has	 received	 considerable	 attention	 from	 economists.	
One	study	argues	that	through	remittances	and	investment,	this	labour	
migration	leads	to	a	greater	differentiation	between	the	rich	and	poor	
farmers	 in	the	area,	although	most	 investment	of	remittances	 is	not	 in	
land	 or	 farming	 techniques	 but	 on	 housing	 improvements	 and	 chil-
dren’s	education.		
Education	also	appears	 to	be	a	major	 focus	of	 the	community,	and	
remittances	are	often	invested	in	school	fees.		Those	who	have	educat-
ed	relatives	 in	urban	areas	also	appear	 to	 receive	 larger	 remittances	
and	are	therefore	able	to	send	a	higher	proportion	of	their	children	to	
school,	perpetuating	inequality	from	one	generation	to	the	next.
Source: Francis (2002); see endnote 154.
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generational ‘migration contract’ between a migrant and his or her parents, in 
which the (usually male) migrant moves and sends remittances in expectation 
of a subsequent inheritance.175
In terms of the consequences of migration for the poor, Oucho discusses 
the problems of balancing the costs and returns to rural areas of rural-urban 
migration, in terms of loss of labour, the cost of supporting the move, estab-
lishment in the town and returns in the forms of remittances, both economic 
and socio-cultural, and eventual return migration. He argues that migration 
creates dependency in rural areas of western Kenya on urban migrants and 
their remittances.176 
In addition to internal migration, international migration also has conse-
quences for the poor. Kenya is a country of origin and transit for trafficked 
persons, primarily women and children. Internal trafficking is reported to occur, 
with an estimated 200,000 street children in Kenya, a significant number of 
whom are believed to be engaged in forced labour or illegal activities, including 
prostitution.177 Women are also reported to be trafficked to Lebanon and other 
Middle Eastern countries, while children are sent to Uganda. Women from 
Eastern Europe and Asia are also believed to be sent through Kenya en route 
to Western countries.
With respect to remittances from abroad, Kenya has no official data, but 
apparently received in the order of KSH 32 billion (about $420 million) in 
2002.178 Internal remittances are also significant, with recent estimates sug-
gesting that migrants in urban areas remit between 13 and 22 per cent of 
their average incomes, whilst migration earnings constitute 20 per cent of total 
non-farm earnings even in remote rural areas, and up to 75 per cent of total 
non-farm earnings in areas close to major cities.179
In a recent study of how remittances are sent, the important role of commer-
cial banks was highlighted. Services such as telegraphic transfers, electronic 
funds transfers and bank drafts are typically used for large value transfers, as 
they offer the cheapest service for the transfer of large amounts. However, for 
smaller amounts, informal means or post office transfers are used, the latter 
especially in the case of domestic transfers, while bus and courier companies 
were also noted as important means to transport remittances.180
..	International	Migration	and	the	Brain	Drain
Evidence on the extent of the ‘brain drain’ in Kenya remains somewhat circum-
stantial, but this has not stopped the issue receiving some public prominence 
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inside the country. Just 152 Kenyan trained nurses were registered to work in 
the UK in 2002/03, hardly a major problem if correct and reflected in other des-
tination countries.181 Yet it is reported that only one out of 14 recent recipients 
of doctoral degrees in molecular biology has stayed in the country to continue to 
conduct research, with the others moving to Europe or North America.182 
Kenya’s Health Minister, Charity Ngilu, is quoted as saying that out of 6,000 
doctors trained in Kenya, just 600 remain in the country’s public hospitals183, 
whilst it is estimated that as many as 20 Kenyan doctors a month are leaving 
the country for better positions elsewhere.184 A recent news article discussing 
why many professionals overseas do not want to return cited political instabil-
ity as a major cause, as well as the lack of infrastructure.185 
One point that should be borne in mind is that many people leave Kenya 
before they complete their university education, such that although they repre-
sent a ‘brain drain’ of sorts, the full cost of their education has not been met by 
the Kenyan state. It has been estimated that 30,000 Kenyans go overseas to 
study in Europe, the United States and Asia each year because of the limited 
access to higher education at home.186 
..	Migration	Policies
In general, policies that have been developed in Kenya in relation to migration 
view it rather negatively. Kenya’s PRSP, although it is light on actual policy 
prescriptions, clearly has a negative view, stating that ‘traditional systems (of 
social protection) are disappearing due to the breakdown of the extended fam-
ily system, migration, economic hardships and poverty’.187 Efforts have been 
made to stem the brain drain, although these have received press criticism, 
as some observers have accused the government of devaluing degrees and 
making them an expensive waste of time.188 In particular, the introduction of 
parallel degree programmes, where students pay all of their fees themselves, 
has not overcome problems of quality control and quality assurance, whilst 
they appear to have created antipathy and resentment by students enrolled on 
state-funded degrees. 
There have also been some attempts to reverse migration of the highly 
skilled. The MIDA scheme in Kenya run by IOM and its RQAN predecessor 
are reported to have returned over 300 professionals to Kenya by the end of 
2002.189 However, Okoth suggests that it is more important to encourage the 
diaspora to contribute to nation and economic building from outside the coun-
try, giving examples such as Africa Online, which was founded by a Kenyan in 
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the US, rather than encouraging the highly skilled to return home in a situation 
where there are high levels of un- and underemployment.190 
A recent and worrying development that runs somewhat counter to previous 
policy to reverse emigration is the decision by the government not to renew 
the visas of many expatriate workers where it is judged that a Kenyan could 
do the job as well.191 
In relation to trafficking there are also problems, as the US State Department 
reports that Kenya does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking, even though it is making significant efforts to do so 
despite severe resource constraints192 (e.g. the Children’s Act of 2001 prohibits 
child labour that prevents children under 16 from going to school or that is 
exploitative and hazardous, and it also prohibits child sexual exploitation). 
Community-based District Advisory Committees, set up to monitor child 
labour issues at district and local levels, have assisted 2,803 children, includ-
ing 1,252 found working in hazardous conditions and 297 found working in 
forced labour conditions. The government is seeking to place street children 
in youth homes and social halls, providing them with meals and shelter to 
prevent them from being victimised. It also supports international organiza-
tions and NGOs to assist children in domestic service that includes education, 
skills training, counselling, legal advice, and a shelter for girls abused by their 
employers. A Human Trafficking Unit within the police was established in 
2002, but its focus so far has been on immigration fraud. Government offi-
cials were implicated in identification fraud to facilitate illegal smuggling and 
six foreign nationals were deported for suspected smuggling of citizens to the 
Middle East.
One area in which there appears to be a gap in both knowledge and policy 
relates to the situation of those forcibly displaced within Kenya. International 
estimates put the number of IDPs in Kenya during the 1990s at over half a mil-
lion, but despite the election of a new government in 2002, and a parliamen-
tary commitment to resettle displaced people passed in July 2003, relatively 
few IDPs appear to have returned to their homes so far.193 
A UN report on IDPs in Kenya noted that over 80 per cent of IDPs cited 
insecurity in their region of origin as their main reason for not returning.194 
Given that many IDPs are in urban areas and may be expected to remain 
there as part of ongoing urbanisation trends in the country, and the fact that 
resettlement proposals so far have been highly controversial, there is also a 
clear need for greater understanding of their situation and conditions in their 
current location.
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.	Tanzania
..1	Introduction
Like other countries in the region, there is a long history of rural-rural and 
rural-urban migration in Tanzania, dating to colonial and indeed pre-colonial 
times. The country also saw significant labour recruitment historically from 
neighbouring countries to provide a workforce for plantation agriculture. In 
post-independence Tanzania, following a socialist development path, long 
distance rural to rural migration slowed due to a policy focus on community 
level farming. However, seasonal labour migration still occurred in rural areas 
as extra labour was required during harvesting, e.g. to what were communal 
sisal farms near the coast. 
Migration to urban areas has continued unabated, and increased during the 
programme of government decentralisation and the creation of new provincial 
capitals in the 1970s. Since the economic liberalisation in the 1980s, rural to 
urban migration has become more permanent, with migrants investing profits 
in ventures in or near the towns rather than remitting them to their areas of 
origin.
Tanzania has also seen a dramatic growth in its refugee population. At 
the height of the Great Lakes refugee crisis from 1993-98 nearly 1.3 million 
people arrived in western Tanzania as refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, 
an influx that increased the populations of the Kagera and Kigoma regions 
by more than 50 per cent.195 At the end of 2002 there were still 689,000 
refugees in the country, with around 57,000 returns, but also nearly 100,000 
new arrivals during 2002.196 These refugees were mainly from Burundi, but 
also included over 100,000 from the DRC. The vast majority of these refugees 
continue to be housed in Kagera and Kigoma, and fall under the responsibility 
of UNHCR.197 
..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Relatively good and recent information is available about the links between 
internal migration and poverty in Tanzania, thanks to an IIED study which 
looked at movement out of rural areas in both the North and South of the 
country.198 In northern Tanzania, around Mt. Kilimanjaro, the migration of 
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young people, both male and female, is very common as a way to increase 
opportunities, especially for marginalised women.199 
In contrast to the situation in Kenya reported above, women were found 
more likely to migrate because daughters are usually excluded from land inher-
itance, so that they are encouraged to move away, either for marriage or work. 
Destinations of men and women were found to vary. Men were more likely to 
stay relatively close to their home area, or if they moved to Dar es Salaam, 
they were likely to be employed or apprenticed with a family member, whereas 
women were more likely to move further away, to Dar es Salaam or Mombasa, 
to reduce the shame to their families from working in bars or prostitution. 
These are often the only sources of employment open to women. 
In southern Tanzania, in the remote area of Lindi, over 60 per cent of fami-
lies interviewed were found to have at least one migrant family member, with 
this applying to households from across the economic spectrum.200 Young 
single men were the biggest migrant group, and most went to Dar es Salaam 
to work as street vendors. Migrants did not move locally to Lindi town due to 
the lack of opportunities. Married men were more likely to engage in temporary 
rural agricultural migration on a seasonal basis. Some migrants also moved to 
settlements and were allocated access to land. Although migrants were found 
to maintain strong links with their rural origins, return migration remained very 
unusual. Remittance levels were found to have dropped in the last 10 years, 
due to increased costs of living. 
Despite obvious difficulties faced by rural-urban migrants, it is interesting to 
note that they are not necessarily the poorest of city dwellers.201 This may be 
partly because they work longer hours. However, where migrants find it difficult 
to survive in urban areas, this may lead them to invest their savings in the 
urban rather than rural areas. One survey from the early 1990s showed 90 per 
cent of urban migrants had bought land near to the town to farm, rather than 
investing in their home village, since this offered the chance to commute daily 
and was closer to urban produce markets.202 
Recent work on remittances in Tanzania has found that intra-regional and 
domestic transfers remain costly as a result of limited money transfer options.203 
Whilst bank transfers are competitive for sending larger amounts in a single 
transaction, of much greater importance for the poor is the service offered by 
bus companies, which are making some inroads into a largely untapped mar-
ket.204 Informal means of transfer (e.g. sending money with relatives or return-
ing with money to the home area) remain the most commonly used, especially 
for transfers of small amounts (but see also Box 12). It is worth noting that 
not just migrants, but also traders in rural areas, such as buyers of coffee, tea, 
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tobacco, and other commodities, also tend to have to carry money to pay for 
the goods at the farm gate or trading centre where they purchase. 
It is also important to pay attention to those in rural areas who are not 
receiving remittances, since they are likely to be the most vulnerable of all. 
One study of rural-urban migration has focused on the extreme poverty of 
women who are on their own through divorce or widowhood, who may be cut 
off from remittances previously provided by a partner, but unable to return to 
their natal home.
Clearly the presence of large numbers of refugees in Tanzania is also a mat-
ter of relevance to pro-poor policy. The coexistence of refugees and the host 
community in western Tanzania has been a major issue, since the livelihoods 
of refugees and host communities interact, in both positive and negative ways 
for the refugee and host populations.205 Although many in the Tanzanian 
government have highlighted negative effects, it is worth noting that there 
are opportunities for local entrepreneurs to exploit the cheap labour and cap-
tive market that the camp dwellers provide. Refugees may benefit from local 
employment, which supplements income and food supplies, while increased 
local economic activity is good for both refugees and locals. 
However, within the host communities there are others who do not benefit, 
either because they lack the social or economic capital to take advantage of the 
rapid influx of investment and business opportunities, or possibly because their 
own employment prospects are affected by refugees looking for work. 
Tanzania is reported to be both a source and destination country for traf-
ficked persons.206 Children are reportedly trafficked internally from rural to 
urban areas for domestic work, commercial agriculture, fishing, mining, and 
prostitution, with refugee children perhaps especially vulnerable to being traf-
ficked to work on Tanzanian farms. To a lesser degree, Tanzania is also reported 
to be a destination country for trafficked persons from India and Kenya. 
Box 12: Changing attitudes to informal remittance 
transfer mechanisms
Despite	noting	the	importance	of	informal	remittance	transfer	mecha-
nisms	 in	East	Africa	 in	general,	and	especially	 for	 internal	 remittances,	
one	important	issue	is	that	there	appears	to	be	growing	mistrust	in	such	
informal	 transfer	mechanisms,	 and	 growing	 demand	 for	more	 formal	
money	 transfer	 mechanisms	 to	 be	 made	 available	 and	 accessible.	
Safety	is	a	pervasive	concern,	and	this	is	an	area	in	which	bus	compa-
nies	may	fill	an	important	niche.		
Source: Sander (2003); see endnote 178.
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..	Migration	Policies
Policies on migration have been developed in several areas in Tanzania. First, 
as elsewhere in the continent, there has been some attempt to reduce rural-
urban migration by focusing development initiatives on intermediate towns.207 
However, although this has given rise to some development, it has not reduced 
the levels of migration to large urban centres. More generally, there is little 
attempt in public policy-making to address the issue of voluntary or economic 
migration; the Tanzania PRSP fails to mention migration at all. 
In relation to forced migration, meanwhile, a contrast can be drawn between 
policy on ‘trafficking’ and on refugees. In relation to ‘trafficking’, the US reports 
that Tanzania does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimina-
tion of trafficking, although it is making significant efforts to do so.208 There is 
a multi-agency government task force working on child labour, including public 
awareness campaigns, while a section of the penal code was enacted in 2001 
that criminalises trafficking within or outside of Tanzania, although the penalty 
is seen as relatively light. During 2002, nightclubs were raided and 23 girls 
were repatriated to India for not having valid work permits. The owners were 
fined. However, financial constraints, corruption and a ‘poor understanding of 
the scope of the problem’ have contributed to a lack of government activity in 
this area.
In contrast, Tanzania’s refugee policy was for many years hailed as a model 
of progressive legislation by refugee lawyers, even if some parallels can be 
found between the country’s openness to refugees, and its historic recruit-
ment of labour from neighbouring countries to work in the plantation sector. 
However, following the crises in Rwanda and Burundi in the mid-1990s, there 
has been a significant change of government policy. 
The 1998 Refugee Act tightened the decision-making process to make it 
harder for asylum seekers to get refugee status, and reduced refugees’ right 
to freedom of movement. After large-scale and largely forced repatriation of 
Rwandans in 1996, President Mkapa stated in May 2001 that all Burundian 
refugees should be repatriated, blaming the refugees for insecurity and the lack 
of development in western areas of Tanzania. Some repatriations to Burundi 
have occurred, although this continues to be problematic because of insecurity 
inside Burundi.209
As in other countries covered by this review, the significance of migration 
as a livelihood strategy remains a largely overlooked area for public policy in 
Tanzania. Although long abandoned as official government policy, the history 
of ‘villagisation’ programmes in the country arguably reinforced a mindset 
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amongst policymakers that development was best promoted through interven-
tions in rural areas that would reduce the need for migration. However, recent 
emphasis on decentralised development does recognise the need for rural 
people to have some level of mobility to smaller towns.
In addition, it is worth noting that Dar-es-Salaam has a longstanding reputa-
tion as a centre of learning for African professionals. Although this has declined 
somewhat in recent years in the face of economic decline, there is scope 
for Tanzania to promote mobility of professionals within the East African (or 
indeed sub-Saharan African) region, both to assist in the development of the 
city and its region, and to tackle the problem of ‘brain drain’ away from the 
continent.
.	Uganda
..1	Introduction
In the late-colonial and early independence period, Uganda attracted labour 
migrants from neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and DRC to work on its 
plantations. However, with economic and political decline in the 1970s and 
1980s, there was no longer any demand for immigrant labour and educated 
and professional Ugandans started to leave for neighbouring countries and 
the West, creating net out-migration. Since the late 1950s, Uganda has also 
received a large number of refugees from various crises and conflicts in the 
region, especially from DRC, Rwanda and Sudan.
There are no accurate figures on the number of Ugandans living outside 
Uganda: an anecdotal estimate suggests 500,000 emigrants, including refu-
gees and migrants. At the end of 2002, there were around 38,000 Ugandan 
refugees registered worldwide, the majority in DRC.210 UNDESA figures sug-
gest net emigration of 14,000 each year from 1995-2000, with this figure 
predicted to rise in 2000-05.211 Only small numbers appear as new entrants in 
Europe or the US, suggesting that most emigration is probably to other African 
countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa and Botswana. 
In contrast, UNDESA figures suggest there were 529,000 immigrants in 
Uganda in 2000, representing 2.3 per cent of Uganda’s population, although 
this is down from previous periods – it was estimated that in 1969, over 5 
per cent of Uganda’s total population were migrants, mostly other Africans.212 
At the end of 2002, just over 200,000 of these migrants were recognised 
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refugees, although the real number of refugees and migrants is likely to be far 
greater. It is estimated that at least 50,000 refugees have self-settled and are 
not counted in these figures, while the Assistant Commissioner for Refugees 
has recently stated that Uganda hosts over 600,000 refugees alone, mainly 
from Sudan.213 
This study has found no recent figures on internal labour migration in 
Uganda, although provisional data from the 2002 census is in the process of 
being published, and suggests that urbanisation has slowed considerably from 
1991-2002. However, forced displacement has clearly increased in impor-
tance, with a report from September 2003 suggesting that the number of IDPs 
in Uganda had risen to over 1.4 million due to continued attacks in the North-
West by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).214 Since the 1990s, LRA attacks 
have caused periodic displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The 
government has moved much of the population into ‘protected villages’, a 
controversial move which has unfortunately not been able to guarantee the 
protection of IDPs who suffer periodic attacks and daily violence.215 
Another area of internal displacement has been the Rwenzori mountains in 
the west, as a result of attacks by the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), although 
security has now improved and people are returning. In eastern Uganda, thou-
sands have been displaced by violent raids by Karamojong pastoralists.216
..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Despite a lack of data on the movement of Ugandans either internally or 
abroad, it is striking that the most recent IMF figures for official remittances 
put the country in the top 20 countries worldwide in terms of the size of 
remittances proportional to GDP.217 Thus, in 2001, the figure was estimated 
at $483 million, without counting informal remittances. This represents some 
8.5 per cent of GDP, or nearly $20 per capita per annum, a sum that is higher 
than total foreign exchange earnings from coffee exports. An even higher figure 
of $600 million was quoted in a speech by the Minister of Internal Affairs of 
Uganda.218 The local press has given a lot of attention to these figures in the 
recent past.
Some caution is needed with respect to these figures. First, the $483 million 
figure is composed of $283 million in private remittances and $128 million 
in NGO inflows, which are not obviously a result of migration. Second, these 
inflows were partly offset by private outflows of $190 million in the year, leav-
ing net private remittances of just $94 million. Nonetheless, a recent study of 
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remittance behaviour has also looked at how people transfer money, finding 
that informal transfers via friends and family were most common, especially 
as many formal mechanisms were geographically or financially inaccessible 
for many people. This would suggest that official remittance figures might still 
understate their total value.
A number of new, innovative mechanisms to transfer money are also worth 
highlighting. People wishing to send smaller amounts often use courier com-
panies such as Elma Express and Yellow Pages, which have offices in most 
districts of Uganda. Users include internal migrants sending remittances and 
school fees to their families, and there is no limit on the amount that can be 
sent. A microfinance provider, Uganda Microfinance Union (UMU) has intro-
duced a pilot money transfer product in one of its branches in 2001 and seems 
to have been successful in attracting clients, although currently these tend to 
be larger corporations and franchises as the fees remain high.
Remittances from migrants are clearly important for the poor, but they do 
not necessarily reach everyone. A recent study of livelihood strategies in Mbale, 
Kamuli and Mubende Districts compared female- and male-headed house-
holds, finding a greater number of economically active adults migrated from 
the former than the latter.219 This affected male sons in particular. However, 
although remittances were found to play an essential role in female-headed 
households, this did not translate into enhanced income diversification, since 
off-farm opportunities for women were more circumscribed than for men.
There is also some evidence in Uganda of the association between HIV/AIDS 
and migration. Thus a longitudinal cohort study in a rural county of Masaka 
District found age and sex-standardised seroprevalence rates were 7.9 per cent 
overall, but only 5.5 per cent for adults who had not moved home; 8.2 per 
cent for adults who had moved within the village; 12.4 per cent for those who 
had moved to the neighbouring village; 11.5 per cent for those who had left 
the area; and 16.3 per cent for those who had joined the study area.220 The 
reported number of lifetime sexual partners was higher for individuals who had 
changed residence.
A study on the livelihoods of self-settled urban refugees in Uganda suggests 
that despite some obstacles, many refugees possess skills, have been able to 
find employment and have either achieved self-sufficiency or are on the way 
to doing so.221 The study therefore questions the policy of confining refugees 
to settlement camps where they cannot use their skills productively for them-
selves or the economy.
There are problems of internal and international trafficking (mainly to Sudan) 
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of women and children, especially for labour and prostitution. In particular, the 
rebel group LRA has abducted tens of thousands of adults and children and 
forced them to become domestics, sex slaves or rebel soldiers.
..	International	Migration	and	the	Brain	Drain
Uganda was one of the first countries in Africa to lose a significant proportion 
of its highly skilled population, mainly in response to economic and political 
decline in the 1970s and 1980s.222 Education had expanded quickly in Uganda 
after independence and its schools and universities produced relatively highly-
skilled people, who then could not find jobs. The main professionals leaving 
since the 1970s have been doctors, nurses, teachers/lecturers, engineers and 
scientists. Uganda was reported to have lost more than half its high-level and 
professional or technical personnel during Amin’s rule from 1971-1979. 
The first destinations were Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa, then Botswana 
and other African countries. A study from the 1980s found that Ghanaian and 
Ugandan nationals constituted 60 per cent of highly skilled migration into 
South Africa from East and West Africa at the time.223 Another survey sug-
gested net out-migration rates of up to 75,000 Ugandan nationals per year 
in the mid-1980s, of whom a high proportion were highly-skilled and profes-
sional migrants. An IMF study based on the 1990 US census shows 5,000 
individuals born in Uganda living in the US, of whom nearly 4,000 were terti-
ary educated.224 This was calculated to represent around 15 per cent of all 
those who had gained a tertiary education in Uganda. 
One more recent study suggests that the exodus of skilled professionals has 
continued, although possibly at a lower rate. Thus an attempt to trace univer-
sity graduates and secondary school leavers identified 414 graduates from four 
cohorts, of whom 321 were still in Uganda, 50 were deceased and 43 were 
overseas in late 2001.225 This suggests a slightly lower level of international 
migration among graduates, although one in five graduates from 1980 was 
living outside Uganda in 2001, whilst of the 1999 graduates, 8 per cent were 
already living overseas in 2001. Male graduates were three times more likely 
to emigrate than female graduates.
The latter study is of particular interest, since it looks at cohorts of school 
leavers, and factors in where they obtained any higher education. Here, it is 
interesting to note a decline in higher education overseas, perhaps reflecting 
declining opportunities. Whereas 42 per cent of 1980 school leavers had gone 
CHAPTER	THREE
||
on to higher education overseas, this figure had declined to 23 per cent in 
1994 and just 13 per cent in 1999. However, the proportion of women going 
overseas for higher education had risen slightly over this period.
..	Migration	Policies
In line with most other countries surveyed in this report, policy on migration in 
Uganda is broadly orientated towards international migration. Historically, this 
has involved measures to limit both emigration and immigration. In the late 
1980s, Uganda instituted measures to restrict emigration of professionals and 
civil servants through the imposition of foreign exchange restrictions and oblig-
atory clearance for travel abroad.226 In 1990, the Government reported that it 
considered emigration levels to be too high and said it would take measures to 
reduce emigration. However, by 2000, the Government described emigration 
levels as ‘satisfactory’ and had moved to a policy of ‘no intervention’.227 
Uganda has participated in the Return of African Qualified Nationals 
Programme (RAQN), which has successfully returned Ugandans from the 
UK, India, Canada and US. Like other countries in SSA, it has more recently 
turned its attention to mobilising the diaspora without necessarily promot-
ing return (e.g. government speakers have attended meetings of the Uganda 
North American Association to raise awareness of development objectives in 
Uganda).228 A number of other Ugandan groups in the diaspora have also 
focused on development issues, such as a variety of Buganda organisations 
mainly in North America, but also in Sweden, and an Acholi organisation 
(Kacoke Madit) established by Acholi communities in the diaspora to promote 
conflict resolution initiatives in northern Uganda.229
Uganda has signed and ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees and 
1967 Protocol and ILO Convention 182 on Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour. Uganda was also one of the first signatories of the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families and acceded in 1995. It has not signed ILO Convention 97 
on Migration for Employment, but it has launched a programme with the ILO 
to combat the worst forms of child labour as well as participated in the ILO 
regional programme to combat child labour in the commercial agricultural 
sector. 
The legislative framework on child labour is quite weak and prosecution 
low, while overall, there remains limited institutional capacity on migra-
tion. Sections of the government involved in migration policy include the 
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Immigration Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (immigration ‘facili-
tation’, monitoring and control), The Population Secretariat in the Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Planning (population policy, programmes 
and research), and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (national migration statis-
tics). The 1995 Constitution also stipulates the establishment of a National 
Citizenship and Immigration Board, although no evidence of its existence 
or work was found. In addition, Makerere University hosts the Refugee Law 
Project and other institutions do limited work on migration, such as the Centre 
for Basic Research and the Makerere Institute for Social Research.
Uganda’s refugee policy is still guided by the outdated 1960 Control of 
Aliens Act, which has been criticised for its inconsistency with international 
refugee law especially as regards the rights of refugees to own property, have 
access to courts and enjoy freedom of movement. Uganda has been discussing 
a new refugee law for some years and in December 2003, it was approved by 
the Cabinet and passed to Parliament. Meanwhile, the government has been 
implementing a Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) programme to try to promote 
integration of refugee assistance and local development, although this has also 
been criticised for concentrating almost entirely on the integration of service 
provision and not wider economic and social integration. 
The protection of refugees and especially IDPs in Uganda is a pressing 
problem. Every month there are abductions and killings in IDP camps in the 
northwest and the government’s policy of grouping the population in camps 
does not seem to be offering any protection. On occasion the government has 
been accused of forcibly removing refugees from Uganda.
The Uganda PRSP (or PEAP) does not mention migration or refugee issues, 
nor do the 2001 and 2002 APRs. However, the 2003 APR does mention the 
issue of refugees in Uganda, commenting on the high numbers of poor rural 
refugees and their impacts on the social and economic development of local/
host populations.230 These are mainly expressed in negative terms such as 
potential environmental damage (depletion, degradation of natural resources, 
scarcity of water), stretching of social amenities and food shortages. 
However, the APR also mentions possible positive effects of refugee pres-
ence including that international assistance to refugees may bring new services 
and infrastructure if properly planned and thus help development of the host 
region. The presence of refugees may also spark economic development if it 
brings additional market outlets, economic opportunities and innovative skills 
and practices.
The APR also discusses the draft Refugee Bill to be tabled to Cabinet and 
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Parliament in 2003. This aims to integrate refugee services within district 
development plans recognising that refugees and local communities share 
services. Thus Self Reliance Strategies (SRS) will be introduced for this pur-
pose to avoid the establishment of parallel structures and ‘foster the capacity of 
refugees to sustain themselves by allowing them to cultivate land, grow crops 
and to generate food and income in order to make them self-reliant’.
In contrast to the PRSP, Uganda’s latest Participatory Poverty Assessment 
(PPA) in 2000 does have a short discussion of migration as an economic or 
coping strategy. Noting that people migrate because of insecurity, to search 
for livelihood opportunities or seasonal water for animals, or to seek better 
services, it suggests that migrants find life hard but may succeed. Migrant 
men are described as often living in sub-standard accommodation and eating 
modestly, but being respected in their communities of origin where they are 
seen as better off. In addition to migration from all districts to Kampala, rural-
rural migration is also noted from Kalangala, Kapchorwa, Kisoro, Kabarole and 
Bushenyi districts. 
Box 13: Turnaround of policy on emigration
The	extent	of	 the	 turnaround	 in	policy	on	emigration	 from	Uganda	 is	
quite	 substantial,	 and	 according	 to	 recent	 articles	 in	 the	 New	Vision	
and	 Monitor	 newspapers,	 reflects	 the	 new	 goal	 of	 the	 Ugandan	
Government	 to	 develop	 the	 potential	 economic	 contribution	 of	 the	
diaspora,	rather	than	encouraging	them	not	to	leave.	
For	example,	the	 liberalisation	of	financial	markets,	especially	trade	 in	
foreign	exchange,	and	the	granting	of	permission	for	 foreign	denomi-
nated	 bank	 accounts,	 are	 said	 to	 have	 increased	 remittances.	 	 The	
Bank	 of	 Uganda	 Forex	 and	 Trade	 Department	 is	 now	 generally	 sup-
portive	 and	positively	 inclined	 towards	 granting	 permission	 to	Money	
Transfer	Organisations	(MTOs).		
There	 is	also	 some	 interest	 in	 using	Micro-Finance	 Institutions	 (MFIs)	as	
providers	of	money	transfer	services.	For	example,	the	Centenary	Rural	
Development	Bank,	a	microfinance	bank,	represents	one	of	the	global	
MTOs,	Western	Union,	as	a	sub-agent	to	a	commercial	bank,	Nile	Bank.	
An	interviewee	in	DFID	Kampala	suggested	the	government	now	actu-
ally	supports	people	going	abroad	to	gain	experience	and	has	been	
engaged	in	training	in	this	respect.
Source:	DFID	Uganda
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Although remittances are seen as playing an important part in rural people’s 
lives, with receipt of cash from children in the city as an important means 
of survival for many elderly people, they are also described as a ‘vulnerable 
source of income’. Migration of relatives to Kampala is seen as placing an 
initial strain on household resources.
At present, the Ugandan government’s capacity on migration issues seems 
to be almost wholly focused on immigration controls and statistics. There is a 
need to engage in capacity building so that the government can also examine 
migration and development issues and develop strategies. In particular, there 
is very little hard data or knowledge on the levels, nature and implications of 
internal migration in Uganda and the links between migration and livelihoods. 
The lack of reliable estimates of the numbers, location and status of Ugandans 
abroad may also be an impediment to programmes to engage the diaspora in 
Uganda’s development. There is also a particular need to collect more informa-
tion on self-settled refugees.
There is particular potential to build on new mechanisms for money transfer 
in Uganda such as courier companies and microfinance institutions to increase 
the possibilities of safe, cost-effective money transfer for internal and interna-
tional migrants. More research on the links between migration and develop-
ment might also help the government to develop a better understanding of the 
importance and risks of migration for the poor and develop strategies that can 
be integrated into the PRSP and rural development plans.
In addition:
• Further research on brain drain could also be done to get more accurate 
figures and details of the professions and destinations of those leaving. 
Uganda could learn from other countries that have put in place policies 
on brain drain, such as enhancing training and facilitating return.
• Uganda still hosts significant numbers of refugees and needs continuing 
support in this respect. In particular, there are a large number of self-
settled refugees about whom less is known. The Refugee Law Project 
at Makerere University has been working with this latter group and its 
research could be used to better inform policy.
• The levels of internal displacement and attacks on IDPs have now 
reached very high levels and there is an urgent need to find solutions 
to the conflict situation in the region and in the meantime to investigate 
better protection measures for IDPs.
• Finally, there is a need for more research and understanding of the prob-
lems of trafficking and exploitation of women and children in Uganda and 
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a more comprehensive government strategy, which prioritises protection 
and rights. There is also a need for Uganda to develop specific anti- 
trafficking legislation. 
.	Rwanda
..1	Introduction
There has been significant movement within, from and to Rwanda over past 
decades, especially forced migration due to conflict and famine. Labour migra-
tion, notably to the mines of DRC and plantations of Uganda, was important 
in the colonial and post-colonial period. Due to the complexities and scale of 
these historical population movements and a lack of statistics, it is difficult to 
obtain accurate figures on the current numbers of Rwandan nationals living 
outside Rwanda. 
A recent website established by the Rwandan government estimates that 
there are more than 100,000 economically productive Rwandans outside 
the country, but this is widely thought to be an underestimate.231 Rwanda 
Information Exchange has previously given a figure of 300,000 and in an 
interview with the Director of Immigration of the Government, he suggested 
the figure could be as high as 600,000.232 
As is the case with all such migration statistics, the problem is compounded 
by problems over whom to count. There are officially registered refugees and 
migrants, unregistered and self-settled refugees and migrants, asylum seekers, 
the children of Rwandan refugees or migrants born elsewhere, as well as those 
who are naturalised but consider themselves Rwandan and still maintain links. 
One author estimates that there were 3.7 million people of Rwandan origin 
living in neighbouring countries – principally Zaire – in 1990, over and above 
official refugee figures.233
UNDESA figures show huge inflows and outflows for Rwanda over the last 
decade, but this reflects the war, genocide and mass returns from 1994-98, 
and tells us little about underlying population movements.234 In contrast, 
Eurostat figures show that an average of just 694 Rwandan immigrants 
entered the EU each year from 1995-2001. According to UNHCR, there were 
75,000 Rwandan refugees and asylum seekers worldwide at the end of 2002, 
the majority in African countries – especially DRC and Uganda – with about 
10,000 Rwandan refugees in OECD countries. 
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In terms of inflows, UNDESA figures gave a migrant stock of 89,000 in 
2000, representing 1.2 per cent of Rwanda’s population.235 At the end of 
2002, there were just under 35,000 refugees, almost all from the DRC.236 
Unlike most neighbouring countries, internal migration rates appear to be low. 
Household surveys in 2000-01 revealed only 9 per cent of the population 
were living outside their province of birth (684,000 people). Kigali is the main 
destination, accounting for 37 per cent of internal migration.237 
Rwanda has not only produced large numbers of refugees, but also up to 
650,000 IDPs at the peak of internal displacement in 1998.238 Officially there 
are no longer any IDPs in Rwanda as they have been resettled. However, in 
October 2001, a multi-agency mission including UN, donor and Rwandan 
government representatives found there were still some 192,000 people liv-
ing in IDP-like conditions, and it seems unlikely that this number has since 
decreased.
There are also problems of internal and international trafficking of women 
and children, especially for labour and prostitution.239 There are an estimated 
2,000 child prostitutes in Rwanda, and tens of thousands of street children 
exploited for labour, plus some abductions by rebel militia. The government 
has been recently criticised for forcible round-ups of street children and their 
internment in centres where they are fed and receive training, but have no 
liberty.
Box 14: IDPs and villagisation in Rwanda
Estimates	of	the	number	of	IDPs	in	Rwanda	are	controversial	partly	due	
to	 the	Rwandan	government’s	National	Habitat	Policy	of	villagisation	
(imidugudu).	 	 This	 policy	was	 launched	 in	 1,	 both	 to	 solve	 acute	
housing	 needs	 of	 returnees	 and	 as	 a	 rural	 development	 strategy.	
However,	from	1-000,	there	was	some	evidence	of	forcible	move-
ment	of	people	into	such	planned	villages.
Accusations	of	 forced	movement	 to	planned	villages	have	 subsided	
since	000,	but	the	policy	of	villagisation	remains	and	there	are	ques-
tions	about	whether	this	programme	will	be	forced	or	voluntary	in	the	
future.		Furthermore,	the	key	element	of	Rwanda’s	draft	land	policy	is	
land	consolidation.	 If	 this	 is	 implemented,	 it	may	 result	 in	a	 far	 larger	
landless	class,	demand	for	labour	on	small	plantations	and	an	increase	
in	internal	migration.
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..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Compared with other African countries, rates of internal migration in Rwanda 
are low. This is related to the nature of Rwanda’s geography and rural econ-
omy, but also to past political controls on internal movement, which made it 
difficult for people to move especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although 
there is no policy of control in place at present, there are still some reports of 
the authorities creating obstacles to movement and of problems in receiving 
communities. 
Reflecting this lack of internal movement, there are virtually no studies in 
Rwanda of the links between migration, poverty and livelihoods, the impor-
tance of remittances, or their intergenerational impacts. Anecdotal evidence 
from NGOs suggests the causes of migration include periodic or chronic food 
insecurity; land pressure due to population density and continuous division of 
household land; and the chance of better employment, education and train-
ing opportunities. There is also some evidence from food security surveys of 
significant periodic and seasonal movement due to periodic or chronic food 
insecurity.240 
Chronic food insecurity in a N-S band west of Kigali (especially parts of 
Gikongoro, Butare and Gitarama) appears to have caused migration eastwards, 
and to provincial towns. At the present time, failed crops in Kigali-Ngali and 
parts of Kibungo have also caused fairly significant movement to Umutara and 
Kigali, whilst there are likely to be some migrant labourers working in the tea 
plantations of Butare and Gikongoro. There also appears to be a recent growth 
in rural-urban migration, focused almost entirely on Kigali. Urbanisation 
remains low in Rwanda at around 10 per cent, but the government’s 2020 
Vision Strategy anticipates that this will rise to 30 per cent by 2020.241
IMF figures on international remittances are also sketchy and incomplete, 
suggesting just $31 million between 1990-99, or just one per cent of all 
resource flows to the country. The Rwandan Ministry of Finance has, however, 
reported a figure of $40 million in official remittances for 2001 alone, and 
admits this is likely to be a significant underestimate. 
..	International	Migration	and	the	Brain	Drain
The limited figures that exist suggest that levels of emigration of tertiary edu-
cated and professionals are also currently relatively low for Rwanda.242 This 
may reflect the relatively low past level of tertiary level training in Rwanda, 
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although now the government is promoting higher education especially in sec-
tors such as ICTs, business administration and management, rates of emigra-
tion may increase.
However, as noted above, there may be quite a substantial Rwandan diaspo-
ra, which certainly includes a large number of the intelligentsia and profession-
al classes under the old regime. One relevant factor is that this group is very 
politically active. There are a number of opposition parties and platforms based 
in Europe and North America including INHANGO and CPODR (Concertation 
Permanente de l’Opposition Democratique Rwandaise) and the head of the 
banned MDR party, Faustin Twagiramungu, remains in exile in Belgium. In the 
absence of strong opposition inside Rwanda, these exiled opposition parties 
in some ways represent an alternative political voice (not all are extremists). 
Some have a large following amongst the diaspora, but it is not clear what 
support they enjoy amongst the population inside Rwanda.
..	Migration	Policies
The parts of the Rwandan government involved in migration issues and policy 
include:
• General Direction for Immigration and Emigration in the National Security 
Office: focus is currently on immigration controls, although there are 
plans to make it into a Migration Department with a mandate to oversee 
migration policy and strategy.
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs: oversees issues to do with Rwandan refugees 
and migrants overseas and has a new diaspora and development desk; 
looks after the Rwandan Global Diaspora Network.
• Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning: oversees remittance issues
• Ministry of Education: nominal brief on brain drain.
• National Statistics Office: monitors national migration statistics, but for 
now limited to census results. 
• National Refugee Council: established to oversee asylum cases and draw 
up a new immigration and asylum law.
In 2001, the government launched the Rwanda Global Diaspora Network 
(RGDN). One of the aims of this network is to establish a Diaspora Investment 
Bank, to try to promote the productive investments and savings of the diaspora. 
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The launch took place at the First Rwandan Diaspora Global Convention, held 
in Kigali in December 2001. There were 385 representatives from the Rwanda 
diaspora in 32 countries. Although this is an excellent initiative, it should be 
noted that reporting on other Rwandan websites at the time (not pro-govern-
ment) were critical and said that those members of the diaspora who went 
were hand-picked and the government failed to attract many Hutus.
In relation to emigration, the Director for Immigration and Emigration reports 
that nothing is done to stop movement abroad, except that the Ministry of 
Education (MINEDUC) has recently changed its policy on overseas scholar-
ships to try to encourage students to return to Rwanda afterwards. There 
are some initiatives to promote return of Rwandans from abroad. As well as 
the UNHCR voluntary return agreements, one aim of the RGDN is to engage 
diaspora skills and knowledge to contribute to Rwanda’s development. 
Rwanda has held discussions with IOM about a possible return scheme, and 
also with UNDP, which is launching a TOKTEN programme that aims to bring 
back short-term volunteers in engineering, medicine, and education. This will 
Box 15: Regional migration arrangements
A	 question	 for	 the	 future	 is	 whether	 or	 not	 Rwanda	will	 join	 the	 East	
Africa	Community	(EAC)	with	Tanzania,	Uganda	and	Kenya	and	thus,	
whether	or	not	the	proposed	provisions	on	free	movement	of	skilled	or	
all	labour	will	become	a	reality.	Rwanda	applied	a	few	years	ago	and	
its	application	was	refused	the	first	time.	However,	the	application	is	still	
on	 the	 table	and	 the	EAC	has	promised	 to	consider	 the	 issue	of	new	
members	later	this	year	once	the	EAC	customs	union	is	operational	after	
March.
In	the	past,	Rwanda	was	part	of	CEPGL	(Communité	Economique	des	
Pays	des	Grands	Lacs),	which	was	established	in	1	by	Rwanda,	Zaire	
and	Burundi.	In	1	CEPGL	adopted	a	convention	on	the	free	move-
ment	of	persons,	goods	and	services,	capital	and	rights	of	establishment	
in	member	countries.	However,	low	prevailing	skill	levels	kept	movement	
of	 high-level	 personnel	 among	 these	 countries	 to	 a	minimum	 (unlike	
Uganda	with	 its	good	quality	higher	education,	Rwanda	and	Burundi	
have	tended	to	rely	on	institutions	in	the	US,	Europe	and	Russia	for	uni-
versity	education)	and	these	protocols	were	never	properly	translated	
into	 national	 legislation.	 Furthermore,	 since	 the	 10s,	 conflict	 in	 the	
Great	Lakes	region	led	to	the	breakdown	of	CEPGL.	At	present	there	is	
little	likelihood	that	it	will	be	revived	in	the	near	future.	
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focus on attracting qualified expatriate nationals as short-term volunteers, 
and the US$5 million project has been designed with MINEDUC (Ministry of 
Education) and the Human Resource Development Agency (HRDA). Rwanda 
has signed and ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees and 1967 Protocol 
and ILO Convention 182 on Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour. It 
has also recently signed Protocols of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime including on Trafficking. It has not signed the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families.
Rwanda does not currently have an immigration and asylum policy. In the 
aftermath of the genocide, UNHCR handled these issues, but in 2001 Rwanda 
set up a National Refugee Council to rule on claims on a case-by-case basis 
and to develop a new immigration and asylum law. The draft law should go to 
Parliament this year.
Overall, Rwanda does not currently have explicit migration policies or activi-
ties in other areas such as migrant protection or trafficking, nor is there cur-
rently huge press attention to the issue. The PRSP makes a passing mention 
to the reintegration challenges since 1994 but does not specifically mention 
migration, whilst the PPA makes no mention of migration issues at all. The 
Rwandan media gives regular coverage to refugee issues, especially about 
returning refugees and the government’s refugee repatriation programme, but 
otherwise, there are hardly any reports about migration, aside from occasional 
reporting about migrants from neighbouring countries who live and work ille-
gally in Rwanda. Finally, Vision 2020 sets out some of the broad lines of the 
strategies of villagisation, land consolidation, urbanisation and decentralisa-
tion.
The Rwandan government has faced many challenges since 1994 and 
developing policies and strategies on migration issues has clearly not been a 
major priority. However, it does now appear to recognise that it needs to look 
at these issues and develop clear strategies. 
A first priority appears to be the finalisation of the immigration and asylum 
law in accordance with international standards. Research is needed on the 
links between migration and development such that migration issues can be 
integrated into the PRSP and rural development strategies as necessary. There 
is some concern within government about the current concentration of rural-
urban migration on Kigali and policy is seeking to focus some urbanisation of 
the other 12 main municipalities. 
A number of other areas can be highlighted where further work would be 
helpful:
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• It would be useful to understand whether there are de facto bureaucratic 
controls on population movement, whilst research on remittances in 
Rwanda – internal and international – including on the levels of formal 
and informal remittances, remittance behaviour and possible schemes to 
promote productive use of remittances would also be of value.
• Although brain drain does not currently seem to be a problem, it may 
become an issue in the future and the government could usefully learn 
from the experiences of other countries in putting in place policies to 
enhance the positive effects and minimise the negative effects of edu-
cated and professionals leaving.
• Programmes should be encouraged and supported to engage the diaspora 
productively and also increase confidence about long-term return, whilst 
an attempt should be made to better understand the transnational activi-
ties of the diaspora and their impacts in Rwanda.
• Underpinning some of the existing policy gaps is the lack of reliable 
estimates of the numbers, location and status of Rwandans abroad, and 
of the scale and nature of internal movements. Indeed, given the mas-
sive inflows and outflows due to the conflict and genocide, and the lack 
of statistics, it is hard to get an idea of the levels of voluntary or labour 
migration of Rwandans, whether internally or internationally. The govern-
ment is aware that this is an important issue and would like to commis-
sion some research in this area.
• Rwanda needs to develop its capacity to collect and monitor both inter-
national and internal migration statistics with the cooperation of destina-
tion countries. There is a need to continue to monitor the flow of asylum 
seekers out of Rwanda even if the numbers are limited. The majority of 
the political opposition is in exile and some of those who continue to 
leave cite the tight political control and inability to criticise the govern-
ment. Refugee flows and returns may be a good barometer of the political 
environment.
• There is also a need to monitor the situation of Rwandan refugees to 
ensure they are being accorded adequate protection in their countries 
of asylum and that return programmes are voluntary. The case of the 
thousands of unregistered or self-settled refugees in Uganda and DRC is 
particularly challenging as these refugees lack status and protection.
• The future implementation of Rwanda’s Habitat and Land policies is 
intended to promote the movement of the population to villages and cit-
ies and the consolidation of agricultural land. This will need monitoring 
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closely to ensure movements are voluntary. Also, if implemented these 
policies may well provoke an increase in internal migration.
• Finally, there is a need for more research and understanding of the prob-
lems of trafficking and exploitation of women and children in Rwanda and 
a more comprehensive government strategy which prioritises protection 
and rights.
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.1	Overview
• Southern Africa has a long history of intra-regional labour migration, dat-
ing back to the mid-nineteenth century. Migration was the single most 
important factor underlying the emergence of a single regional labour 
market. Longstanding patterns, forms, and dynamics of migration have 
undergone major restructuring in the last two decades with considerable 
implications for sound migration management, livelihood strategies of 
the poor, human rights observance, and poverty and inequality reduction 
policies.
• The end of apartheid, the integration of South Africa with the SADC 
region and SADC’s reconnection with the global economy have brought 
a major increase in legal and undocumented cross-border flows and new 
forms of intra-regional mobility. 
• Growing rural and urban poverty and unemployment have pushed more 
people out of households in search of a livelihood. One aspect of this has 
been the feminization of poverty in rural Southern Africa and a significant 
gender reconfiguration of migration streams. 
• Southern Africa has experienced a major depletion of its human resource 
base through emigration (‘brain drain’) over the last two decades. South 
Africa and Zimbabwe are most affected. No countries have developed 
successful retention strategies or offsetting immigration strategies.
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• Migration is a critically important survival strategy for hundreds of thou-
sands of households throughout the region. This reality is rarely recog-
nised in policies directed at poverty and inequality reduction.
• Recurrent civil strife in the rest of Africa has generated mass refugee 
movements and new kinds of asylum seekers to and within the region. 
The cessation of hostilities and threat has confronted countries of asylum 
with issues of repatriation and integration.
• Supporting regional integration and cooperation within Southern Africa is 
a major goal of SADC, and is also consistent with NEPAD. Migration is a 
major cross-cutting issue in the recent SADC Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan. 
• Regional policy forums such as the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa 
(MIDSA) represent an important vehicle for promoting regional inter-state 
dialogue, migration policy harmonization and raising the national and 
regional profile of migration as a development issue. 
• Development projects and programmes specifically targeted at mobile 
populations have not been a major feature. Migrants are the incidental 
beneficiaries or victims of other interventions (e.g. rural development, 
trade policy, food security programmes). Mainstreaming migration means 
foregrounding migrant populations and communities as viable agents of 
self-development. 
• Migration data collection and analysis is outdated and unusable to policy-
makers in many countries. Initiatives to build a local sustainable capac-
ity for migration information collection and analysis (within and outside 
government as appropriate) could be supported.
• The extent to which rural and urban households engage in internal and 
cross-border migration to maintain incomes and reduce risk has been 
seriously underestimated in Southern Africa. The failure of governments 
and international agencies to integrate migration impacts into poverty and 
inequality reduction strategies is one unfortunate consequence. Not only 
is better information needed on the poverty reduction potential of migra-
tion, but concrete strategies need to be developed to assist migrants and 
migrant households to maximise the benefits of migration (e.g. through 
support of migrant and refugee associations, burial societies, micro-credit 
facilitation, rural cooperatives, and migrant SMMEs).
• The relationship between migration and HIV/AIDS is increasingly clear. 
Migration is a vector for disease transmission, but mobile populations 
CHAPTER	FOUR
|1|
are particularly vulnerable to infection. A review of past experiences and 
programmes would assist the development of appropriate models of pre-
vention, peer education, palliative care and treatment roll-out plans. At 
the regional level, the development of the Partnership for HIV/AIDS And 
Mobile Populations in Southern Africa (PHAMSA) is an important new 
research, policy, advocacy and networking possibility deserving of sup-
port. Finally, there is a significant dearth of capacity in the management 
and evaluation of HIV/AIDS project programming, leading to poor imple-
mentation and results. Training initiatives to build capacity could enhance 
outcomes associated with improved management of the epidemic. 
Existing programmes directed at migrants and migrant populations are 
not working. A sounder knowledge base would assist in the development 
of workable models. 
• As regards policy reform, several countries in the region have recently 
overhauled or are in the process of reforming outdated immigration and 
migration laws. The quest for greater control underpins these initiatives. 
Migration policy and legislation needs to be read and reformed in ways 
that facilitate economic development and alleviate poverty. The develop-
ment and implementation of new policy needs to be given a pro-poor 
optic to assess the implications for the poor. Where these consequences 
are negative or non-facilitative, these need to be brought to the attention 
of policymakers and adjustments sought. At the regional level, SADC and 
COMESA have both developed plans for greater freedom of movement 
along the EU model. Individual countries have been wary of, and stymied, 
this process. A systematic regional study of the positive and negative 
implications of freedom of movement is long overdue. 
• The amount of basic information on migration causes, consequences and 
impacts has grown considerably in recent years. South Africa is particu-
larly well-researched in this regard, other countries less so. A long-term 
governmental capacity for collecting nationally representative migration 
information at the household level needs to be developed. National 
migration household surveys conducted at regular intervals would provide 
invaluable data on migration/poverty connections and allow monitoring 
of change over time. National statistical offices, working in regionally 
coordinated fashion, would be the best location for such a venture.
• The lack of reliable data on the numbers and transnational connec-
tions of Southern Africans living abroad is an obvious gap. The poten-
tial of diasporic connections in facilitating development has not been 
addressed. 
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• Regional economic integration and harmonization of migration and immi-
gration policies is a matter of urgency for the Southern African region. The 
likely impact of greater freedom of movement within SADC is unknown. 
A systematic study of this issue would help countries make a realistic 
assessment of consequences.
.	Region-Wide	Issues
Migration was probably the single most important factor tying together all of 
the various colonies and countries of the sub-continent into a single regional 
labour market during the twentieth century. 
Established patterns, forms, and dynamics of migration have undergone 
major change in the last two decades with considerable implications for liveli-
hood strategies of the poor and for government poverty and inequality reduc-
tion policies. Southern Africa is now, quite literally, a region on the move.243 
Several fundamental reasons are responsible for this dynamic state of affairs:
• The end of apartheid, a system designed to control movement and 
exclude outsiders at all costs, produced new opportunities for internal and 
cross-border mobility and new incentives for moving. 
• The ensuing integration of South Africa with the SADC region brought 
new forms of intra-regional mobility. 
• More broadly, South Africa’s reconnection with the global economy has 
opened the country and region up to forms of migration commonly associ-
ated with globalization.244 
• Domestically, rural and urban poverty have pushed more people to move 
in search of a livelihood. The feminization of poverty in rural Southern 
Africa and a significant gender reconfiguration of migration streams have 
resulted.245 
• HIV/AIDS has also impacted considerably on migration. Not only is 
the rapid diffusion of the epidemic itself inexplicable without reference 
to the mobility of people but new forms of migration are emerging in 
response.246 
• Finally, the social and economic impact of the Mozambican and Angolan 
civil wars continue to reverberate. Recurrent civil strife in the rest of Africa 
has generated mass refugee movements and new kinds of asylum seek-
ers to and within the region. The cessation of hostilities and threat has 
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confronted countries of asylum with issues of repatriation and integra-
tion.
Regional and national programmes and migration policy responses directed 
at poverty and inequality reduction within migrant communities and between 
migrants and non-migrants must take cognizance of the extraordinary dyna-
mism and instability of migration forms and patterns in the region. Governments 
wedded to legal frameworks of control and exclusion are finding it increasingly 
difficult to cope. The fundamental policy challenge is to move the states of 
Southern Africa to a regionally harmonised and consistent set of policies that 
emphasise good governance, sound management and client-centred service 
delivery.247 In addition, because migration is a cross-cutting phenomenon, 
it needs to be integrated into all facets of state policymaking and planning, 
including programmes and strategies to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. 
For this to happen, migration’s key role needs to be documented by researchers 
and recognised by policymakers. 
This section highlights the continuities and changes in the regional migra-
tion regime over the last two decades. Subsequent sections examine the policy 
implications of these changes. The states of Southern Africa can be divided 
into migrant-sending (Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho) and migrant-receiving 
states (Botswana, Namibia). A few, such as South Africa, fall into both cat-
egories. Others, such as Tanzania and Zambia, have experienced major refugee 
influxes in the last decade but do not tend to send or receive large numbers of 
labour migrants. Several migration streams can be identified. Trends increas-
ingly evident in each category can be expected to continue in the foreseeable 
future:
• Restructuring of traditional contract labour systems
• Growth in the volume and complexity of cross-border mobility
• Declining levels of legal migration to and within the region
• Expansion in undocumented migration and human trafficking
• Increase in skills brain drain from the region
• Resettlement and reintegration of mass refugee movements 
• Feminization of cross-border migration
• Growth in intra-regional, informal, cross-border trade
• Rapid urbanization and reconfiguration of rural-urban linkages
Male labour migration to the mines (of South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe) 
and commercial farms and plantations (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Swaziland) is 
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the most enduring form of legal cross-border labour migration within the region, 
beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing to the present.248 Mine 
migration was the most highly regulated through systems of recruitment under 
a single agency, the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). 
By the 1990s only the South African gold and platinum mines continued 
to employ large numbers of domestic and foreign migrants; other mining 
sectors in South Africa (such as coal mining) and elsewhere in the region 
(Zambia, Zimbabwe) had moved to local and/or stabilised workforces before 
the 1990s.249 During the 1990s, the South African mines experienced major 
downsizing and retrenchments creating considerable social disruption and 
increased poverty in supplier areas. Interestingly, the mines laid off local work-
ers at a much faster rate than foreign workers. As a result, the proportion of 
foreign workers rose from 40 per cent in the late 1980s to close to 60 per 
cent today. This ‘externalization’ of the workforce was particularly beneficial to 
Mozambique. Mozambicans now make up 25 per cent of the mine workforce, 
up from 10 per cent a decade ago.
Remittance levels have remained stable in Mozambique but fell during the 
1990s to many areas, especially Lesotho, Swaziland and the Eastern Cape. 
This has presented a major challenge for households formerly reliant on mine 
remittances. Poverty levels have increased as have domestic and family ten-
sions. Other family members have begun to migrate in response. Various 
efforts have been made to soften the impacts of retrenchments. These include 
the community development programmes of the Mineworkers Development 
Agency, the CARE programme adopted by Canadian-owned Placer Dome, the 
rural development programmes of TEBA and an IOM project on retrenched 
miners.250 The overall impact of these interventions has yet to be systemati-
cally assessed but initial signs are not that encouraging. 
The numbers of people legally crossing borders throughout the Southern 
African region has exploded in the last decade. In South Africa, for example, 
the annual number of legal visitors from other SADC countries has increased 
from around 1 million in the early 1990s to over 5 million at the present time. 
Border posts throughout the region have experienced major increases in the 
volume of human traffic. The pressure on limited border control resources has 
been enormous, with long delays and inefficiency experienced at many border 
posts. Corruption has become endemic at many posts as travellers seek to 
jump queues and gain unlawful entry. In addition, the region has experienced 
a major influx of Africans from other parts of the country as well as significant 
growth in tourism arrivals from overseas. Intra-regional tourism has also grown 
to significant levels.
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South African stated-purpose-of-entry data is available by country from 
Statistics South Africa on a monthly basis. Although limited to designated 
categories (holiday, business, study, work, immigration), the numbers do not 
suggest that the majority of people enter for work or work-seeking. This is 
confirmed by SAMP research which reveals a multiplicity of motives for cross-
border movement.251 Cumulatively, in 6 SADC countries less than 25 per cent 
of international migrants moved to work or look for work. However, there was 
considerable inter-country variation: Mozambique (67 per cent), Zimbabwe 
(29 per cent), Lesotho (25 per cent), Namibia (13 per cent) and Swaziland 
(9 per cent). Other major reasons included visiting/tourism: Namibia and 
Swaziland (58 per cent), Lesotho (36 per cent), Mozambique (17 per cent), 
and Zimbabwe (16 per cent); and trading and shopping: Zimbabwe (42 per 
cent), Lesotho (22 per cent); Swaziland (12 per cent), Mozambique (6 per 
cent), and Namibia (3 per cent). Relatively minor reasons included study, 
business, and medical treatment. Available data from other SADC countries 
shows a marked increase in inward and outward legal border crossing in most 
other states.252 Studies also show similar variety in stated reasons for entry. 
Again, the primary stated reason is not to work but for visiting, tourism and 
trade and business.
SAMP research shows that the majority of cross-border migrants in Southern 
Africa remain circular migrants. In other words, although many stay for longer 
than initially intended their visits are generally seen as temporary not perma-
nent. Across a whole range of indices, migrants tend to prefer living in their 
own countries. The major migrant-receiving countries (South Africa, Botswana) 
are seen as superior only in terms of employment and economic opportunity 
and perhaps health facilities. In every other respect – personal and family 
safety, educational opportunities, access to land, national culture, etc. – home 
countries are viewed as preferable. The obvious conclusion is that economic 
stability and growth at home is the single most important factor in slowing 
labour migration across borders. The only major exception to the tendency of 
impermanence is in the case of Mozambicans who came to South Africa during 
the civil war of the 1980s and have stayed rather than return.
Most countries of the region tend to see in-migration more as a threat than 
an opportunity. Migrants are viewed as carriers of disease, takers of jobs and 
perpetrators of crime. Policy has tended to focus, as a result, on control and 
exclusion. Unfortunately, this general mentality extends to legal immigration. 
Few, if any, of the SADC states have pro-active immigration policies. Rights of 
permanent residence and settlement are extremely difficult to obtain in most 
countries. Until the 1990s, South Africa was the only country with a pro-
active immigration policy (in that case to recruit white immigrants to boost the 
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economy and shore up white rule). After 1994, even South Africa became an 
anti-immigrationist state. After independence, most countries did solicit foreign 
skilled workers on contract in the public sector but this was always subject to 
active Africanization and localization employment policies. Only Botswana has 
taken a more open position on skilled immigration, but there are strong indica-
tions that this too is about to change.
Clearly, pervasive anti-immigrationist policies are at odds with the realities of 
globalization and global skills markets. SADC is in significant danger of becom-
ing a seller but never a buyer in this marketplace, to its own detriment. Events 
such as the decimation of workforces by HIV/AIDS may force the region’s hand, 
but for now it appears that most countries are more prepared to rail against 
and try and prevent the exodus of skilled nationals than adopt pro-active immi-
gration policies to attract economic immigrants from other jurisdictions in order 
to stimulate growth and employment.
The migrant stream that attracts most public and official attention is ‘undoc-
umented’ or ‘illegal’ or ‘unauthorised’ migration. The first point to emphasise 
is that clandestine border crossing in Southern Africa is nothing new. Second, 
while the volume has undoubtedly increased in the last two decades, it hardly 
warrants the aquatic imagery that is generally applied to the phenomenon 
(‘floods’, ‘tidal waves’, etc.). Third, undocumented migration tends to be driven 
by economic circumstances and, in some cases, desperation. Finally, enforce-
ment in all countries tends to focus on identifying and deporting violators with 
the minimum of due process. In terms of sheer volume, South Africa is eas-
ily the regional leader, having deported over one million people since 1990. 
Significantly, the vast majority of deportees (upwards of 80 per cent) are sent 
home to only two countries, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Tensions between 
these countries have simmered below the surface on this issue for some time. 
Bilateral commissions have done little to either stop the flow of migrants or 
change the mentality of exclusion and control.
Studies of sectors where undocumented migrants are employed in the region 
have revealed consistent violation of labour standards, sub-minimum wages, 
rampant economic and sexual exploitation, and great instability and fear 
among migrants. These sectors include commercial agriculture, construction 
and secondary industry.253 A systematic regional investigation of undocument-
ed migration and irregular employment has yet to be undertaken.254
The fundamental contradiction facing most countries is this: enhanced 
regional integration would suggest the need for greater mobility in the factors 
of production (including labour) but nationalist sentiments cast foreigners as a 
threat to the job security of citizens. As long as migration is viewed as a threat 
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not an opportunity for sending and receiving states, the legal drawbridge is 
likely to remain up. Without legal means to sell their labour or pursue economic 
livelihood strategies across borders, migrants will turn to clandestine methods. 
The predictable result has been a massive ‘trade’ in forged documentation and 
police corruption as migrants buy the right to stay, an increase in trafficking 
and the disintegration of sound and professional management practices. 
In terms of forced migration, both Mozambique and latterly Angola have 
experienced major outflows of refugees to neighbouring countries and signifi-
cant internal displacement. In Mozambique, for example, the civil war is esti-
mated to have produced 4 million IDP’s and a further 1.5 million refugees.255 
In the 1990s, the majority of refugees to Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe 
retuned home but not without considerable uncertainty and hardship. Not so 
the 350,000 refugees who fled from southern Mozambique to South Africa, 
many of whom remained. 
In the 1990s, there has been a new and steady southward flow of forced 
migrants, undocumented migrants and students. South Africa now boasts 
sizable Francophone African and Nigerian urban communities.256 Between 
1994 and 2001, 64,000 applications were made for refugee status in South 
Africa. Foremost amongst these were applicants from the African countries of 
DRC (7,700), Angola (6,900), Somalia (5,900), Nigeria (5,300), Senegal 
(4,500), Ethiopia (3,200) and Burundi (2,000), and the Asian countries of 
India (6,400), Pakistan (5,300) and Bangladesh (1,300). 
Refugee determination is heavily influenced by national origin, as reflected in 
acceptance rates. Somali applicants had a 90 per cent success rate, Angolans 
65 per cent, DRC 64 per cent, and Burundi 46 per cent. On the other hand, 
Indian applicants have an 88 per cent rejection rate, closely followed by 
Nigeria (82 per cent), Senegal (82 per cent), and Bangladesh (72 per cent). 
Traffickers have battened on to this movement and sought to profit by it.257 
Other organizations have suggested that intra-regional trafficking for sexual 
exploitation is a growing cause for concern.258
SADC does not have a coordinated regional response to the challenge of 
internal and external refugee movements. Individual countries are left to shoul-
der the burden as best they can with support from international agencies. All 
are signatories to the major refugee conventions but few have advanced or 
adequate systems of refugee determination in place. Regional burden-sharing 
is a key concept that SADC could easily turn into a reality. 
Migration in Southern Africa is profoundly gendered. In the colonial period, 
women were generally prohibited from migrating. As the primary reasons for 
migration in the region have been for labour, men have dominated internal and 
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cross-border migration. Today women and men are differently involved in and 
affected by migration. Although women are increasingly part of the movement 
of skilled migrants in the region and out of it, and have proportionally higher 
educational levels than male migrants, they are more likely to be involved in 
less skilled and informal work and therefore may be more likely to be irregular 
migrants, with the attendant disadvantages, as it is harder for them to access 
legal migration channels.259
Women are migrants in their own right, as well as partners of migrant male 
spouses.260 Notwithstanding this, a recent study found that male respondents 
were more likely to have been to South Africa than female (Mozambique: 41 
per cent of men and 9 per cent of women; Zimbabwe: 25 per cent and 20 per 
cent; Lesotho: 86 per cent and 76 per cent).261 Traditional areas of employ-
ment for women migrants (internal and cross-border) have been agriculture 
(particularly seasonal work), domestic work, the service sector and trade. Men 
are more likely to have formal employment, particularly in the industrial (espe-
cially mining), agricultural and construction sectors. 
The Southern African region is being increasingly integrated into transna-
tional continental and regional trade networks, both formal and informal.262 
Informal traders or small entrepreneurs are amongst the most enterprising and 
energetic of contemporary migrants. They face major bureaucratic and other 
obstacles, even within a region heading for free trade by 2008. Trading is a 
key means of livelihood for many households in some countries and needs 
to be better understood and, wherever possible, facilitated by policy changes 
governing entrance, exit and customs duties. Work could also be done with 
traders and traders associations to build capacity, provide micro-finance and 
maximise the development spin-offs of informal trade.
All of the countries of SADC have experienced rapid post-independence 
urbanization, which, with few exceptions, has shown few signs of slowing. The 
primary evidence for rapid urbanization lies in census data. Unfortunately, with 
the exception of South Africa, national urbanization data is generally a decade 
or more old. However, as the results of the 2002 round of censuses become 
available, a relatively updated picture will emerge. Case study evidence has 
shown that:
• The lifting of colonial and apartheid restrictions on internal movement 
made a significant difference to many poor households who were freer to 
pursue livelihood strategies away from the rural areas.
• Rapid urbanization is largely a function of rural poverty. Environmental 
shocks, such as drought and flooding, have accelerated this process, as 
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has the failure of the rural development industry and state agricultural 
policies to stabilise populations in the countryside.
• The displacement of poverty from the countryside to the town has led to 
new forms of survival strategy such as a greatly enlarged informal sector 
in most cities and the growth of urban agriculture. Both of these proc-
esses and the enabling policy responses they have provoked have been 
examined in considerable depth in many SADC countries.
• Rural-urban migration is not a one-time, all-inclusive process. The 
emergence and spread of the ‘geographically-split household’ is one 
of the major defining features of post-independence internal migration. 
Research in Namibia has demonstrated that new forms of rural-urban 
reciprocity have been underwritten by circulatory migration. Urban food 
security for the poor is predicated on the flow of remittances to the coun-
tryside and foodstuffs to the city.
• Most first-generation city-dwellers maintain strong rural linkages. However, 
there is growing evidence that the ties become much weaker with sec-
ond- and third-generation in-migrants. The South African and Zambian 
cases suggest that such ties may eventually be severed altogether.
The clear implication of this seems to be that much greater attention should 
be focused on urban poverty and food security than happens at present and 
rather less on ‘rural development’ as traditionally conceived.
Urban poverty in some cities is prompting some reverse migration (de-urban-
ization) in countries such as Zambia. The viability and desirability of this as a 
livelihoods strategy is uncertain but depends critically on the viability of rural 
production and access to productive resources. In many countries of SADC, 
this trend could therefore accelerate in the future. In countries like South Africa 
and Lesotho it is highly unlikely.
.	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Cross-border and internal migration constitute significant livelihood strate-
gies for Southern Africans across all skill levels. Internal and cross-border 
migration are integral to regional labour markets, and therefore, regional liveli-
hood strategies. Migration has a strong relationship to poverty, social exclusion, 
as well as poverty alleviation.263 Yet, there is little evidence of acknowledge-
ment of these relationships (let alone migration itself) in national, donor, and 
international pro-poor policies. 
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Cross-border and internal migration takes many forms. Studies of cross-
border migration show that circular migratory patterns are prevalent.264 Thus, 
migrants may leave family members in their home country maintaining access 
to land and housing in rural and urban areas. Studies by SAMP indicate that 
regional cross-border migrants to South Africa say they have better access to 
land, housing and services in their home countries and that they are travelling 
for work and trading opportunities. Migration is, therefore, a way to amass 
capital and income. Maintaining two homes may be expensive, but it enables 
migrants to retain access to land and housing.
For similar reasons, circular migration is also a feature of internal migration. 
In South Africa, apartheid restrictions on movement and settlement enforced 
the development of circular migration. Studies indicate that the most common 
form of internal migrancy in the region has been rural-urban. Rural-urban 
migration of individuals and families reflects opportunities available in urban 
areas and pressure on land in rural areas.
Surprisingly, given levels of migration, data on the remittance behaviour 
of internal and cross-border migrants and receiving households is limited. 
Similarly, little information is available on their impact on national economies, 
economic development, alleviating inequalities, and on financial systems in 
the region. Furthermore, remittances in the form of goods are not recorded. 
And, little is known about any differences in the remittance behaviour of male 
and female migrants. SAMP is currently undertaking an eight-country study on 
remittance behaviour and household livelihoods. 
Data on cash remittances is hard to gather as foreign exchange regulations, 
weak financial infrastructures and high transfer costs in formal systems encour-
age the use of informal channels for transferring money. This is because: 
• Formal banking systems can be difficult and expensive to access. 
• Getting a bank account is hard for low-income earners and semi-literate 
people.
• Transfer costs in formal banking systems can be higher than in informal 
systems, especially for small amounts. 
• Many areas (particularly rural) are not serviced by formal banking sys-
tems.265 
• Irregular cross-border migrants often cannot access formal transfer sys-
tems.
• Foreign exchange regulations and differential exchange rates may inhibit 
the use of formal systems, e.g. Zimbabwean cross-border migrants are 
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unlikely to use formal channels as official exchange rates are far below 
black market exchange rates.266
National level data on cross-border and internal remittances are largely 
unavailable. However, in 2001 in Lesotho, remittances were estimated to 
contribute as much as 26.5 per cent of GDP.267 A significant proportion of 
this comes from mineworkers. To encourage remittances, under bilateral 
agreements, Lesotho and Mozambican mineworkers receive part of their pay 
as deferred pay. Therefore, a portion of their pay is compulsorily sent to their 
home country where it is collected. Mozambican mineworkers can also take 
advantage of reduced tariffs on goods ordered and sent home by a specific 
company. Other than these schemes, there is no evidence of government poli-
cies to encourage remittance transfer. Non-national mineworkers on the South 
African mines can use a bank run by the main recruiting company, TEBA bank, 
to transfer funds. 
For national economies, cross-border remittances are a source of foreign 
exchange and taxes, contribute to the balance of payments, and provide capital 
for enterprises and household investment.268 Global research on remittance 
flows shows that in developing countries they are exceeded only by foreign 
direct investment, and exceed donor and capital market flows, and are more 
stable.269 Given the high rates of migrancy in the region, it is possible that the 
same holds true in Southern Africa. Furthermore, remittances go directly to 
households. Remittances from internal migrants spatially redistribute income 
and relieve some income distribution inequalities.
Remittances to home areas contribute to household livelihoods. Remittances 
may be in goods or cash. Remittances can play a key role in the livelihoods 
of migrant households allowing for social, or human capital investment in 
education, health and housing and food. They may also be used as capital to 
invest in income-earning household inputs as well as to capitalise entrepre-
neurial activities. It is commonly held that remittances flow from migrants in 
urban areas to rural households. However, research from Namibia on internal 
migration suggests that remittances promoting food security may be a two-way 
flow.270 
To enable migrant households to make the most of their earnings, it appears 
there is a need for affordable, accessible banking systems available in rural 
and urban areas and which can handle international transfers. Further research 
is required to understand the needs of migrants for channels to remit money 
and goods effectively so best use can be made of remittances once they are 
received. Assistance with the development of effective, safe banking systems 
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and foreign exchange regulations which can accommodate low-income earners 
and which meet international requirements (e.g. FATF) are required. 
Informal sector cross-border trade is important to the transfer of goods and 
commodities in the region. Initial studies of cross-border trade in the region 
suggest that:
• It is significant to the movement of food and agricultural goods in the 
region;
• It plays a role in regional food security;
• It plays a part in the development of small and medium enterprises;
• It is a household livelihood strategy;
• It engages a significant number of women; 
• It constitutes a significant proportion of cross-border traffic in the 
region;
• Policymakers have yet to engage with this trade.271
Cross-border traders are also involved in other entrepreneurial activities 
in the region. Initial research in South Africa suggests they bring skills and 
employment opportunities for nationals.272 
However, more needs to be known and understood about the extent of infor-
mal sector cross-border trade in the region and its role in livelihood strategies 
and food security, as well as an income-earning opportunity for women. Further 
research is required to better understand the relationship between these 
entrepreneurs and their businesses, poverty alleviation, agricultural commod-
ity and consumption chains and food security. This research could inform the 
development of migration, trade, and investment policies which include these 
entrepreneurs and that could promote the positive aspects of this sector and 
ameliorate the negative. Furthermore, it could inform the development of train-
ing programmes for participants to enable them to develop their businesses as 
well as the development of facilitating financial systems.
Research suggests that cross-border trading provides a significant income-
earning opportunity for women, who constitute a significant proportion of 
informal sector cross-border traders. However, neither migration legislation, 
nor regional and national trade policies, accommodate the activities of cross-
border traders.273
Women migrants were more likely to be disadvantaged by the migration 
experience than their male counterparts. They are more likely to be single or 
widowed, but less likely to be in formal sector employment or to own property 
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than their male counterparts.274 Migration is a significant livelihood strategy 
for women and women-headed households.275 Although women constitute a 
significant part of cross-border and internal migratory movement, they are also 
left behind as employment and earning opportunities favour men. 
The wives and family members of migrants (internal and cross-border) may 
be left behind to retain access to land and housing in home areas, as well as 
to pursue traditional household activities. This increases the labour load of the 
home household, and, as remittances may be intermittent, can place house-
holds in a precarious position, and encourage unsafe sexual behaviour. On the 
other hand, regular remittances may provide inputs to the household. 
Little is known about the internal or cross-border migration of children as 
migrants or refugees. However, they may migrate in their own right or with 
parents to work as child labourers, particularly in the agricultural sector. SAMP 
research suggests that cross-border migrants prefer to leave children behind. A 
study by Save the Children Fund South Africa, found an increase in the number 
of unaccompanied Zimbabwean children entering South Africa in 2003 for 
work in the northern border areas as a result of economic crisis and drought. 
Census 2001 suggests that, in South Africa at least, internal migrants are 
likely to travel with their children.276 This may be to enable access to better 
schooling.
While some attempts have been made to better understand the gender 
dimensions of migration, the area remains unexplored. In a changing migra-
tion arena, affected by changing roles for women, employment opportunities, 
household structure as well as HIV/AIDS, further contemporary research into 
the impact of migration on gender as well as household formation and liveli-
hood strategies could assist policymakers in the development of effective 
poverty alleviation strategies. Furthermore, more needs to be known about the 
impact of migration on the lives of children, their education, their health, and 
their access to health services. 
Links between HIV/AIDS, migration and poverty are close and complex.277 
The current geography of the epidemic is also the clue to its link with mobil-
ity. The highest incidence is not in Africa’s poorest countries, but in Southern 
African countries such as South Africa and Botswana which have good trans-
port infrastructure, relatively high levels of economic development, and con-
siderable internal and cross-border migration. Understanding this region can 
therefore help in the prediction – and thus prevention – of the spread of HIV 
elsewhere on the African continent. 
There are four key ways in which migration is tied to the rapid spread and 
high prevalence of HIV/AIDS:
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• There is a higher rate of infection in ‘migrant communities’, which are 
often socially, economically and politically marginalised. 
• Migrants’ multi-local social networks create opportunity for mobile sexual 
networking. 
• Mobility per se can encourage or make people vulnerable to high-risk 
sexual behaviour. 
• Mobility makes people more difficult to reach through interventions, 
whether for preventive education, condom provision, HIV testing, or post-
infection treatment and care.
There is abundant empirical evidence of a link between HIV/AIDS and mobil-
ity. The incidence of HIV has been found to be higher near roads, and amongst 
people who either have personal migration experience or have sexual partners 
who are migrants. In Southern Africa, migrant workers (and their sexual part-
ners) have a higher level of infection than the general population. Itinerant 
traders display high infection rates and the infection rate is spectacularly 
high amongst truck drivers and migrant sex workers. Refugees and internally 
displaced persons have also been found to be especially vulnerable to HIV 
infection. Different forms of migration lead to different social and geographical 
forms of migrant ‘community’, and thus to different risk. 
Looking at the relationship from the other direction, it is apparent that HIV/
AIDS will become an increasingly important factor influencing migration and 
mobility and household sustainability in Africa: 
• People with AIDS commonly return to live with family members to obtain 
care. This might entail moving from an urban back to a rural area or from 
one country to another. Others migrate in order to provide care to family 
members living elsewhere.
• Loss of a household’s income though death or debilitation of a former 
migrant worker encourages migration by other household members to 
seek income-earning opportunities. As most migrants today are still male, 
this could lead to an increase in female migration. 
• Death or debilitation of household or community members can lead to a 
decline in rural productivity and food security, thus contributing to pres-
sure for out-migration by remaining members. 
• High rates of death or debilitation in particular labour sectors create the 
need to replace workforce with new migrant workers. (This is one fac-
tor that may explain the ‘Mozambicanization’ of the South African mine 
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labour force, as employers seek out labour from areas known to have 
lower HIV infection rates.)
• People diagnosed HIV-positive or displaying physical evidence of disease 
may migrate to avoid stigmatisation by their community. 
• People with AIDS-related opportunistic infections migrate to obtain health 
care. This could involve cross-border movements to a country perceived 
to have better health care facilities.
• The HIV/AIDS death toll disproportionately affects the most economically 
productive strata of society in some countries. Skills gaps and shortages 
could lead countries to seek replacement skills from other African coun-
tries. The result would be an increase in brain drain within Africa. AIDS 
orphans (who may themselves be HIV positive) migrate to live with rela-
tives or to seek their own income-earning opportunities. 
• New widows or widowers (also themselves often HIV positive) may 
migrate upon the death of their partner. Women or men may choose 
to move after the death of a spouse, perhaps to rejoin biological family 
elsewhere. The death of a husband can lead to wife losing access to land 
and thus a livelihood, forcing her to move elsewhere to seek a living.
• HIV/AIDS is placing an increasing burden on rural communities, not only 
in terms of care of returning migrants but also in declining agricultural 
production and productivity. 
HIV/AIDS may also impede certain forms of migration. For example, parents 
dying today means that there will be no grandparents for the next generation 
of children, and grandparents have traditionally been important in caring for 
children while parents migrated in search of employment. HIV/AIDS creates 
new motives for migrating while making some established forms of migration 
more difficult to sustain. 
Migration is the means by which many African individuals and households 
seek income and livelihood security. Migration is a critical factor in understand-
ing the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS including the incidence and prevalence of 
the epidemic. Migration has also emerged as a critical incidental and strategic 
response to coping with the consequences of the disease. However, to recog-
nise the existence of these connections is insufficient. More knowledge, based 
on sound research, is needed to identify the links and their implications for 
migration policy and the effective management of HIV/AIDS. 
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.	International	Migration	and	the	Brain	Drain
The ‘brain drain’ issue is a recurrent theme in the Southern African media, with 
much heat, little light and a great deal of scaremongering. The brain drain is 
increasingly cited as the cause of a growing skills crisis in individual countries 
and the region as a whole.278 In South Africa, the idea of a brain drain-induced 
‘skills crisis’ was the single most significant reason for the recent rethink of 
government policy towards skills immigration. Is there a ‘skills crisis’ brought 
on by a combination of skills emigration and restrictive immigration policy? 
Despite the extraordinarily poor quality of the data, there can be little doubt 
that the ‘brain drain’ has accelerated from the SADC region since 1990, par-
ticularly from South Africa and Zimbabwe. Domestically, economic and politi-
cal circumstances have conspired to create a large pool of potential emigrants. 
New global job opportunities in many sectors have turned latency into action.
The brain drain has undoubtedly accelerated in the last decade but some 
care is required in interpreting data and making policy recommendations for 
the following reasons:
• Uncertainty over the numbers involved. In the case of South Africa, there 
is evidence that official statistics undercount the numbers by as much as 
two-thirds. Studies of other countries in the region show statistics that are 
either nonexistent or very badly outdated. In the vacuum, highly-inflated 
guesstimates are extremely common in the media.
• Most projections about future trends are based on faulty methodological 
assumptions that tend to exaggerate the likelihood of emigration.
• There is a common notion that emigration means departure for good. 
Many who depart do not intend to stay away permanently. And, consist-
ent with the precepts of transnationalism, those that leave retain strong 
backward linkages. 
• A distinction must be made between a sizable intra-regional brain drain 
and emigration from the region. Some countries are disadvantaged 
by both (Zimbabwe). Some may gain what others lose (South Africa, 
Botswana). For the region as a whole, within-SADC brain drain means 
no net loss. 
• The ‘demand’ side means that some sectors are harder hit than others. 
• There is little concrete evidence about the actual economic and social 
impact of the brain drain, even in sectors hardest hit. 
• The reality is that most countries in the region have eschewed ‘brain 
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gain’ strategies in the form of proactive immigration policies and search 
for replacement skills. The impact of the brain drain of citizens is exacer-
bated as a result.279
Clearly, all governments would benefit from an improved baseline capacity 
to document and monitor the extent of skills emigration. 
A systematic data base of the numbers and skills profile of diasporic Southern 
Africans worldwide using host country census, immigration and survey data 
would also be an extremely useful exercise. In the absence of reliable statis-
tics, prediction of future trends is also a hazardous exercise. SAMP developed 
a methodology in the late 1990s to assess the real emigration potential of the 
skilled population. At one end of the spectrum was Botswana with low rates 
of emigration and low emigration potential. At the other were South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. In the case of South Africa, an Emigration Potential Index was 
developed which showed 2 per cent of the skilled population with very high 
emigration potential (32,000 individuals), a further 10 per cent (192,000) 
with high potential, and 25 per cent with moderate potential. SAMP also 
initiated a six-country study of skills-in-training – the PSBS or Potential Skills 
Base Survey – to assess the emigration intentions and potential of tomorrow’s 
labour force.
The brain drain in the health sector is clearly the most problematical for 
countries within the region. Aggressive recruiting of health professionals by 
Europe and North America is denuding the region of scarce skills, at a time 
when they can ill afford to lose them. Working conditions emerge as the single 
most important predisposing factor for health professional emigration.280 As 
Loewenson and Thompson argue, ‘personnel scarcities have become a criti-
cal limiting factor in health interventions’ for the public health sector and the 
poorest populations.281 Health systems in Southern Africa face a variety of 
problems, including ‘an overall lack of personnel in key areas of the health 
sector; an inequitable distribution of those health personnel who are available 
(public v private, urban v rural); and a significant attrition of trained personnel 
from the health sector and from the region’. The capacity of the public health 
sector to deliver services is being compromised by the brain drain at precisely 
the time at which the HIV/AIDS epidemic is seriously increasing the burden 
on the system. 
There are no adequate statistics to measure the existing stock of health 
professionals and the extent and trends in health personnel flows from and 
within the region or individual countries.282 In the case of the health sector, two 
additional factors complicate any attempt to assess the stock of health profes-
sionals from local health council data. First, many who leave maintain local 
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registration with the councils. Second, some who register no longer practice or 
practice on a part-time basis. In general, policy responses to the brain drain 
have been control-oriented in character and not informed by research on the 
actual perceptions and intentions of the skilled. 
Various initiatives have sought to encourage the return of diasporic citizens 
by offering incentives and job-matching programmes. The IOM’s Return and 
Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) Program (which included 
Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe within SADC) assisted the return of a 
miserly total of 2,009 professionals to Africa as a whole over a 17-year period. 
On the evidence of RQAN, these kinds of programmes are likely to be inef-
fectual at best. Recently, the IOM has initiated a more flexible skills transfer 
programme called MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa) with the IOM 
acting as a kind of ‘go-between’. While this programme seems, in principle, to 
have a higher likelihood of success, its effectiveness has yet to be tested. In 
general, it seems likely that formalised skills return or linkage schemes coor-
dinated by international organizations are not going to have a major impact in 
reversing or ameliorating the effects of the brain drain.
Although increasing attention has been given to the brain drain in Southern 
Africa, the field is notable for the lack of sound information on which to base 
policies that might impact positively on the poor. A more systematic and com-
prehensive effort needs to be made to:
• Document the extent of the brain drain by examining data in the region 
and in major host countries; 
• Produce an inventory of the overseas skills base and, through survey 
work, determine the potential for return and the nature of backward link-
ages (financial and social);
• Systematically assess the economic impact and resource implications of 
the brain drain by sector (with particular emphasis on health implications 
for the poor); and 
• Work with government and private industry to develop retention, replace-
ment, brain train and attraction strategies to mitigate the impact of skills 
loss on development prospects.
.	Migration	Policies
Migration policy is formulated at various interlocking scales from the continen-
tal (NEPAD) to the local (city government). A major challenge is how to get 
CHAPTER	FOUR
||
these different levels of governance to interface with one another to develop an 
integrated approach to policy development and migration management. A sec-
ond challenge is to understand the institutional mechanisms and constraints 
operating on the development and implementation of policy. 
At the continental level, NEPAD’s attitude to the migration issue is emblem-
atic. Freer movement of people across the continent is cited as a key long-term 
objective of the AU. Little analysis is presented of the reasons for this position 
and likely positive impacts and there is no systematic discussion of the institu-
tional mechanisms by which this might be achieved. At the regional level, the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) aims to promote regional 
development through cooperation and integration. Protocols pursuing these 
aims have been developed. In 2000, the SADC Free Trade Protocol was rati-
fied. Attempts to move towards the free movement of people within the SADC 
have been less successful. Increasingly, regional realities demand that national 
governments consider whether or not to soften their borders and/or move 
towards a harmonised approach to migration management. Unfortunately, the 
Box 16: Facilitating movement in Southern Africa
The	 countries	 of	 the	 SADC	 region	 are	 committed	 to	 greater	 regional	
integration	 in	 all	 economic	 spheres.	 They	 have	 been	 considerably	
more	 resistant	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 freedom	of	movement	 of	 people	
in	 the	 region	would	hasten	economic	 integration	and	 regional	devel-
opment.	 National	 immigration	 policies	 are,	 almost	without	 exception,	
focused	on	exclusion	and	control.	Development	 is	certainly	not	main-
streamed	 into	 immigration	policy	 (and	nor	 for	 that	matter	 is	migration	
mainstreamed	 into	 development	 and	 poverty	 reduction	 policy).	 The	
SADC	Secretariat	tabled	a	Protocol	on	Free	Movement	as	long	ago	as	
1.	 Even	 a	much-diluted	 Protocol	 on	 the	 Facilitation	 of	Movement	
was	consistently	opposed	by	a	group	of	countries	led	by	South	Africa.	
The	issue	remained	deadlocked	until	00	when	discussion	resumed	on	
the	Facilitation	Protocol.	South	Africa,	with	a	new	ANC	Minister	of	Home	
Affairs	in	charge,	reversed	its	earlier	hostility	to	greater	freedom	of	move-
ment	within	SADC.	When	the	Protocol	was	 ratified	by		states	 in	00,	
South	 Africa	 was	 amongst	 the	 first	 countries	 to	 endorse	 it.	 The	 winds	
of	change	are	blowing	through	South	African	migration	policy	after	a	
decade	of	prevarication	and	indecision.	Without	doubt,	the	migration	
and	development	issue	will	soon	come	on	to	the	policy	agenda	in	that	
country,	if	not	in	the	region	as	a	whole.	
Source: Oucho and Crush (2002); see endnote 283.
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first attempt to craft a SADC-wide protocol on free movement ran aground 
on the rocks of opposition from South Africa, Botswana and Namibia.283 In 
1997, it was replaced by the more cautious Draft Protocol on the Facilitation 
of Movement of People. Even this Protocol was rejected in 2000 by the SADC 
Council of Ministers.284 
Only in 2003 did the SADC Secretariat revive the Protocol. Whether the 
protocol will suffer a different fate second time round remains to be seen. 
However, the reality is that this Protocol, or one of similar ilk, would have 
major positive implications for the poor of the region, freeing up obstacles to 
cross-border movement and the search for a livelihood through migration.
In sum, unlike in other areas such as trade, education and transportation, 
there has been considerable reluctance to move forward on developing a 
SADC-wide policy on the movement of people. Cross-border migration in the 
region is, therefore, governed by national migration and refugee legislation. 
COMESA, to which a number of SADC states belong, has been a little more 
positive about the concept of freer movement of persons within the borders of 
the grouping. There seems to be less opposition to the idea within COMESA, 
whose founding Treaty advocates the free movement of persons within the 
area. Acceptance of the principle was probably facilitated by the fact that 
South Africa is not a member. How this will be operationalised, however, is 
unclear.
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Protocol, SAMP and the IOM com-
bined to establish the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) in 
partnership with all SADC states. MIDSA has become an established and well-
recognised forum for training and policy debate on a variety of issues pertaining 
to migration management in the region. During 2003, the major development 
was the preparation by SAMP of a major report on migration policy harmoniza-
tion within the SADC region. This report was presented and discussed at the 
November 2004 MIDSA Forum in Maseru, Lesotho. In 2005, MIDSA held a 
forum on migration and development which foregrounded the role of migra-
tion in poverty reduction for senior officials and policymakers in the region. 
Further forums will be convened thereafter, as the two organizations involved 
seek to move the migration issue even more firmly onto government agendas 
throughout the region. 
In terms of national immigration policy, the overriding focus of most legal 
instruments is enforcement, control and exclusion. The particulars vary from 
country to country but the overall intent is extremely similar.285 No country, 
with the possible exception of Botswana, has migrant or immigrant-friendly 
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legislation on the books.286 Most policies were devised in the immediate post-
colonial period. The imperatives of new nation-building and Africanization did 
not encourage the idea of immigration as a tool of social and economic devel-
opment. Indeed, outsiders were generally viewed as a threat to citizens. Legal 
stays were time-limited and goal-directed. Permanent immigration is extremely 
difficult from one country to another within the SADC and into the region from 
outside. Tanzania and Zambia are currently undergoing a process of immigra-
tion policy reform. Opportunity therefore exists in those countries to integrate 
pro-poor considerations into the legislation.
All countries within SADC are adopting an increasingly harsh line on enforce-
ment. In South Africa, human rights lawyers have argued that many enforce-
ment tactics are strongly reminiscent of the apartheid pass laws and influx 
controls.287 A corruption industry has sprung up as the enforcers are paid off 
for the right to remain.288 There has been a major increase in deportations 
since the end of apartheid. Since 1990, South Africa has deported over one 
million people to neighbouring countries, 70 per cent of these to Mozambique 
(including many former refugees). Other countries are beginning to follow suit, 
particularly Botswana in regard to undocumented Zimbabweans in the country. 
The workability of this deportation system is dubious and does not justify the 
cost. All it appears to do is enrich the enforcers and disrupt the lives and liveli-
hoods of the deportees. People using migration as a livelihood can scarcely 
afford the disruption to lives and livelihoods that usually ensues.
At the national level, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
have all made significant changes to migration laws in the past ten years and 
Lesotho, Tanzania and Malawi are currently revising their legislation.289 Only 
the immigration legislation of South Africa and Mozambique makes any refer-
ence to complying with international conventions, and bilateral accords.290 
Arrest, detention and repatriation procedures do not always protect irregular 
(and regular) migrants from abuse.291 Furthermore, they have the potential to 
cause conflict between neighbouring countries.
As in most parts of the world, immigration legislation favours the entry of 
skilled and wealthy migrants. However, the legislation and migration policy 
of the region still hampers the recruitment of skilled professionals to replace 
those who are being lost. Bilateral agreements and legislation allow the South 
African mining and agricultural sectors to employ contract migrant workers 
from neighbouring countries.292 A number of other agreements exist at bilateral 
levels between countries in the region to facilitate or hamper movement. As 
noted above, bilateral agreements exist around skilled migration. For instance, 
the United Kingdom has agreed that it will not directly recruit medical profes-
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sionals and teachers. There is little evidence that such measures are effective. 
The UK is considering direct assistance to Malawi to slow the loss of medical 
professionals from the country.  
Associated with the liberation struggle, and civil war in Mozambique, forced 
migration has long been a feature of the region. All countries under discussion 
have ratified or comply with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the more inclusive 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.293 The Refugee Acts of Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe incorporate both definitions of refu-
gees.294 The Botswana Refugee Act restricts its definition to that under the 
1951 Convention.295 Swaziland’s and Zambia’s refugee legislation gives the 
Minister the power to define a refugee, but in practice they are guided by the 
1951 and 1969 Conventions. Botswana is said to reject asylum claims from 
people from outside the region.296 
The Refugee Acts of Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe protect asylum seekers from non-refoulement, do not require 
them to meet immigration legislation requirements for entry, and give recog-
nised refugees the right to remain in the country.297 Although not protected by 
legislation, these principles are largely upheld in practice by Swaziland and 
Zambia. Ministers of Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe can declare a class of persons to be refugees. Individual status 
determination procedures are found in all the countries under discussion. 
With the exception of South Africa, by law and in practice, countries in the 
region require refugees and asylum seekers to live in designated areas (usually 
some form of camp), and Zambia allows some exceptions to this rule.298 With 
the exception of Mozambique and South Africa, refugees and asylum seekers 
are required to apply for work permits before they can work.299 Refugees in 
Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are entitled to 
some form of identity and travel documents. As support to refugees and asylum 
seekers is limited in the region, the rights to freedom of movement and work 
are important. Differences in refugee and asylum policies are significant and 
harmonisation of policy could establish minimum standards. More needs to be 
known about how refugees and asylum seekers survive, as well as their actual 
potential contributions and costs to receiving countries.
No country in the region has specific legislation regarding trafficking, and 
existing legislation makes no provisions for the protection of trafficked persons. 
However, South Africa is considering anti-trafficking legislation.300 Given the 
lack of attention paid to trafficking it is unclear how prevalent the problem is in 
the region. However, evidence suggests that women and children are trafficked 
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for sexual purposes.301 There is also anecdotal evidence that irregular migrants 
pay couriers to facilitate and guide entry, particularly across land borders, but 
that these migrants are not trafficked. 
All countries in Southern Africa have ratified the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa have signed 
the associated Protocol on the Rights of the Child in Armed Conflict. And, 
Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa have all signed 
the associated Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child 
pornography. While most countries have legislation that outlaws child labour 
and protects children from exploitation, their ability to enforce such legislation 
is doubtful. 
The UNHCR and UNICEF operate in all countries in the region. Other inter-
national agencies tasked with the protection of vulnerable groups also operate 
in the region, for instance, the Save the Children Fund. These agencies do not 
have a specific mandate to protect migrants or promote migrant rights. Perhaps 
reflecting the migration environment, it seems it is only in South Africa that 
NGOs and church-based organisations specifically attempt to protect migrants, 
but focus on refugees and asylum seekers.302 Trade Unions and other profes-
sional organisations may also protect the rights of legal migrant workers. 
The principle of freer movement within the SADC region is critically impor-
tant. So too is the idea that policies should be harmonised. Despite the political 
sensitivities, the status quo simply cannot prevail. Existing national migration 
frameworks are not integrated into poverty reduction strategy. For migration to 
become a lever of social and economic upliftment for the poor, the migration 
issue has to be confronted at both national and regional levels. 
The failure to craft a regionally-coordinated approach to migration in the 
1990s is attributable to the concerns of migrant-receiving countries such as 
South Africa. It is inevitable that SADC will be forced to confront the issue 
again. The scale of unrecorded migration and the attendant exploitation of 
migrants require a coordinated response. Freeing up flows of goods and capital 
while simultaneously trying to shut down the movement of people makes lim-
ited economic sense. And if nothing else makes countries reconsider their need 
to import labour from their neighbours, the HIV/AIDS epidemic will eventually 
do it for them.
In 2004-5, the Draft Protocol on Facilitation of Movement within SADC was 
revisited and ratified by six states. Regional dialogue on this and other issues 
is essential. MIDSA is the only high-level, intergovernmental forum designed 
to catalyze policy discussion and debate on the desirability and obstacles of 
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a regional approach to migration management. MIDSA forums and technical 
workshops are attended by representatives from all 14 SADC states and pro-
vide an important venue for identifying national obstacles and opportunities for 
a regionally-coordinated approach. The hope is that MIDSA will eventually be 
absorbed into SADC and that the forum will have very direct impacts on the 
harmonization of national immigration laws and data collection systems.
Assistance with harmonising migration legislation and data collection could 
promote more effective management of migration in the region. To promote 
effective implementation of legislation and to curtail corruption, further 
research is required on the training needs of Departments of Immigration, and 
with training of officials. Further research is also needed on the effectiveness of 
arrest and detention procedures across the region and their impact on regional 
relationships. 
In terms of improved service delivery to the poor (citizens and non-citizens) 
there is an urgent need to professionalise the activities of Departments of 
Home Affairs and Immigration throughout the region. 
Migration has not been systematically factored into national poverty reduc-
tion strategies throughout the region. Nor has immigration policy been inte-
grated systematically with pro-poor policies. Most immigration and migration 
policy frameworks were developed before the contemporary focus on poverty 
reduction began to frame foreign aid and state policy. On the other hand, it is 
apparent that few poverty reduction strategies (as evidenced by PRSPs, etc.) 
have made any serious attempt to integrate migration realities into strategis-
ing and planning. Hence there is a profound disjuncture between immigration 
policies and poverty reduction strategies in most countries of the Southern 
African region. 
Xenophobia and hostility to migrants is common in the region, and in some 
countries (e.g. South Africa) can involve physical attacks on non-nationals. A 
SAMP study suggests that nationals of Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa 
are particularly intolerant of non-nationals, and especially African non-nation-
als.303 These attitudes are reflected in the media and often in government 
policies and the rhetoric of politicians. The new South African Immigration 
Act commits the government to challenge xenophobia; however, it is difficult 
to know how it will do so. The UNHCR and the South African Human Rights 
Commission are funding a Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign, which provides 
limited training to relevant officials, journalists and schools.
High levels of xenophobia are of concern, not just because they make indi-
vidual migrants’ lives uncomfortable. Xenophobia allows the exclusion of non-
CHAPTER	FOUR
|10|
nationals from vital services that they may be entitled to, for instance, health 
and education, and further marginalises and excludes vulnerable communities, 
thus increasing inequalities – even for non-nationals who are in the country 
legally.304 Furthermore, while the regulatory regime looks relatively protective 
of migrants, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, most governments 
(including wealthier countries like South Africa) lack the resources to effectively 
enforce legislation.
More also needs to be known about the access and exclusion of migrants, 
adults and children, to services to which they may be entitled. Combined 
with research on xenophobia, this could assist in curriculum development 
for schools and training programmes which could be used to educate people 
and service providers on the rights and entitlements of different categories of 
migrants. 
Despite the importance of both cross-border and internal migration to the 
region, pro-poor policies of governments, the region and continent, as well as 
donor agencies and countries that include migrants, are lacking. Internal and 
cross-border migrants appear to be operating in a policy environment that 
largely excludes them, although they may, in some cases, be affected by these 
policies. Regional migration policies, legislation and practice are fragmented 
along national lines, and at times do not appear to meet the objectives of con-
temporary regional and continental policies of the SADC, COMESA, or NEPAD. 
And, they often seem to omit the needs of migrants and possibilities for devel-
oping managed migration regimes, whether regional or nationally based, that 
could allow migrants, and national economies, to maximise the possibilities of 
regional migration and minimise the negative impacts. 
On a continental level, NEPAD, an initiative by African governments to 
stimulate and promote the development of Africa and its peoples, like national 
and regional development policies, is silent around issues of migration. While 
the development of programmes and policies under NEPAD is still in its early 
stages, the only real mention of migration concerns the movement of skilled 
professionals, and particularly health professionals. Yet, throughout the conti-
nent migration is a feature of African livelihoods and provides opportunities for 
development, as well as potential for conflict between African countries, which 
could undermine the principles of NEPAD. Understanding the role of migra-
tion across, through and from the continent could assist in the development of 
NEPAD policies, and in the stated intention to foster African cooperation, unity, 
interaction and development. 
On a regional level, the SADC is intent on fostering regional integration 
and cooperation for development and the alleviation of poverty. The Regional 
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Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) does not, however, explicitly 
identify migration as a key area for community intervention. A close reading 
of the RISDP reveals that migration is a significant cross-cutting in all prior-
ity areas. The RISDP identifies numerous migration-related policy issues and 
concerns that the community will confront including the brain drain, informal 
trade, mobility of the ‘factors of production’, tourism, and so on. Hence there 
is every reason to suppose that SADC does recognise the significance of migra-
tion in poverty reduction and region policy integration. Migration has also 
resurfaced on the agenda of the SADC in the form of renewed attention to the 
Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People. 
Migration (internal and cross-border) is a key feature of the regional labour 
market and livelihood strategies of Southern Africans. A key pillar of SADC, 
the Free Trade Protocol, did not take into account that SMEs and small entre-
preneurs are a key feature of regional trade. Their movement and income-gen-
erating possibilities are often constrained by national migration policies (even 
if unintentionally). 
The Millenium Development Goals, PRSPs, and CAPs increasingly struc-
ture donor agency interventions in the region. To the extent that migration is 
sidelined or ignored in policy thinking, so pro-poor policy frameworks will fall 
short in their attempts to alleviate poverty and minimise inequalities in the 
region. Yet, they have the potential to make a significant difference to the lives 
of migrants and non-migrants. However, there are increasing signs that donor 
agencies are beginning to recognise the significance of migration as a develop-
ment issue. CIDA and DFID support for the Southern African Migration Project 
is a case in point, as is EU and SIDA support for the HIV/AIDS and Mobility 
initiative, PHAMSA.
Migration has an impact on the following areas of policy formation and 
interventions to alleviate poverty, reduce inequality and to promote good gov-
ernance:
• Support to regional organisations, e.g. SADC, COMESA. If migration is 
key to the region, and an unspoken part of regional cooperation and inte-
gration, efforts need to be made to integrate and mainstream migration 
when providing assistance to regional organisations in the development 
of policies, protocols and initiatives to reduce poverty, reduce inequalities 
and encourage development. 
• PRSP support models and some aspects of CAPs. Where these are 
pursued, the links to migration can seem tenuous. Yet, if the PRSP is to 
be effective, should the role of migration in the country’s economy and 
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poverty alleviation policies not be considered? Providing support to gov-
ernments in the preparation and implementation of budgets may seem 
rather remote from migration and other PRSP support activities. But 
consideration needs to be given to:
• Understanding the role of migration in a country’s fiscus; 
• Quantifying remittances as part of GNP;
• Identifying the role of remittances at national, regional/provincial, local 
and household levels;
• Identifying the role (and its potential role) of migrant incomes in tax 
regimes;
• Identifying the role of migration in key areas of budgetary activity, e.g. 
health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, to ensure spending is 
appropriate; 
• Identifying the impact of migration on service delivery;
• Identifying the impact of skilled emigration on service provision and 
staffing and training demands;
• Identifying the impact of migration on demand for services (which may 
change according to seasonal patterns of migration (e.g. agricultural 
labour) or to changes in employment opportunities elsewhere (e.g. 
retrenchments in South African mines);
• Identifying where migrant populations are particularly vulnerable, or 
alleviating poverty to target spending appropriately;
• Identifying the role of migration and income through migration in taxa-
tion. 
• Governance. Governance programmes include minimising corruption in 
administrations. The SADC and NEPAD show the commitment of most 
governments in the region to developing good governance. Territorial 
integrity and security are key to most nation states. Migration (and asso-
ciated customs and excise issues) is an area of concern for both security, 
and corruption. 
• Anti-corruption initiatives should include Departments of Immigration/
Home Affairs, Trade and Industry, Customs and Excise as well as secu-
rity services to ensure not only territorial integrity, but integrity in the 
implementation of migration and customs and excise legislation. 
• Governance in these areas should promote good management of 
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migration, and not disadvantage (even if unintentionally) the positive 
poverty alleviating aspects of migration.
 There is also a need for further research into governance aspects of 
migration including: developing appropriate anti-corruption programmes, 
service delivery and security. 
• Financial services. Part of support to PRSPs, and development of govern-
ance policies includes assistance with the growth of secure, accessible 
financial services, which for some countries includes compliance with 
FTF. The role of remittances in development in the region, at national, 
regional and household levels is significant, and, as noted above, in some 
countries exceeds FDI. The use of informal banking and money transfer 
systems may have the potential to undermine efforts under FTF, and the 
growth of formal banking systems.
• When developing assistance programmes to financial services, small 
investors, and individuals who wish to bank or accumulate relatively 
small amounts of money need to be accommodated. 
• Efforts need to be made to ensure that cross-border and internal 
transfers of relatively small amounts of money can be made with low 
transfer costs, to ensure the safe transfer of remittances while address-
ing security needs. 
• Development of other financial transfer systems that meet FTF require-
ments but are accessible to rural areas is needed.
 Further research is needed in the development of appropriate, accessible 
and affordable financial systems, including credit at regional and national 
levels, which promote pro-poor investment and the transfer and posi-
tive use of remittances and can accommodate internal and cross-border 
migrants. 
• Livelihoods approach. Internal and cross-border migration play a key role 
in livelihoods strategies of households in the region. When considering 
policies to enable Southern Africans to maximise their household liveli-
hoods there is a need to:
• Identify the role of migration in urban and rural livelihood strategies.
• Identify how policies to manage migration may affect urban and rural 
livelihoods.
• Identify how other policies and economic changes may affect the liveli-
hoods of migrant households.
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 There is a need to promote further research on the role of migration 
in household livelihood strategies to facilitate households maximising 
opportunities, as well as the role of remittances as part of livelihoods at 
regional, national, and local levels.
• Rural development. Internal and cross-border migrants constitute a sig-
nificant proportion of the workforce in the commercial agricultural sector. 
Migration may affect small holder agricultural production at a household 
level. Internal and cross-border trade, which involve short-term migration, 
and for cross-border traders negotiation of migration controls, play an 
important role in the distribution of agricultural goods in the region, and 
in the livelihoods of producers. There is therefore a need to:
• Identify the role of migrant labour in the viability of commercial agri-
culture, including the conditions and terms of employment of migrant 
labourers. 
• Identify how changes in the commercial agricultural sector may affect 
demands for labour, patterns of migrancy, and therefore the livelihoods 
of migrant households. 
• Identify the role of remittances in agricultural inputs for smallholder 
producers, and therefore the impact of policies which may cause 
changes in patterns of migrancy. 
 Further research is needed on: migrancy, labour and commercial agricul-
ture; role of remittances in smallholder agriculture; chains of commodity 
and consumption for agricultural goods in the region, including SME 
cross-border and internal trade; impact of direct and indirect barriers 
to trade; impact of changing employment opportunities on patterns of 
migrancy and agricultural production at a household level, and therefore 
poverty. 
• Food security. As a livelihood strategy, migration obviously plays a role in 
food security. Changing patterns of migrancy may affect food security in 
some areas, e.g. large scale retrenchments in sectors employing migrant 
labour may affect food security in previously sending areas. Policies 
affecting patterns of trade and the movement of small entrepreneurs may 
have an impact on food security strategies. There is therefore a need to:
• Identify the role of migration in food security strategies at a household 
level.
• Identify how policies and economic changes which impact on migra-
tion may affect food security.
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• Identify the role of trade and SME traders in food security.
 There is also a need for further research on: the role of migration in food 
security in urban and rural areas at household level; the role of SME 
cross-border trade in the region in promoting or negatively impacting food 
security; and the impact of food security programmes on migration. 
• Infrastructure development. Programmes concerned with the develop-
ment of infrastructure may seem a long way from migration. However, 
who is the infrastructure being developed for? How does migration affect 
the demand for services (e.g. seasonally) and demographics of an area? 
Furthermore, infrastructure programmes (e.g. roads) may use migrant 
labour. Therefore to be effective, these programmes need to:
• Account for migration and changing population distribution (including 
seasonal) when developing where and how much infrastructural devel-
opment is required. 
• Identify where and how remittances may act as contributor to fees 
for the use of infrastructure or the tax base to pay for infrastructural 
development.
• Identify the impact and implications of using migrant labour in the 
development of infrastructural programmes.
• Design transport programmes to account for their use by migrants and 
SME traders.
• Trade and customs and excise. Trade ostensibly stands outside migra-
tion. Yet, a significant proportion of regional cross-border trade (and the 
majority across some borders), is undertaken by small entrepreneurs who 
migrate for short periods of time. They therefore have to negotiate the 
migratory legislative framework as well as customs and excise policies. 
Trade policies need to:
• Account for the activities of SME, or informal sector, traders and their 
role in cross-border trade.
• Promote SME trade as it has a direct impact on household livelihoods, 
the alleviation of poverty, and women’s economic empowerment. 
• Encourage the positive aspects of informal sector, cross-border trade 
and ameliorate the negative. 
• Identify the impact of migration, trade and customs and excise policies 
and legislation on SME traders. 
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 There is also a need for further research on: the role of informal and SME 
cross-border trade in regional trade; role of SME trade and the economic 
empowerment of women; role of the SME trade in entrepreneurial devel-
opment; role of SME cross-border trade in household livelihoods; role 
of SME cross-border trade in agricultural commodity and consumption 
chains; role of SME cross-border trade in food security; role of migration 
regimes in encouraging or discouraging trade.
• Service provision. Migration has an impact on service delivery as the 
emigration of skilled professionals and others who deliver services affects 
investments in education (particularly at tertiary level), staffing levels, 
and training needs. It also affects the demand for services, gendered 
demand for services, and the kinds of services that might be required. 
For effective delivery of services there is a need to:
• Identify levels of skilled migration to plan for future staffing needs and 
therefore demands for education, i.e. on service delivery and planning 
for future service delivery. 
• Identify the demand for services, and which services, by new in-
migrants, internal and cross-border migrants.
• Identify the impact of migration patterns on demand for services, by 
numbers, age, gender, and type of services.
• Identify how patterns of migration affect demographics of an area and 
therefore demand for services in that location.
 There is also a need for further research on: the impact of migration on 
the use of services; if and how available services may act as a pull fac-
tor for migrants; whether migrants are excluded from access to essential 
services. 
• Education. Education is central to the alleviation of poverty and develop-
ment. Migration plays a role in the delivery and use of education. The 
emigration of teaching professionals in the region may affect the ability 
of government to effectively provide schooling. Migrant children (inter-
nal and cross-border) may change the spatial demand for educational 
services. Migrant children may be excluded from education. Therefore 
consideration needs to be given to:
• Tracking and understanding the migration of teaching professionals 
within and outside the region to understand staffing needs.
• Including retention and recruitment programmes for teachers in educa-
tion budgets.
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• Accounting for the use of education services by migrant children.
• Planning for recruitment and investment in tertiary education to amel-
iorate the loss of skills through emigration.
 There is also a need for further research into: migration of education pro-
fessionals; migrants and tertiary education; the use of education facilities 
by migrant children; the possible exclusion from education of migrant 
children; the use of remittances for education of children in migrant 
households.
• Health. Health is a key development indicator and poor health and health 
services a barrier to the alleviation of poverty. The emigration of health 
professionals, from nurses to surgeons, within and out of the region, is 
of great concern to regional governments. It affects the ability of govern-
ments to effectively deliver health services. People may migrate to take 
advantage of health services available in another place, or another coun-
try. There is a need to:
• Track and understand the migration of health professionals and include 
in identifying staffing needs.
• Include retention, recruitment and training programmes in health 
budgets.
• Account for the use of health services by migrants.
• Identify how new health policies may affect migration patterns.
 There is also a need for further research including: quantification and 
understanding of the scope of emigration in the region; identifying what 
is pushing health professionals to migrate and what would assist in their 
retention; impact of emigration on service delivery in rural and urban 
areas; the role of health services in migration; the use of health services 
by migrants; the exclusion of migrants from health services; and the role 
of remittances in accessing health services for migrant households. 
• HIV/AIDS. As discussed above, migration is a key feature of the epidemic 
in Southern Africa. It has played a role in the spread of HIV, and now 
the epidemic has a hold on the region, may affect migration patterns. 
So, effective HIV/AIDS education, prevention and treatment programmes 
need to:
• Identify the role of migration in the epidemic in the country con-
cerned.
• Identify the impact of HIV/AIDS on current and future patterns of 
migration. 
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• Ensure programmes can accommodate the movements and needs of 
migrants, including basics such as developing evaluation mechanisms 
that can incorporate migrant populations. 
• Ensure education and prevention programmes are accessible to 
migrants. 
 Further research is needed on HIV/AIDS and specific migrant populations, 
in specific countries; impact of HIV/AIDS on household livelihood strate-
gies and consequently migration patterns; access to education, preven-
tion and treatment programmes of migrants; impact of introduction of 
ARV programmes on migration patterns and therefore households. 
• Gender mainstreaming. Migration is a gendered process. Evidence sug-
gests that women constitute an increasing proportion of the migrant flow 
in Southern Africa, at all skill levels. It also suggests women may experi-
ence migration differently. Gender sensitive policies which are considering 
migration, and which may have an impact on migration need:
• To identify how legislation (including migration legislation) may have a 
different impact on male and female migrants.
• To identify the role of migration in women’s economic and social 
empowerment – or disempowerment.
 Further research is needed on the migration of women across the region, 
including: legislative and other barriers; cross-border traders; role of 
migration and remittances in the livelihoods of women ‘left behind’; the 
role of migration in the empowerment or disempowerment of women, and 
particularly women-headed households. 
The above discussion identifies the role that migration plays in key areas of 
development policy in the region and makes recommendations for considering 
migration when developing these policies. The existing policy frameworks of 
NEPAD, the SADC, national governments and donor agencies, including the 
MDGs, PRSPs, and CAPs provide opportunities to mainstream and retrofit 
migration. This chapter suggests there is a need to review these policies and 
initiatives to incorporate migration to enable them to more effectively intervene 
to reduce poverty and encourage development in the region. Notwithstanding 
the evidence of the role of migration in the lives of Southern Africans pre-
sented here, this paper also identifies gaps in knowledge which require further 
research to better enable policymakers to make and deliver effective poverty 
alleviation interventions.
The country summaries that follow use the same format as the regional 
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report. However, the focus here is very selective. First, the major features of 
each national migration regime are presented. Second, the summaries focus on 
particular migration-related issues that are specific to the country concerned 
and/or of pressing policy importance. Third, the discussion highlights issues, 
such as the brain drain, common to all countries. The major finding in all coun-
tries is that despite some acknowledgement of the importance of migration 
to poor households, none of the current round of policy reduction strategies 
systematically integrates migration into their findings and recommendations. 
The result is a significant lacuna at the heart of poverty reduction strategies in 
Southern Africa. Migration needs to be systematically mainstreamed into all 
aspects of government and international agency efforts to reduce poverty and 
inequality. Ordinary people throughout the region view migration as a critical 
strategy for poverty reduction and community-level development. There is no 
reason why interventions designed to provide an enabling policy environment 
should not do the same.
.	South	Africa
..1	Introduction
South Africa is the major foreign migrant receiving country in the region. The 
overall number of ‘visitors’ to South Africa from other countries in the region 
rose significantly with the collapse of apartheid, from around 500,000 in 
1990 to 5 million p.a. at the present time. The 2001 Census showed the 
total foreign-born population of South Africa as 1,025,072 including 687,678 
from the SADC region, 228,318 from Europe and only 41,817 from the rest 
of Africa. These figures are sharply at odds with other estimates. Estimates of 
the numbers of undocumented migrants in South Africa have grown from the 
barely plausible to the completely outrageous: in the 1-2 million range in the 
early 1990s to 8-10 million at the present time.305 President Mbeki claimed 
in January 2004 that there were 7 million ‘illegal immigrants’ and 3 million 
Zimbabweans in South Africa, figures without any basis in fact. One study 
claims that there are 500,000 Mozambican migrant workers, mostly in South 
Africa.306 Another suggested in 2001 that a total of 400,000 Zimbabweans 
were in South Africa, most for work.307 The primary reason for the census 
discrepancy is South Africa’s large undocumented migrant population and 
the reluctance of foreign Africans to disclose their origins to the authorities. 
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Certainly there are more than 41,817 Africans from outside SADC in the 
country; but precisely how many is anyone’s guess.
There has been a vigorous debate in South Africa about the numbers of 
undocumented migrants in the country. Official estimates, based on a meth-
odologically dubious study by the HSRC, suggest numbers in the 4-8 million 
range. Despite the withdrawal of the study by the HSRC, officials continue to 
cite these figures as ‘methodologically scientific’. Other studies have pointed 
out that the category of ‘undocumented migrant’ needs to be disaggregated 
into at least three streams: lawful entrants/unlawful stayers, unlawful entrants/
lawful stayers; unlawful entrants/unlawful stayers. This, and other studies, 
point out that the ‘unauthorised’ population is a floating one, that it has been 
decreased by over 250,000 as a result of immigration amnesties between 
1996-2000; and that the majority of migrants enter the country through legal 
means. South Africans believe that 25 per cent of the population is foreign. 
The figure is probably closer to 3-5 per cent with around 500,000 undocu-
mented migrants.
Regardless of the numbers, the policy discourse around migration remains 
focused on the ‘illegal alien’ problem and how to deal with the obvious con-
tradictions. For migrants from the region, migration to South Africa is a well-
established household poverty reduction strategy. Legalised migration would 
make the benefits even more transparent and attainable since South African 
employers are known to favour foreign migrants in many sectors. 
The apartheid system was predicated on the control of internal migration by 
black South Africans. So draconian were these controls (pass laws and influx 
controls) that scholars concluded that South Africa was characterised by ‘con-
strained’ or ‘displaced’ urbanization. The assumption, therefore, was that the 
collapse of apartheid would precipitate mass rural to urban movement. Census 
data shows that the movement has been significant, particularly to Gauteng 
Province. Census 2001 shows that 20 per cent of the population was born 
outside the province. Studies based on the annual October Household Survey 
of Statistics South Africa show, however, that the end of apartheid has certainly 
not put an end to internal circular migration. Migration remains a major liveli-
hoods strategy of most rural households. Fully 25 per cent of all households 
nationwide contain migrant workers. The proportion rises to over 40 per cent 
of households in deep rural areas. Johannesburg accounts for nearly 25 per 
cent of migrant destinations, followed by Pretoria (10 per cent), Durban (6 per 
cent) and Cape Town (4 per cent). 
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..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
South Africans, by and large, are internal migrants and do not migrate out of 
the country to the region (except as short-term visitors, tourists, for business, 
etc.). The question of the importance of migration to the poor therefore has 
two dimensions: does the presence of unskilled and semi-skilled migrants 
from other countries create fewer opportunities and greater impoverishment 
for South Africans? And second, has internal migration on the scale witnessed 
since the collapse of apartheid assisted households to deal with the appalling 
human legacy of that iniquitous system?
On the first question, for the South African government, every job occupied 
by a foreign migrant is potentially one less job for a population with formal 
unemployment rates of 30-40 per cent. The problem, as SAMP has demon-
strated, is that although South Africans feel they are impoverished by the pres-
ence of non-South Africans, there is no hard evidence to support this belief. 
Very few say that they have ever lost a job to a foreigner and some studies 
suggest that some categories of migrant actually increase the size of the cake 
for South Africans by creating employment.
On the second question, the consensus seems to be that post-apartheid 
urbanization has simply displaced poverty from the countryside to the town. 
The growth of informal settlements in most major South African cities and 
towns is clear evidence of that position. The settlements are, of course, hives 
of informal sector activity which suggest that for some at least, the conse-
quences of rapid urbanization may be facilitating a slow ascent out of absolute 
poverty. 
..	International	Migration	and	Brain	Drain
The brain drain is a major issue of public and official concern within South 
Africa. Official emigration statistics clearly undercount the extent of the loss. 
Official data shows that 82,811 people emigrated from South Africa between 
1989 and 1997. Official statistics from the ‘big five’ destination countries 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, USA) show that 233,609 South 
Africans landed as immigrants over the same time period. For profession-
als, the comparable figures are 7,534 individuals (South Africa) and 19,890 
(overseas). 
Destination country statistics show 23,400 health workers from South Africa 
in the ‘big five’. The OECD notes that this is equivalent to 10 per cent of all 
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health professionals registered in the country, ‘suggesting that emigration rates 
are significantly higher for health workers than skilled workers in general’.308 Of 
these, 8,921 are practitioners, 6,844 nurses, and 7,642 other health profes-
sions. Some 3,146 South African nurses registered with the UK CC between 
1998 and 2001.309 In the United Kingdom, the OECD also estimates that 6 
per cent of the total health workforce is South African.310 The net training loss 
to South Africa is estimated at US$1 billion.
South Africa’s Health Professionals Recruitment and Retention Strategy 
attempts to develop a broad-based and multi-faceted set of interventions, 
which includes addressing social and economic push factors.311 Ironically, 
this strategy cannot address a major cause of emigration (crime and personal 
insecurity). And it makes no comment on the desirability of developing a strat-
egy for replacement immigration. Restrictions on outward movement are not 
generally feasible in states that guarantee freedom of movement to citizens. 
Instead, Southern African states have also sought to exercise leverage over the 
pull factors by (ineffectual) appeals to the morality of industrial countries or 
Box 17: Deportations and development
The	collapse	of	the	apartheid	system	in	1	brought	with	it	hopes	of	a	
new	era	of	racial	tolerance	in	South	Africa.	A	decade	later	South	Africa	
still	remains	deeply	divided	on	racial,	economic	and	social	lines.	On	one	
thing	virtually	all	South	Africans	agree,	however:	immigration	is	bad	for	
the	country	and	migrants,	particularly	from	the	rest	of	Africa,	should	be	
ostracised	and	shunned.	Over	one	million	irregular	migrants	have	been	
deported	from	South	Africa	since	1	and	the	methods	used	to	identify	
and	deport	migrants	are	regularly	criticised	by	South	African	and	inter-
national	human	 rights	organizations.	Most	of	 those	who	are	deported	
are	unskilled	and	semi-skilled	but	are	also	engaged	in	some	form	of	pro-
ductive	economic	activity.	 Their	households	 in	neighbouring	countries	
are	heavily	dependent	on	remittances	and	goods	sent	home	by	these	
migrants.	While	arrest	and	deportation	of	irregular	migrants	is	uncontro-
versial	as	a	policy	tool,	there	is	considerable	doubt	as	to	whether	it	is	a	
cost-effective	 strategy	 for	 the	state.	Who	 it	 seems	 to	enrich	are	 those	
who	administer	 the	 tough	 laws	 (reports	 of	bribery	and	corruption	are	
legion).	There	 is	also	the	distinct	possibility	that	the	disruption	and	cost	
of	deportation	have	a	profoundly	disruptive	effect	on	the	migrants	and	
their	livelihoods.	
Source: Klaaren and Ramji (2002); see endnote 287.
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entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with Western governments to 
control recruiting or hiring of professionals on a sectoral basis. The effective-
ness of such agreements has yet to be properly tested. 
A SAMP survey of 200 South African public and private sector enterprises 
in 1999 found only 2,000-3,000 foreign skilled personnel in total. The 
enterprises were asked to assess the impact of the brain drain on their opera-
tions. One third rated the outflow and impact of post-apartheid migration as 
‘significant’. On the other hand, 41 per cent said that the brain drain was of 
‘no importance’ to their operations with another 26 per cent saying the impact 
was negligible. What this suggests is that at present there is no crippling 
shortage of skills across the board. Responses were sharply differentiated by 
sector. This suggests that brain drain impacts are likely to be sector and even 
firm-specific. A recent study of South Africa’s R & D sector also found little 
concrete evidence of a ‘brain drain crisis’ in the private sector.312 The actual 
labour market impacts of the brain drain have yet to be satisfactorily under-
stood. These studies also provide insights into the reasons for the brain drain 
by asking respondents about factors that would promote or stop emigration. In 
general, push factors are much more important than pull factors in predispos-
ing people to leave. 
Little information exists on the remittance behaviour of South Africans who 
leave or the linkages maintained by the diaspora. In the last year, the South 
African media has been profiling what it calls the ‘brain gain’ of returning 
South Africans. There is little concrete evidence, however, that this return is 
either large or sustainable. The only attempt to tap the diaspora to date is the 
SANSA project, set up by the University of Cape Town and taken over by the 
National Research Foundation.313 SANSA was designed to match diasporic 
South Africans with local employers for short-term assignments and employ-
ment. The intention was never to encourage permanent return. The success of 
this initiative is unknown.
..	Migration	Policies
The migration issue has been central to the post-apartheid government’s policy 
agenda. Regrettably, the development of a coherent and sound policy has been 
continuously compromised by political disagreement between the IFP (respon-
sible for the immigration portfolio) and the ANC. The result was a painfully 
slow progression towards a post-apartheid immigration framework. A new 
Refugee Act (South Africa’s first) took four years to craft; a new Immigration 
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Act (to replace the Aliens Control Act of 1991) nearly ten. 
In the inter-regnum the anti-poor policies of the apartheid era Aliens Control 
Act continued to be enforced. The new Act is an improvement on the Aliens 
Control Act but does not promise a great deal for the poor. For example, the 
Act advocates a new openness towards immigration and puts new mecha-
nisms in place to facilitate this process. In practice, the emphasis of the Act is 
almost exclusively on the highly skilled. It promises nothing to the unskilled or 
semi-skilled, and their South African employers, except tougher enforcement 
and increased xenophobia at the community level. The drafters of the Act also 
ignored the lobby that argued for a greater openness towards informal trade, 
a recommendation that would have had considerable implications for small 
entrepreneurs and the poor. 
In many ways, the Act will simply entrench the status quo. By failing to 
provide reasonable means of controlled access to the South African labour 
market, the Act will drive labour migration further underground where exploi-
tation and corruption already flourish. The effectiveness of mass deportations 
has already been called into question. The Act ensures that they will continue 
with a vengeance. 
Only the mining industry escapes the Act’s blandishments, again, an 
entrenchment of the status quo. Although the cost details are still being nego-
tiated between Mozambique and South Africa, there is every indication that 
the mines will continue to enjoy unfettered access to foreign migrant labour. 
Access to such labour is governed by bilateral agreements signed in the 1970s 
and 1980s (between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Swaziland). These agreements are badly outdated. When devised they did put 
in place basic protections for migrant workers but most of these are now redun-
dant. These agreements badly need to be revisited and revised to take account 
of contemporary realities and to ensure that the benefits of migration continue 
to accrue to migrants and migrant households. One of the main unresolved 
issues is the compulsory deferred pay question (by which miners from Lesotho 
and Mozambique are forced to defer a portion of their wages back home). This 
system is opposed by miners and favoured by their dependents.
There are a number of key migration-related issues confronting South Africa. 
The first are the social, economic and fiscal implications of inter-provincial and 
rural-urban migration. These implications drive to questions of employment 
creation, resource allocation and urban governance. Some provincial and local 
authorities have begun to take the migration issue more seriously in the last 
three years. Both Gauteng Province and the Johannesburg City Council, for 
MIGRATION	AND	DEVELOPMENT	IN	AFRICA:	AN	OVERVIEW
|10|
example, have commissioned SAMP to examine the implications of continued 
in-migration over the next 20 years. 
Second, even in a country with a sophisticated infrastructure for data col-
lection, migration policy decisions are made in an information vacuum. This 
is particularly evident in the assumptions underlying the White Paper on 
International Migration and the attendant Immigration Act. Both Statistics 
South Africa and Home Affairs have begun to investigate means of building 
internal capacity for the collection, analysis and use of migration data as a 
policymaking tool.
Third, the issue of good migration governance at the national level is criti-
cal. The Department of Home Affairs is under-resourced and, in the words of 
a former Director General, in a state of disrepair. The Home Affairs Turnaround 
Strategy, if implemented, promises a major shift towards good migration man-
agement through increased resourcing, capacity-building and the creation of a 
professional, client-oriented service. 
The one issue that South Africa has sought most systematically to address 
in policy terms is the brain drain through high-profile involvement in multilat-
eral initiatives and bilateral agreements with particular countries and sectors. 
The main thrust of these initiatives is to discourage ‘recruiting’ or ‘poaching’ of 
South Africans in South Africa. Another finding is that state efforts to restrict 
the brain drain through bonding or compulsory national service are likely to 
precipitate rather than slow emigration. Research on South Africa’s compul-
sory community service programme for new health sector professionals shows 
widespread satisfaction with the system and a high propensity to emigrate 
(20-40 per cent) once the service is over.314 Recent legislative moves to reform 
the public health sector in South Africa have received a less-than-enthusiastic 
response from doctors. 
South Africa’s dated bilateral labour treaties with Mozambique, Lesotho, 
Botswana and Swaziland urgently need to be revisited and updated or abol-
ished. The unresolved question is whether the mining industry should still 
enjoy unfettered access to foreign labour and no obligation to employ South 
Africans, as it has in the past. The industry is pushing strongly for this ‘right’. 
It is certain that other employers, without the economic organization and clout, 
will be unable to do the same.
South Africa’s new Immigration Act should ensure that future policy gaps 
are around questions of implementation. In practice, the Act raises as many 
questions as it answers and has little concrete to offer on many key issues 
(informal trade, xenophobia). Even the role of an independent Immigration 
Advisory Board in developing policy is uncertain.
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.	Malawi1
..1	Introduction
Like other countries in the region, Malawi’s migration regime has changed 
considerably over the last decade. In this case, Malawi has shifted from status 
as a classic ‘labour reserve’ to greatly reduced dependence on out-migration. 
This process was facilitated by the first inter-state disagreement in the region 
over HIV/AIDS policy.
After World War II, Malawi became the most important supplier of mine 
labour to South Africa. By the early 1970s, close to 120,000 Malawians 
worked on the South African mines. Malawians also migrated informally to 
work on commercial farms in Zimbabwe and South Africa and in South Africa’s 
service sector. The majority of this migration was goal-directed. The model of 
a successful migrant career was to accumulate sufficient rural resources to 
invest in business activity at home and opt out of the system. Migrants from 
areas adjacent to the lake were particularly effective in using remittances to set 
themselves up in small business in the fishing industry.
In 1972, then-President Banda ordered the return of all Malawi’s migrant 
miners from South Africa. Within a year, all had returned home. The option 
of using migration as a form of rural development was removed at a stroke. 
However, most returnees were absorbed into the commercial farming sector.
By the late 1970s, 15,000-20,000 Malawians were back on the mines. 
Then, in 1987, Banda ordered them to return when South Africa insisted on 
compulsory HIV/AIDS testing for all recruits. Mine migrancy therefore plays no 
role in contemporary Malawi, although the government has appealed to the 
South African mining industry on several occasions to take migrants back.
The majority of current migration out of the country for work is clandestine. 
The numbers are unknown but certainly do not compare with those from 
Mozambique. Even less is known, therefore, about remittance transfers and the 
potential role of remittances as a development resource in the country.
The other significant change for Malawi in the last decade has been the 
repatriation of several hundred thousand migrants from the south of the coun-
try to Mozambique. In March 1993, the Mozambican refugee population in 
Malawi was recorded at 1,057,314. This was about 10-12 per cent of the 
country’s de jure population. In at least one district, Nsanje, at the southern 
end of the country, the refugee population was larger than the local popula-
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tion. Repatriation has certainly reduced the pressure on local communities and 
resources in the areas around the resettlement camps. 
With little more than 10 per cent of Malawi’s estimated 10.5 million people 
living in urban areas, the country is still predominantly rural. The largest urban 
centres in the country are Blantyre (including Limbe) and Zomba in the south, 
Lilongwe in the centre and Mzuzu in the north, which accommodate approxi-
mately 75 per cent of the national urban population. However, with high natu-
ral growth rates and increasing rural-urban migration, levels of urbanisation 
are rising in Malawi. 
..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Studies show that the transfer of cash incomes from urban workers to their 
rural homes is significant in Malawi, either in the form of investments or as 
family support. The 1998 Integrated Household Survey found that 13 per 
cent of rural households’ cash income was from wage work. Migrants within 
Malawi, and beyond the country’s borders, behave like typical ‘target workers’, 
earning cash incomes in towns and repatriating these and investing them in 
micro-enterprises in the rural villages. Urban wage incomes thus bolster rural 
economic enterprises. Another common way is through the purchase of farm 
inputs, including fertilisers and seeds. Almost every rural household in Malawi 
depends on family members working in towns for its farm inputs. Through this 
practice the urban workers are in turn able to maintain ties with their rural 
places of origin.
A recent study observed that rural dependence on off-farm income (from 
urban areas) and from out-migration in general has a number of implications 
for rural socio-economic structures. These include the relief of pressure on land, 
increased influx of money into the rural economy, investments in agricultural 
production and small-scale enterprises, investments in rural transportation 
(mini-buses, trucks and push bikes) and hence ease of access to commodity 
markets, and improvements in rural housing. 
Another very important linkage, but particularly difficult to quantify, is trade 
between the rural and urban areas. The dependence on off-farm incomes for 
the majority of the rural households results in the emergence of a wide range of 
commercial activities between rural and urban communities. There are a large 
number of rotating markets that facilitate the circulation of goods and cash. A 
common feature at these markets is the itinerant traders that operate across 
district, regional, and, in some cases, international borders. 
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Many of the goods traded are thus brought in from outside the areas of the 
markets – often from towns and beyond political boundaries, with the latter 
being especially important in border districts. The existence of long, open, and 
poorly policed borders between Malawi and its immediate neighbours facili-
tates the unhindered movement of traders and their goods.
..	Migration	Policy
Malawian immigration policy is similar to that of other countries in its focus on 
enforcement rather than proactive recruitment of immigrants. 
The country is still dealing with the Banda legacy of enforced cessation of 
legal migration to South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Mine migrancy is no 
longer a strategy for household income-generation, although the South Africa-
Malawi bilateral agreement has never been officially rescinded.
Most Malawian migrants now leave the country as undocumented migrants 
with all of the difficulties and vulnerabilities associated with that status. 
Malawi would clearly benefit from the freeing up of movement within the SADC 
region.
Malawi’s PRSP has been widely praised for its relevance and comprehensive 
character. Like many other PRSPs it does, at least, acknowledge the impor-
tance of migrant remittances to rural poverty reduction. However, the issue 
is largely forgotten when it comes to policy recommendations. As in other 
countries, migration realities need to be mainstreamed into government policy 
reduction policies.
.	Mozambique
..1	Introduction
Migration is one of the mainstays of the Mozambican economy and plays 
a critical role in securing a livelihood for tens of thousands of Mozambican 
households. Migration has recently been described as the ‘lifeblood’ of south-
ern Mozambique. An estimated 500,000 Mozambican migrants work outside 
the country, more than in any domestic sector of the Mozambican economy. 
Approximately 80,000 of these migrants are legally employed in the South 
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African mining industry; the rest work in commercial agriculture, manufactur-
ing, the services industry and in the informal sector. Mozambicans also cross 
borders to work in Zimbabwe and Swaziland.
Since 1990, and the end of apartheid and Mozambique’s civil war, estab-
lished patterns of cross-border and internal migration have intensified and 
altered in various ways. Mozambique, for example, is now the single largest 
supplier of mine labour to South Africa. Annual remittances through formal 
channels total US $32 million. Informal remittances and remittances ‘in kind’ 
mean that the ‘value package’ is a major contributor to Mozambican liveli-
hoods and the country’s foreign exchange earnings. 
Another increasingly important form of mobility between South Africa and 
its neighbours is informal cross-border trade. Women are perhaps the primary 
participants and beneficiaries of such movement. The dimensions of trade 
are unknown because much of it is currently ‘clandestine’ in the sense that 
there are no formal structures for monitoring trade and many overt and hidden 
obstacles for the trader. Nevertheless, cross-border trade is becoming a major 
income-generating strategy for urban and rural households, particularly those 
with female heads. As the SADC region moves towards free trade by 2008, 
the obstacles to informal trade should be systematically reduced. Informal 
trade will then become an even greater opportunity for income generation, 
sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction. Women would be the greatest 
beneficiaries. 
One of the major features of post-war Mozambican migration to South 
Africa is its irregular or undocumented nature. The scale of undocumented 
migration is a function of the pull of the South African labour market for many 
Mozambicans. Migrants are vulnerable and exploited and enjoy few of the 
protections and rights of legal workers. Along with persistent violation of basic 
rights, migrants are seen as ‘job-stealers’, criminals and disease-carriers and 
become the objects of xenophobia. 
Another factor affecting the extent to which Mozambique benefits from 
migration is the degree of permanence of migration. The repatriation of over 
300,000 displaced Mozambicans in South Africa during the war did not take 
place as planned when they were offered permanent residence rights. Over 
200,000 former refugees accepted this offer and have been integrated to vary-
ing degrees into South African communities. The extent to which these former 
refugees maintain contacts with home is uncertain. 
A new phenomenon observed more recently is when Mozambican migrants 
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maintain a household and dependents in South Africa and Mozambique simul-
taneously. This has considerable implications for Mozambican households 
dependent on migrant earnings. One counter-strategy has been for wives to 
move to South Africa to be with their spouses and reduce the likelihood of 
transnational households emerging. Clearly permanent emigration to South 
Africa is counterproductive for Mozambique. At the same time, to the extent 
that emigrants have incentives and avenues for maintaining contact, some of 
the benefits will still flow back across the border.
..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
Out-migration is clearly of great significance to the poor of Mozambique, both 
urban and rural. Any country that sends 500,000 migrants abroad every year 
is going to be heavily impacted by its ability to maximise the fruits of migra-
tion. Fortunately for Mozambique, the evidence suggests that most migrants 
see Mozambique as home and migrate in order to build wealth and security 
in Mozambique.
Clearly, migration throws up major developmental, policy and capacity-build-
ing challenges for a country such as Mozambique seeking to reduce poverty 
and inequality. At present, the influence of cross-border migration on economic 
and social development for Mozambique is poorly understood and definitely 
underestimated. Mozambique’s CDPF is virtually silent on an issue that affects 
the lives and livelihoods of so many poor Mozambicans.
Through remittances especially, migration has the potential to contribute 
positively to economic development while the continued outflow of labour 
unskilled and skilled simultaneously can also destabilise this process. The 
lack of up-to-date information on migration and continued implementation of 
outdated immigration legislation pose additional barriers. 
Out-migration is clearly geographically differentiated in Mozambique with 
the south of the country heavily integrated into regional migration streams, 
and the centre and north hardly at all. Recent work by de Vletter demonstrates 
that in relative terms, it is the south of the country that is much better off. The 
connection between migration and poverty alleviation seems to be relatively 
clear.
Informal trade with South Africa and Zimbabwe is another key area with 
implications for the poor, especially women. By freeing up informal trade with 
neighbouring countries, small-scale entrepreneurship (currently mired in red 
tape) would be able to grow and flourish.
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..	Migration	Policies
Contract migration to South Africa is governed by a bilateral agreement signed 
between South Africa and the Portuguese as long ago as 1964. The new 
South African Immigration Act threatens to impose a levy on all Mozambicans 
employed legally in South Africa. The two governments are currently discuss-
ing an exemption for Mozambicans. In fact, the whole agreement needs to be 
reviewed and revised, so outdated are most of its provisions.
Mozambique has a vested interest in maximising the flow of migrants to the 
South African mines. Mozambique has been the only country to increase its 
market share over the last decade. The reasons have more to do with mine 
politics than national policy, particularly the lack of militancy of Mozambican 
workers.
The whole remittance system to Mozambique needs further study and 
encouragement. One contentious policy area is that of deferred pay. 
Mozambican miners are forced to compulsorily defer up to 60 per cent of their 
pay. This policy is opposed by miners. However, SAMP research shows that it 
Box 18: Maintaining mine labour from Mozambique
Mozambique	has	supplied	migrant	contract	workers	to	the	South	African	
gold	mines	 for	over	a	century.	Mozambican	society,	particularly	 in	 the	
South,	has	been	profoundly	shaped	by	generations	of	migration.	Since	
the	 late	 10s,	 the	 South	 African	 gold	 mining	 industry	 has	 been	 in	 a	
prolonged	 state	 of	 crisis	with	mine	 closures	 and	major	 retrenchments.	
The	mine	workforce	has	been	cut	 in	half	 since	1	 from	over	00,000	
to	under	00,000.	Every	internal	and	external	migrant	sending	area	has	
been	 extremely	 hard	 hit	 by	 retrenchments	 which	 have	 exacerbated	
household	poverty	and	raised	unemployment	levels.	All,	that	is,	except	
Mozambique.	The	number	of	miners	from	Mozambique	has	remained	vir-
tually	the	same	for	the	last	two	decades.	The	proportion	of	Mozambican	
migrants	in	the	mine	workforce	increased	from	10	per	cent	to	over		per	
cent.	The	mines	retain	control	over	where	they	get	their	labour	so	this	is	
a	deliberate	choice	on	their	part.	Why	this	 loyalty	 to	 the	Mozambican	
miner?	 Some	 say	 that	 it	 is	because	Mozambican	workers	are	 less	mili-
tant,	more	compliant	and	accepting	of	poorer	working	conditions.	The	
reasons	for	that	lie	not	in	any	cultural	predisposition	to	complacency	but	
the	vulnerability	of	workers	from	poverty-stricken	areas	with	little	choice.	
They	would	rather	work	on	the	mines	than	not	work	at	all.	
Source: Crush and Tshitereke (2002); see endnote 289.
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is favoured by miners’ dependents. In other words, while deferred pay appears 
to violate the rights of the miner it does bring benefit to households who have 
a greater chance of accessing it.
Detailed and up-to-date data on migrants and immigrants would allow 
Mozambique to deal more effectively with the challenge of integrating migra-
tion into poverty reduction strategies. It would also allow the country to estab-
lish new national approaches and policies on migration that can play a larger 
part in pro-poor growth and social development.
By producing a comprehensive, reliable knowledge base on migration and 
local capacity to manage and advise on migration challenges, flows of peo-
ple and remittances could be channelled more effectively towards productive 
investment and sustained economic growth. 
The South African deportation system is riddled with abuse and corruption 
and is increasingly recognised as completely ineffectual. Trafficking of migrants 
and women and children for sexual exploitation is also on the increase, further 
victimising the vulnerable migrant. Both governments will need to eventually 
come to terms with the inevitability of Mozambican migration and transform 
its management into an orderly and workable system as part of a joint com-
mitment to the good governance of migration. Mozambique needs to develop 
greater capacity to advocate for the rights of migrants, develop workable mod-
els of migration regulation and to effectively manage the movement of people 
across borders in the interests of migrants. Only then will the material benefits 
of migration accrue to Mozambique rather than the South African police and 
border guards involved in the corruption industry.
Mozambique, like all of the countries in Southern Africa, is currently being 
ravaged by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The epidemic will exact a major toll on 
the national economy as well as the livelihoods of individual households and 
communities through its impact on rural agricultural production. The particu-
lar intersection of migration and HIV/AIDS is being increasingly recognised by 
governments. Migration plays a major role in the dissemination of the virus to 
rural areas in Mozambique. Migrants have also been shown to be particularly 
vulnerable to infection. Conventional interventions to prevent infection and 
control the spread of HIV/AIDS are generally ineffectual amongst migrants 
and in migrant communities. Information on migration patterns and sexual 
networking could play a significant role in the development of workable inter-
ventions and thereby contain the spread of the disease. 
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.	Zambia
..1	Introduction
Zambia’s national migration regime is distinctive from that of the other coun-
tries reviewed in this volume. Historically, Zambia received migrants from 
Malawi and Congo to work on the country’s copper mines. The mine workforce 
was stabilised and internalised several decades ago.
Zambia is neither a country of significant out-migration nor in-migration 
of the poor. Foreign migrants comprised only 1 per cent of the population in 
2000 (down from 4 per cent in 1980). In absolute terms, there were 328,188 
foreign-born people in Zambia in 1969. This number had fallen to 92,504 in 
2000.
The country has experienced a brain drain of professionals over the last 
decade, but this has not been as voluminous or serious in its consequences as 
that from Zimbabwe or South Africa. Systematic information on the extent of 
the brain drain is unavailable. As an example, one study estimates that only 
50 of 600 doctors trained in Zambia since independence remain in the public 
health service.316 
Cross-border trading is the primary income generating form of migration 
for Zambia’s poor. The country has an extremely active Cross Border Traders’ 
Association that advocates for reforms and advances the interests of its mem-
bers with national governments and regional bodies such as COMESA.
Internal migration is the primary form of migration affecting the poor in 
Zambia. The country is one of the most urbanised states in the region with a 
significant permanent urban population. Census data shows that the propor-
tion of the population defined as migrant declined from 22 per cent in 1980 
to 18 per cent in 2000. The number of people captured as migrants increased 
from 1.18 million in 1969 to 1.68 million in 2000. Rural-urban links are 
weaker in Zambia than in any other country, with the possible exception of 
South Africa. 
During the 1990s, Zambia experienced a mass influx of refugees from the 
civil war in Angola. Estimates are in the 250,000-300,000 range. Refugee 
camps were established and there was limited integration of refugees into 
mainstream Zambian society. With the end of the civil war, voluntary repatria-
tion is currently under way.
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..	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
In the past, urban-rural links were strong in Zambia and migration played a 
major role in rural household strategies for survival. Divided households are 
still common but it is extremely difficult for poor urban dwellers to access the 
resources and remittances to support rural families.
One study of southern Zambia suggested that the primary determinant of 
out-migration was lack of access to land and productive resources. On the 
other hand, with the harsh economic conditions in Zambian cities, regular 
‘remittances’ do not exist. In fact, sending gifts or assistance to family back in 
the village is almost non existent’.317
One consequence of urban poverty and unemployment has been a process 
of de-urbanization with unemployed urban dwellers re-migrating back to the 
countryside on a permanent basis to support themselves on the land. Urban 
Zambia experienced net out-migration between 1990 and 2000, and rural 
Zambia net in-migration. The Copperbelt districts experienced the highest rates 
of outmigration (137 per thousand). The questions raised by this tendency 
need further examination, since they may prefigure a broader regional trend.
..	Migration	Policies
Like other countries in the region, Zambia does not have a proactive immigra-
tion policy. The foreign-born population of the country has actually declined 
significantly over the last three decades. The thrust of policy focuses on exclu-
sion and control. 
Zambia’s unique internal and external migration history requires further 
study. The fact that Zambia is one of the most urbanised countries in the region 
has made the challenge of urban poverty reduction particularly important. This 
fact is well-recognised in the country’s PRSP.
The PRSP dubiously asserts that the urban and rural populations are discon-
nected and that there is no significant pattern of remittances back to the rural 
areas. This issue needs further examination. So too does the question of de-
urbanization and its implications for poverty in both urban and rural Zambia.
The particular needs of cross-border traders, vis-à-vis restrictive cross-border 
travel to neighbouring countries needs to be addressed, given Zambia’s role in 
both COMESA and the SADC.
As in other countries, migration is not factored into the country’s PRSP. In 
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the Zambian case, unlike elsewhere, it might be argued that this omission is 
justified in light of the relative unimportance of migration as a poverty response 
and alleviator. However, the government’s policy still needs to be re-examined 
to ensure that it is not overlooking hidden potentials and impacts of migration, 
particularly de-urbanization.
.10	Zimbabwe
.10.1	Introduction
Zimbabwe is in the unusual historical position of being both a labour importer, 
exporter and corridor, the precise balance of roles varying over time. During the 
colonial period, Zimbabwe’s mines and commercial farms attracted migrants 
from countries such as Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. South Africa, in 
turn, attracted unskilled and semi-skilled Zimbabweans to its own farms and 
mines. 
The 1992 Census showed that of the 10.4 million people in the country, 
453,405 (4.4 per cent) were born outside Zimbabwe including 165,000 
Mozambicans, 38,000 Malawians and 10,000 Zambians. The 2002 Census 
indicates a significant decline in the number of Mozambicans (returning home 
after the war). 
Since independence, Zimbabwe has experienced a number of shifts in tradi-
tional migration patterns. Some are the result of general social and economic 
change in the region. Others are a very direct result of Zimbabwe’s economic 
decline and political malaise. Notable are the following: 
• Zimbabwe is no longer a significant recipient of migrant labour except, 
perhaps, on the border with Mozambique.
• The Mugabe government’s land policy has left significant numbers of 
first- and second-generation migrant farmworkers without economic 
support. Indeed, it has been suggested that farmworkers on commercial 
farms have been the major victims of the policy.
• The volume of cross-border traffic between Zimbabwe and its neighbours 
has escalated dramatically over the last decade as job opportunities 
within the country have shrunk. In the main, these are moves of the poor 
and impoverished.
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• Migration prompted by the search for a livelihood has increased dra-
matically in the last five years. South Africa and Botswana have been 
the major destinations. Both have reacted by deporting undocumented 
migrants in growing numbers (about 90,000 per annum from South 
Africa at the present time).
• Informal trade between South Africa and Zimbabwe has mushroomed 
since 1994. This trade, in which women are significant players, has 
been studied in some depth. South Africa’s current restrictions on move-
ment from Zimbabwe are causing major difficulties for small traders. 
Zimbabwean women also trade extensively with countries to the north 
(Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania).
• Internal rural-urban migration increased dramatically after independ-
ence. The colonial pattern of circulation has increasingly been replaced 
by a more stable urban population. Many first-generation migrants retain 
strong links with the rural home but linkages are loosening with the sec-
ond generation. 
The most dramatic development of the last decade has been a massive 
bleed of skills from a once-vibrant economy. Zimbabwe’s brain drain has 
assumed crisis proportions and shows no signs of decelerating. One recent 
study notes the difficulty of obtaining brain drain statistics that are ‘accurate, 
reliable, comparable and detailed’.318 At the same time, a seemingly precise 
figure of 479,348 Zimbabweans has been advanced as the total number of 
Zimbabweans outside the country, including 176,400 in the UK, 165,375 in 
Botswana, 33,075 in the USA and 22,050 in South Africa. 
The source of these figures is unclear, as are the findings reported from a 
survey of diasporic Zimbabweans.319 A SAMP survey of a representative sam-
ple of skilled Zimbabweans in 2001 showed that the brain drain is likely to 
accelerate in the foreseeable future. There, 27 per cent of skilled respondents 
were committed to emigrating within 6 months, 55 per cent within 2 years 
and 67 per cent within 5 years. Conventional economic push factors were seen 
as most important: taxes, cost of living and public services. In the case of the 
health sector, the Ministry of Health does not have precise figures because 
departing health professionals are ‘not willing to announce their destinations’ 
and many who leave choose to keep their registration active’.320 
Statistics are anecdotal at best: for example, of 1,200 physicians trained 
in Zimbabwe in the 1990s, only 360 were left in 2001, or that Zambia has 
retained only 50 of more than 600 doctors trained since independence.321 
Clearly a far more detailed inventory is needed than currently exists. In 
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Zimbabwe, a new initiative to resettle and reintegrate diasporic Zimbabweans 
is underway. However, without a significant change in the circumstances that 
are forcing Zimbabweans to leave it is hard to see such an initiative having 
much short-term success, much less compensate for the ongoing brain drain.
Internal migration, and accompanying accelerated urbanization, has been a 
notable feature of Zimbabwe’s human landscape in the last two decades. This 
process has been studied in some detail, and the enduring character of rural-
urban migration established.322 Studies of remittance behaviour of migrants 
have broader implications for poverty reduction more generally. Work on remit-
tances had shown (a) that 25 per cent of rural household income comes from 
remittances; (b) that remittances play a significant role in raising agricultural 
productivity; (c) that households with access to remittances are more able to 
invest in agricultural inputs; (d) that the dependence of rural households on 
income coming from migrants is higher in the drier regions of the country and 
(e) that remittance flows have declined in the 1990s consequent upon growing 
urban unemployment.323 One study has suggested that rural households are 
now sending ‘reverse remittances’ to support urban households.
Box 19: The Zimbabwean diaspora
The	political	and	economic	crisis	 in	Zimbabwe	has	prompted	a	major	
exodus	 of	 skills	 to	 other	 countries	 in	 the	 region	and	overseas.	 The	UK	
and	South	Africa	have	been	major	beneficiaries	of	this	brain	drain.	The	
health	sector	has	been	particularly	hard-hit.	Unless	there	is	an	economic	
turnaround	in	the	country,	this	skills	flight	is	likely	to	continue,	making	life	
still	harder	for	those	who	remain.	Ironically,	the	Zimbabwean	economy	
is	 now	 increasingly	propped	up	by	 those	who	have	 left.	 Zimbabwe’s	
diaspora	 retains	a	keen	 interest	 in	 their	country	and	sends	 large	sums	
of	money	home	to	 relatives	who	 remain.	 The	government	has	 sought	
to	gain	greater	control	over	 the	 remittance	 flow	and	has	also	estab-
lished	a	programme	called	Homelink	which	is	designed	to	encourage	
diasporic	Zimbabweans	to	remit	through	formal	channels,	to	purchase	
property	 and	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 country.	 Homelink	 is	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	
Reserve	Bank	of	Zimbabwe	and	remains	deeply	controversial	within	the	
diaspora.
Source: www.homelinkzimbabwe.com
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.10.	Importance	of	Migration	to	the	Poor
In Zimbabwe’s current straitened circumstances, migration has become a key 
response of both the poor and the better-off. The large numbers of migrants 
now heading south are doing so in direct response to the situation in Zimbabwe 
and the perception of economic opportunity in South Africa and Botswana. The 
problem is that their reception has been frosty, to say the least. This is push-
ing migrants into low-wage jobs with few rights and protections. The case of 
commercial farms along the South Africa-Zimbabwe border has been studied. 
Conditions on the farms are particularly exploitative as farmers take advantage 
of the presence of Zimbabwean migrants.
As a result, the possible benefits of migration to Zimbabwe are not being 
maximised. Not only are migrants themselves being exploited but they are 
not in a position to remit the kinds of funds that their households desperately 
need.
The poor are also incidental victims of the brain drain. The brain drain has 
been particularly significant in the public health sector. Seriously short-staffed 
and under-resourced, the health sector is in crisis and simply unable to meet 
the basic health needs of the Zimbabwean population, a significant deteriora-
tion from the situation a decade ago when universal access to primary health 
care was Zimbabwe’s great post-independence achievement.
Internally, it is clear that households in drier and more marginal areas of the 
country are likely to be more dependent on remittances. Interruptions in the 
flow of remittances as a result of urban unemployment are therefore likely to 
lead to greater impoverishment in the poorer parts of the country.
At this time of economic stress, informal cross-border trading has assumed 
increased importance as a livelihoods strategy. Muzvidizwa shows that urban 
households in Masvingo have used trading as a successful strategy for climbing 
out of poverty.324 
.10.	Migration	Policies
Like most countries in SADC, Zimbabwe has not encouraged permanent immi-
gration since independence. Issues of immigration and citizenship are governed 
by three principal pieces of legislation: the Immigration Act, the Refugees Act 
and the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act. The Immigration Act empowers the 
Minister of Home Affairs to determine who may enter the country and under 
what conditions. Persons wishing to come to Zimbabwe for work are admit-
MIGRATION	AND	DEVELOPMENT	IN	AFRICA:	AN	OVERVIEW
|1|
ted only if prospective employers can demonstrate to the Foreign Recruitment 
Committee that the skills are unavailable locally. Temporary residence for peri-
ods of up to five years is generally all that is permitted.
Zimbabwe is probably the firmest supporter of the SADC Draft Migration 
Protocol. This is unsurprising. With burgeoning unemployment and an increas-
ingly important role as a migrant exporter, Zimbabwe would benefit consider-
ably from more open borders across the region.
The Zimbabwean government has expressed recurrent concern about the 
brain drain and has contemplated measures to discourage professionals from 
leaving. However, only fundamental attention to the structural conditions 
encouraging the skilled to leave would likely make any difference. The solution 
is to be found in political and economic reform, not ad hoc migration policy 
measures.
The fundamental policy challenge in Zimbabwe is to decipher whether 
the extraordinary migration movements out of the country in the last decade 
are a temporary aberration or prefigure a more permanent way of life for 
Zimbabweans. Levels of dissatisfaction are so high that barring fundamental 
economic and political reform, out-migration will continue and even accelerate. 
While this may have positive benefits for those left behind, in the form of remit-
tance flows primarily, the current situation is ultimately unsustainable.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that diasporic Zimbabweans maintain strong 
linkages with home and that most see emigration as a temporary phenomenon 
or response. A study by the National Economic Consultative Forum argued that 
the Zimbabwe diaspora was ‘unique’ in the strength of the ‘organic links’ with 
home of 480,000 professionals living overseas. Some 70 per cent of those 
interviewed expressed a ‘strong desire’ to return home. However, the longer 
that perceived conditions in the country continue to deteriorate, the more likely 
it is that they will become progressively more integrated into host societies. 
Certainly second-generation emigrants will be less and less inclined to return.
Patterns of out-migration and informal cross-border trade can be seen as a 
direct survival strategy by poor households. Migration in Zimbabwe, then, is a 
direct response to poverty. Whether migration, particularly of the clandestine 
kind, gives the participants and their dependents full value is probably doubt-
ful. In other words, migration is a poverty alleviation but not poverty reduction 
strategy.
The policy challenge that will face any future government is how to reverse 
the tide of out-migration and provide economic and other incentives for 
diasporic Zimbabweans to return or maintain strong linkages with home. 
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Appendix 1 Mean annual flows to Europe and US, 1995-2000 
To 
Europe 
(1)
USA (2) Total 
(Europe 
and USA)
Population (3) Av annual 
emigration 
rate 1995-
2000 %
East Africa
Somalia 5949 2744 8693 8,175,320 0.11
Ethiopia 2749 5081 7831 61,266,000 0.01
Kenya 2336 1632 3968 28,726,000 0.01
Eritrea 770 686 1457 3,879,000 0.04
Tanzania 759 435 1194 32,128,480 0.00
Uganda 710 372 1082 21,040,000 0.01
Rwanda 744 92 836 7,284,000 0.01
Burundi 326 36 362 6,548,190 0.01
Djibouti 42 16 59 608,150 0.01
Total East Africa 14385 11095 25481 169,655,140 0.02
Central Africa
Congo, Dem Rep 4175 262 4437 48,178,170 0.01
Cameroon 2120 765 2885 14,238,860 0.02
Congo, Rep 1067 94 1161 2,850,060 0.04
Equatorial 
Guinea
538 3 541 433,060 0.12
Sao Tome 233 5 238 141,700 0.17
Gabon 117 18 136 1,167,290 0.01
CAR 93 9 102 3,603,400 0.00
Chad 56 16 72 7,282,870 0.00
Total Central 
Africa
8400 1171 9571 77,895,410 0.01
West Africa
Nigeria 7204 7736 14940 120,817,300 0.01
Ghana 5840 4563 10403 18,449,370 0.06
Senegal 4894 480 5374 9,033,530 0.06
Cape Verde 2514 951 3465 412,240 0.84
Sudan 1386 1650 3036 29,978,890 0.01
Liberia 981 1817 2798 2,961,520 0.09
Cote d’Ivoire 2046 377 2423 15,159,110 0.02
Sierra Leone 910 1374 2284 4,830,480 0.05
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Togo 1155 225 1380 4,258,140 0.03
Mali 1258 97 1354 10,333,640 0.01
Gambia, The 1008 196 1204 1,223,810 0.10
Guinea 965 98 1063 7,086,120 0.01
Guinea-Bissau 884 89 973 1,149,330 0.08
Mauritania 583 48 631 2,493,120 0.03
Burkina Faso 528 21 549 10,730,330 0.01
Niger 180 212 392 10,125,740 0.00
Benin 306 46 353 5,950,330 0.01
Western Sahara 1 1 2 - -
Total West Africa 32642 19980 52622 254,993,000 0.02
Southern Africa
South Africa 10825 2323 13148 41,402,390 0.03
Mauritius 2700 54 2754 1,159,730 0.24
Angola 2056 82 2138 12,401,580 0.02
Zimbabwe 1653 275 1928 12,153,850 0.02
Zambia 584 213 796 9,665,710 0.01
Namibia 607 26 633 1,681,820 0.04
Madagascar 584 37 621 14,592,380 0.00
Malawi 514 55 569 9,884,000 0.01
Comoros 290 2 291 530,820 0.05
Mozambique 221 45 266 16,965,000 0.00
Botswana 208 14 222 1,614,190 0.01
Seychelles 52 14 66 78,850 0.08
Swaziland 18 13 31 990,530 0.00
Lesotho 15 8 22 1,978,090 0.00
Others 59 - - - -
Total Southern 
Africa
20385 3158 23484 125,098,940 0.02
Africa - Others 8413 - - - -
Total Africa 84226 35404 111157 627,642,490 0.02
Notes: (1) Immigration of Africa citizens to European countries, by citizenship, 1995-2001, Copyright 
Eurostat. All Rights Reserved. 
(2) US immigrants admitted by region and country of birth fiscal years 1995-2001, 2002 Year Book of 
Immigration Statistics, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics 2003. 
(3) Population Estimate 1998, World Development Indicators Data Query Service: http://devdata.world-
bank.org/data-query/
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Appendix 2: Availability of data on internal migration
Countries Last census Next census Census 
includes 
internal 
migration 
data?
Internal migration 
survey
East Africa
Somalia 1987 2003 No No
Ethiopia 1994 2004 Yes 1999 Labour Force 
Survey
Kenya 1999 2009 Yes No
Eritrea 1984 2003 Yes No
Tanzania 2002 No No
Uganda 2002 Yes No
Rwanda 2002 Yes No
Burundi 1990 No No
Djibouti 1983 2003 Yes No
Central Africa
Congo, DR
Cameroon 1987 2003 Yes No
Congo, Rep.
Eq. Guinea 1994 No No
Sao Tome 2001 No No
Gabon 1993 2003 Yes No
CAR 1988 2003 Yes No
Chad 1993 2003 Yes No
West Africa
Nigeria 1991 2004 No Survey of internal 
migration and tourism
Ghana 2000 2010 Yes Migration Research 
Study in Ghana 
(1995)
Senegal 2002 2009 Yes No
Cape Verde 2000 2010 Yes No
Sudan 1993 2003 Yes No
Liberia 1984 2003 Yes No
Cote d’Ivoire
Sierra Leone 1985 2003 Yes No
Togo 1981 Yes No
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Mali 1998 2008 Yes No
Gambia, The 1993 2003 Yes No
Guinea 1996 Yes No
Guinea-Bissau 1991 No No
Mauritania 2000 Yes No
Burkina Faso 1996 2006 Yes No
Niger 2001 Yes Survey of migration 
and urbanisation 
(1993)
Benin 2002 Yes No
Western Sahara
Southern Africa
South Africa 2001 2006 Yes University of Pretoria 
Project on Internal 
Migration
Mauritius 2000 2010 Yes No
Angola 1970 2004 No No
Zimbabwe 2002 Yes No
Zambia 2000 2010 Yes No
Namibia 2001 2011 Yes Intercensal demo-
graphic survey
Madagascar 1993 2003 Yes No
Malawi 1998 2008 No No
Comoros 1991 No No
Mozambique 1997 Yes No
Botswana 2001 2011 Yes No
Seychelles 2002 Yes No
Swaziland 1997 2007 Yes Demographic and 
Housing Survey
Lesotho 2001 2005 Yes No
Source: Data compiled from website of Queensland Centre for Population 
Research, http://www.geosp.uq.edu.au/qcpr/database/IMdata/Imdata.htm
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Appendix 3: Summary of PRSP comments on migration
Country Negative Neutral Positive Policy
Benin Emigration of 
children causes  
poverty
Movement 
from land 
scarce areas 
to land avail-
able areas
None
Burkina 
Faso
• Development 
inequalities cause 
migration 
• Internal and 
external migra-
tion exacerbate 
HIV/AIDS
• Incentives to pre-
vent young people 
abandoning their 
land 
• Narrow develop-
ment gaps between 
regions
Burundi Displaced people 
depend on charity
Socio-economic 
reintegration of dis-
placed prioritised
Cameroon • ICTs to prevent 
rural outmigration 
• Train and recruit 
teachers to prevent 
migration to foreign 
universities 
• Limit outmigra-
tion by promoting 
income generating 
activities in rural 
areas
Cape 
Verde
• Restrictive 
measures in host 
countries have 
cut remittances 
• Rural-urban 
migration trans-
fers problems to 
urban environ-
ment
• Emigration 
a social 
buffer 
• Emigration 
a survival 
strategy
• Promote remit-
tances 
• Engage emigrants 
in implementing 
national develop-
ment strategy 
• Develop ethnic 
markets abroad
DR Congo Mass displace-
ment a problem
Reunite families and 
relocate displaced 
communities
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Côte 
d’Ivoire
• Domestic and 
foreign migra-
tion impoverishes 
the vulnerable 
• Immigration 
linked to soaring 
crime
Djibouti Urban migra-
tion caused by 
drought
Need study of 
effects of  
immigration
Ethiopia Spontaneous 
migration causes 
NR degradation
Planned 
resettlement 
from high-
land to low-
land can be 
beneficial
Gambia • Immigration 
leads to high 
population 
growth rates 
• Rural areas left 
underpopulated 
• New problems 
in urban areas 
• Economic 
downturn has 
reduced oppor-
tunities in urban 
areas without 
promoting return
Seasonal 
return during 
rainy months
Ghana Migration from 
north caused by 
poverty
Guinea Urban problems 
exacerbated by 
‘urban drift’
Aim to improve 
mobility through 
improved road  
network
Kenya Migration breaks 
down traditional 
social protection
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Malawi • Poverty of 
south partly 
caused by  
migration 
• Illegal immigra-
tion causes crime 
and undermines 
integrity of pass-
ports 
• Migration 
breaks down 
male-female rela-
tions 
• Male migration 
leaves illiterate 
women manag-
ing farms and 
families
Mali Emigration 
attenuates 
demographic 
growth
Mauritania • Drought and 
poor living con-
ditions cause 
migration of poor 
• Urbanization 
creates shanty 
towns, environ-
mental problems 
and pressure on 
services
Create viable jobs in 
urban areas
Mozam-
bique
• Urbanization 
low, but rural-
urban migration 
likely in future
Niger • Internal and 
external migra-
tion helps spread 
HIV/AIDS 
• Outmigration a 
cause of poverty
Migrant 
remittances 
an important 
source of 
household 
income
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Rwanda Distress migra-
tion in some 
areas due to 
drought
The ‘money 
rich’ migrate
• Seasonal 
migration 
of labour 
a ‘social 
mechanism’ 
• Loss of 
outmigration 
options has 
negatively 
affected 
poor house-
holds
Priority to  
resettlement of the 
displaced
São Tomé 
and 
Principe
Poverty causes 
migration to  
cities
Senegal Emigrants 
can revital-
ise economic 
activities in 
rural areas 
through 
investment, 
advice and 
identification 
of niches for 
rural  
products
• Outreach to 
migrants 
• Incentives for emi-
grants to invest in 
rural production
Sierra 
Leone
Internal displace-
ment disrupted 
agriculture, edu-
cation, spread 
crime and HIV/
AIDS
Focus on  
improving living 
standards of  
displaced and 
returnees
Source: PRSP and IPRSP documents for each country, searched March 2004. 
Note: The following countries did not mention migration in their PRSPs: CAR, Chad, 
Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
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